Personal Identity & Choice

Contact

espringer — 2007-12-11

Corrections, comments, or requests should be sent to <>.

TimelineMacro

espringer — 2007-12-11

{{{ // a hack to pretty up the timeline Date.prototype._formatString = Date.prototype.formatString; Date.prototype.formatString = function(template) { if(template == 'DD MMM YYYY') { var repr = this._formatString('YYYYMMDD'); var day = new Date(); if(repr == day._formatString('YYYYMMDD')) return 'Today'; day.setDate(day.getDate()-1); if(repr == day._formatString('YYYYMMDD')) return 'Yesterday'; for(var i=0; i<3; i++) { day.setDate(day.getDate()-1); if(repr == day._formatString('YYYYMMDD')) return config.messages.dates.days[this.getDay()]; } } return this._formatString(template); } }}}

SideBarOptions

espringer — 2007-12-11

<><><><>

welcome

espringer — 2007-12-11

|This interactive site allows students to share work and access resources connected to [[Wesleyan University's|http://www.wesleyan.edu/]] [[Personal Identity and Choice|PHIL 21 course description]] course, Philosophy 218 with [[Elise Springer]].| ! @@First:@@ Please ''log in'' with __username: namehandle __ & __password (three digits, as emailed to registered students)

textbooks

espringer — 2007-12-11

The following textbooks are available at ''Broad Street Books'': * Pereboom, ed., 1979 //Free Will// (Indianapolis: Hackett) Additional readings will be available in our [[course packets]].

participation

espringer — 2007-12-11

In a philosophy class, good ''participation'' consists mostly of fostering good discussion. If you've done the reading but still have confusions and concerns about the material, chances are that other students will also appreciate hearing your questions. For those who find it easy to speak up, participation also requires making sure that the conversational space feels open to quieter students.

proofread

espringer — 2007-12-11

Philosophical writing must take particular responsibility both for [[reasoning clearly|argument analysis vocabulary]] and for general clarity and correctness of expression. Writing correctly requires discipline, and sloppy writing easily takes hold as a bad habit. Please make sure that you are attentive in avoiding basic writing problems, such as: * misspelling and confusion of homonyms (their / there / they're; effect / affect; its / it's, etc.) * sloppy capitalization and abbreviation * sentence incompleteness, or failing to connect subject and predicate of sentence properly (as in the popular {{{"just because... doesn't mean..."}}} idiom) * dangling participles and other disconnected opening phrases (as in nonsequiturs like {{{"by writing a philosophy paper, the material becomes easier"}}}) Please consult with ~TAs and with basic writing manuals (such as the //Little, Brown Essential Handbook for Writers//) for pointers on these and other problems.

espringer

espringer — 2007-12-11

Elise Springer: I am an Assistant Professor of [[Philosophy|http:/www.wesleyan.edu/phil]] at [[Wesleyan University|http://www.wesleyan.edu]] (See also my [[main homepage|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/]], or email <>. ---- |I pursued a music major, with a focus on composition, when I was an undergraduate, and I became interested in philosophy too late to become a major. I changed course anyway and studied philosophy at the graduate level at the University of Connecticut, eventually specializing in ethics. Life paths can change!
I decided to offer a course on these themes after realizing how many people speak about their ''moral choices'' in terms of ''personal identity'' and commitments undertaken as a response to experience.| [img[espringer in office|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/images/espringerBWsm.jpg]]

SyllabusDetails

espringer — 2007-12-11

^^[[course description|PHIL 212 course description]]^^ ^^[[calendar]]^^ ^^[[assignments|assignment overview]]^^ ^^[[discussion teams]]^^ ^^[[reading strategies]]^^ ^^[[commentaries]]^^ ^^[[exams]]^^ ^^[[long essay]]^^

SubmitHelp

espringer — 2007-12-11

~~[[welcome]]~~ ~~[[sign-ups|scheduling commentaries]]~~ ~~[[submitting commentaries]]~~ ~~[[about tagging]]~~

ForEachTiddlerPlugin

espringer — 2007-12-11

/*** |''Name:''|ForEachTiddlerPlugin| |''Version:''|1.0.4 (2006-01-06)| |''Source:''|http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#ForEachTiddlerPlugin| |''Author:''|UdoBorkowski (ub [at] abego-software [dot] de)| |''Licence:''|[[BSD open source license]]| |''Macros:''|[[ForEachTiddlerMacro]] v1.0.4| |''TiddlyWiki:''|1.2.38+, 2.0| |''Browser:''|Firefox 1.0.4+; InternetExplorer 6.0| !Description Create customizable lists, tables etc. for your selections of tiddlers. Specify the tiddlers to include and their order through a powerful language. ''Syntax:'' |>|{{{<<}}}''forEachTiddler'' [''in'' //tiddlyWikiPath//] [''where'' //whereCondition//] [''sortBy'' //sortExpression// [''ascending'' //or// ''descending'']] [''script'' //scriptText//] [//action// [//actionParameters//]]{{{>>}}}| |//tiddlyWikiPath//|The filepath to the TiddlyWiki the macro should work on. When missing the current TiddlyWiki is used.| |//whereCondition//|(quoted) JavaScript boolean expression. May refer to the build-in variables {{{tiddler}}} and {{{context}}}.| |//sortExpression//|(quoted) JavaScript expression returning "comparable" objects (using '{{{<}}}','{{{>}}}','{{{==}}}'. May refer to the build-in variables {{{tiddler}}} and {{{context}}}.| |//scriptText//|(quoted) JavaScript text. Typically defines JavaScript functions that are called by the various JavaScript expressions (whereClause, sortClause, action arguments,...)| |//action//|The action that should be performed on every selected tiddler, in the given order. By default the actions [[addToList|AddToListAction]] and [[write|WriteAction]] are supported. When no action is specified [[addToList|AddToListAction]] is used.| |//actionParameters//|(action specific) parameters the action may refer while processing the tiddlers (see action descriptions for details). <>| |>|~~Syntax formatting: Keywords in ''bold'', optional parts in [...]. 'or' means that exactly one of the two alternatives must exist.~~| See details see [[ForEachTiddlerMacro]] and [[ForEachTiddlerExamples]]. !Revision history * v1.0.4 (2006-01-06) ** Support TiddlyWiki 2.0 * v1.0.3 (2005-12-22) ** Features: *** Write output to a file supports multi-byte environments (Thanks to Bram Chen) *** Provide API to access the forEachTiddler functionality directly through JavaScript (see getTiddlers and performMacro) ** Enhancements: *** Improved error messages on InternetExplorer. * v1.0.2 (2005-12-10) ** Features: *** context object also holds reference to store (TiddlyWiki) ** Fixed Bugs: *** ForEachTiddler 1.0.1 has broken support on win32 Opera 8.51 (Thanks to BrunoSabin for reporting) * v1.0.1 (2005-12-08) ** Features: *** Access tiddlers stored in separated TiddlyWikis through the "in" option. I.e. you are no longer limited to only work on the "current TiddlyWiki". *** Write output to an external file using the "toFile" option of the "write" action. With this option you may write your customized tiddler exports. *** Use the "script" section to define "helper" JavaScript functions etc. to be used in the various JavaScript expressions (whereClause, sortClause, action arguments,...). *** Access and store context information for the current forEachTiddler invocation (through the build-in "context" object) . *** Improved script evaluation (for where/sort clause and write scripts). * v1.0.0 (2005-11-20) ** initial version !Code ***/ //{{{ //============================================================================ //============================================================================ // ForEachTiddlerPlugin //============================================================================ //============================================================================ version.extensions.ForEachTiddlerPlugin = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 4, date: new Date(2006,1,6), source: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de/#ForEachTiddlergPlugin"}; // For backward compatibility with TW 1.2.x // if (!TiddlyWiki.prototype.forEachTiddler) { TiddlyWiki.prototype.forEachTiddler = function(callback) { for(var t in this.tiddlers) { callback.call(this,t,this.tiddlers[t]); }; } } //============================================================================ // forEachTiddler Macro //============================================================================ version.extensions.forEachTiddler = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 4, date: new Date(2006,1,6), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Configurations and constants // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- config.macros.forEachTiddler = { // Standard Properties label: "forEachTiddler", prompt: "Perform actions on a (sorted) selection of tiddlers", // actions actions: { addToList: {}, write: {} } } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // The forEachTiddler Macro Handler // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- config.macros.forEachTiddler.handler = function(place,macroName,params) { // config.macros.forEachTiddler.traceMacroCall(place,macroName,params); // --- Parsing ------------------------------------------ var i = 0; // index running over the params // Parse the "in" clause var tiddlyWikiPath = undefined; if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "in") { i++; if (i >= params.length) { this.handleError(place, "TiddlyWiki path expected behind 'in'."); return; } tiddlyWikiPath = this.paramEncode((i < params.length) ? params[i] : ""); i++; } // Parse the where clause var whereClause ="true"; if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "where") { i++; whereClause = this.paramEncode((i < params.length) ? params[i] : ""); i++; } // Parse the sort stuff var sortClause = null; var sortAscending = true; if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "sortBy") { i++; if (i >= params.length) { this.handleError(place, "sortClause missing behind 'sortBy'."); return; } sortClause = this.paramEncode(params[i]); i++; if ((i < params.length) && (params[i] == "ascending" || params[i] == "descending")) { sortAscending = params[i] == "ascending"; i++; } } // Parse the script var scriptText = null; if ((i < params.length) && params[i] == "script") { i++; scriptText = this.paramEncode((i < params.length) ? params[i] : ""); i++; } // Parse the action. // When we are already at the end use the default action var actionName = "addToList"; if (i < params.length) { if (!config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions[params[i]]) { this.handleError(place, "Unknown action '"+params[i]+"'."); return; } else { actionName = params[i]; i++; } } // Get the action parameter // (the parsing is done inside the individual action implementation.) var actionParameter = params.slice(i); // --- Processing ------------------------------------------ try { this.performMacro({ place: place, whereClause: whereClause, sortClause: sortClause, sortAscending: sortAscending, actionName: actionName, actionParameter: actionParameter, scriptText: scriptText, tiddlyWikiPath: tiddlyWikiPath}); } catch (e) { this.handleError(place, e); } } // Returns an object with properties "tiddlers" and "context". // tiddlers holds the (sorted) tiddlers selected by the parameter, // context the context of the execution of the macro. // // The action is not yet performed. // // @parameter see performMacro // config.macros.forEachTiddler.getTiddlersAndContext = function(parameter) { var context = config.macros.forEachTiddler.createContext(parameter.place, parameter.whereClause, parameter.sortClause, parameter.sortAscending, parameter.actionName, parameter.actionParameter, parameter.scriptText, parameter.tiddlyWikiPath); var tiddlyWiki = parameter.tiddlyWikiPath ? this.loadTiddlyWiki(parameter.tiddlyWikiPath) : store; context["tiddlyWiki"] = tiddlyWiki; // Get the tiddlers, as defined by the whereClause var tiddlers = this.findTiddlers(parameter.whereClause, context, tiddlyWiki); context["tiddlers"] = tiddlers; // Sort the tiddlers, when sorting is required. if (parameter.sortClause) { this.sortTiddlers(tiddlers, parameter.sortClause, parameter.sortAscending, context); } return {tiddlers: tiddlers, context: context}; } // Returns the (sorted) tiddlers selected by the parameter. // // The action is not yet performed. // // @parameter see performMacro // config.macros.forEachTiddler.getTiddlers = function(parameter) { return this.getTiddlersAndContext(parameter).tiddlers; } // Performs the macros with the given parameter. // // @param parameter holds the parameter of the macro as separate properties. // The following properties are supported: // // place // whereClause // sortClause // sortAscending // actionName // actionParameter // scriptText // tiddlyWikiPath // // All properties are optional. // For most actions the place property must be defined. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.performMacro = function(parameter) { var tiddlersAndContext = this.getTiddlersAndContext(parameter); // Perform the action var actionName = parameter.actionName ? parameter.actionName : "addToList"; var action = config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions[actionName]; if (!action) { this.handleError(parameter.place, "Unknown action '"+actionName+"'."); return; } var actionHandler = action.handler; actionHandler(parameter.place, tiddlersAndContext.tiddlers, parameter.actionParameter, tiddlersAndContext.context); } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // The actions // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Internal. // // --- The addToList Action ----------------------------------------------- // config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions.addToList.handler = function(place, tiddlers, parameter, context) { // Parse the parameter var p = 0; // Check for extra parameters if (parameter.length > p) { config.macros.forEachTiddler.createExtraParameterErrorElement(place, "addToList", parameter, p); return; } // Perform the action. var list = document.createElement("ul"); place.appendChild(list); for (var i = 0; i < tiddlers.length; i++) { var tiddler = tiddlers[i]; var listItem = document.createElement("li") list.appendChild(listItem); createTiddlyLink(listItem, tiddler.title, true); } } // Internal. // // --- The write Action --------------------------------------------------- // config.macros.forEachTiddler.actions.write.handler = function(place, tiddlers, parameter, context) { // Parse the parameter var p = 0; if (p >= parameter.length) { this.handleError(place, "Missing expression behind 'write'."); return; } var textExpression = config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[p]); p++; // Parse the "toFile" option var filename = null; var lineSeparator = undefined; if ((p < parameter.length) && parameter[p] == "toFile") { p++; if (p >= parameter.length) { this.handleError(place, "Filename expected behind 'toFile' of 'write' action."); return; } filename = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getLocalPath(config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[p])); p++; if ((p < parameter.length) && parameter[p] == "withLineSeparator") { p++; if (p >= parameter.length) { this.handleError(place, "Line separator text expected behind 'withLineSeparator' of 'write' action."); return; } lineSeparator = config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode(parameter[p]); p++; } } // Check for extra parameters if (parameter.length > p) { config.macros.forEachTiddler.createExtraParameterErrorElement(place, "write", parameter, p); return; } // Perform the action. var func = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(textExpression, context); var count = tiddlers.length; var text = ""; for (var i = 0; i < count; i++) { var tiddler = tiddlers[i]; text += func(tiddler, context, count, i); } if (filename) { if (lineSeparator != undefined) { lineSeparator = lineSeparator.replace(/\\n/mg, "\n").replace(/\\r/mg, "\r"); text = text.replace(/\n/mg,lineSeparator); } saveFile(filename, convertUnicodeToUTF8(text)); } else { var wrapper = createTiddlyElement(place, "span"); wikify(text, wrapper); } } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Helpers // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.createContext = function(placeParam, whereClauseParam, sortClauseParam, sortAscendingParam, actionNameParam, actionParameterParam, scriptText, tiddlyWikiPathParam) { return { place : placeParam, whereClause : whereClauseParam, sortClause : sortClauseParam, sortAscending : sortAscendingParam, script : scriptText, actionName : actionNameParam, actionParameter : actionParameterParam, tiddlyWikiPath : tiddlyWikiPathParam } } // Internal. // // Returns a TiddlyWiki with the tiddlers loaded from the TiddlyWiki of // the given path. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.loadTiddlyWiki = function(path, idPrefix) { if (!idPrefix) { idPrefix = "store"; } // Read the content of the given file var content = loadFile(this.getLocalPath(path)); if(content == null) { throw "TiddlyWiki '"+path+"' not found."; } // Locate the storeArea div's var posOpeningDiv = content.indexOf(startSaveArea); var posClosingDiv = content.lastIndexOf(endSaveArea); if((posOpeningDiv == -1) || (posClosingDiv == -1)) { throw "File '"+path+"' is not a TiddlyWiki."; } var storageText = content.substr(posOpeningDiv + startSaveArea.length, posClosingDiv); // Create a "div" element that contains the storage text var myStorageDiv = document.createElement("div"); myStorageDiv.innerHTML = storageText; myStorageDiv.normalize(); // Create all tiddlers in a new TiddlyWiki // (following code is modified copy of TiddlyWiki.prototype.loadFromDiv) var tiddlyWiki = new TiddlyWiki(); var store = myStorageDiv.childNodes; for(var t = 0; t < store.length; t++) { var e = store[t]; var title = null; if(e.getAttribute) title = e.getAttribute("tiddler"); if(!title && e.id && e.id.substr(0,lenPrefix) == idPrefix) title = e.id.substr(lenPrefix); if(title && title != "") { var tiddler = tiddlyWiki.createTiddler(title); tiddler.loadFromDiv(e,title); } } tiddlyWiki.dirty = false; return tiddlyWiki; } // Internal. // // Returns a function that has a function body returning the given javaScriptExpression. // The function has the parameters: // // (tiddler, context, count, index) // config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction = function (javaScriptExpression, context) { var script = context["script"]; var functionText = "theFunction = function(tiddler, context, count, index) { return "+javaScriptExpression+"}"; var fullText = (script ? script+";" : "")+functionText; return eval(fullText); } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.findTiddlers = function(whereClause, context, tiddlyWiki) { var result = []; var func = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(whereClause, context); tiddlyWiki.forEachTiddler(function(title,tiddler) { if (func(tiddler, context, undefined, undefined)) { result.push(tiddler); } }); return result; } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.createExtraParameterErrorElement = function(place, actionName, parameter, firstUnusedIndex) { var message = "Extra parameter behind '"+actionName+"':"; for (var i = firstUnusedIndex; i < parameter.length; i++) { message += " "+parameter[i]; } this.handleError(place, message); } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.sortAscending = function(tiddlerA, tiddlerB) { var result = (tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue == tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue) ? 0 : (tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue < tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue) ? -1 : +1; return result; } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.sortDescending = function(tiddlerA, tiddlerB) { var result = (tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue == tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue) ? 0 : (tiddlerA.forEachTiddlerSortValue < tiddlerB.forEachTiddlerSortValue) ? +1 : -1; return result; } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.sortTiddlers = function(tiddlers, sortClause, ascending, context) { // To avoid evaluating the sortClause whenever two items are compared // we pre-calculate the sortValue for every item in the array and store it in a // temporary property ("forEachTiddlerSortValue") of the tiddlers. var func = config.macros.forEachTiddler.getEvalTiddlerFunction(sortClause, context); var count = tiddlers.length; for (var i = 0; i < count; i++) { var tiddler = tiddlers[i]; tiddler.forEachTiddlerSortValue = func(tiddler,context, undefined, undefined); } // Do the sorting tiddlers.sort(ascending ? this.sortAscending : this.sortDescending); // Delete the temporary property that holds the sortValue. for (var i = 0; i < tiddlers.length; i++) { delete tiddlers[i].forEachTiddlerSortValue; } } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.trace = function(message) { displayMessage(message); } // Internal. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.traceMacroCall = function(place,macroName,params) { var message ="<<"+macroName; for (var i = 0; i < params.length; i++) { message += " "+params[i]; } message += ">>"; displayMessage(message); } // Internal. // // Creates an element that holds an error message // config.macros.forEachTiddler.createErrorElement = function(place, exception) { var message = (exception.description) ? exception.description : exception.toString(); return createTiddlyElement(place,"span",null,"forEachTiddlerError","<>: "+message); } // Internal. // // @param place [may be null] // config.macros.forEachTiddler.handleError = function(place, exception) { if (place) { this.createErrorElement(place, exception); } else { throw exception; } } // Internal. // // Encodes the given string. // // Replaces // "$))" to ">>" // "$)" to ">" // config.macros.forEachTiddler.paramEncode = function(s) { var reGTGT = new RegExp("\\$\\)\\)","mg"); var reGT = new RegExp("\\$\\)","mg"); return s.replace(reGTGT, ">>").replace(reGT, ">"); } // Internal. // // Returns the given original path (that is a file path, starting with "file:") // as a path to a local file, in the systems native file format. // // Location information in the originalPath (i.e. the "#" and stuff following) // is stripped. // config.macros.forEachTiddler.getLocalPath = function(originalPath) { // Remove any location part of the URL var hashPos = originalPath.indexOf("#"); if(hashPos != -1) originalPath = originalPath.substr(0,hashPos); // Convert to a native file format assuming // "file:///x:/path/path/path..." - pc local file --> "x:\path\path\path..." // "file://///server/share/path/path/path..." - FireFox pc network file --> "\\server\share\path\path\path..." // "file:///path/path/path..." - mac/unix local file --> "/path/path/path..." // "file://server/share/path/path/path..." - pc network file --> "\\server\share\path\path\path..." var localPath; if(originalPath.charAt(9) == ":") // pc local file localPath = unescape(originalPath.substr(8)).replace(new RegExp("/","g"),"\\"); else if(originalPath.indexOf("file://///") == 0) // FireFox pc network file localPath = "\\\\" + unescape(originalPath.substr(10)).replace(new RegExp("/","g"),"\\"); else if(originalPath.indexOf("file:///") == 0) // mac/unix local file localPath = unescape(originalPath.substr(7)); else if(originalPath.indexOf("file:/") == 0) // mac/unix local file localPath = unescape(originalPath.substr(5)); else // pc network file localPath = "\\\\" + unescape(originalPath.substr(7)).replace(new RegExp("/","g"),"\\"); return localPath; } // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // Stylesheet Extensions (may be overridden by local StyleSheet) // --------------------------------------------------------------------------- // setStylesheet( ".forEachTiddlerError{color: #ffffff;background-color: #880000;}", "forEachTiddler"); //============================================================================ // End of forEachTiddler Macro //============================================================================ //============================================================================ // String.startsWith Function //============================================================================ // // Returns true if the string starts with the given prefix, false otherwise. // version.extensions["String.startsWith"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // String.prototype.startsWith = function(prefix) { var n = prefix.length; return (this.length >= n) && (this.slice(0, n) == prefix); } //============================================================================ // String.endsWith Function //============================================================================ // // Returns true if the string ends with the given suffix, false otherwise. // version.extensions["String.endsWith"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // String.prototype.endsWith = function(suffix) { var n = suffix.length; return (this.length >= n) && (this.right(n) == suffix); } //============================================================================ // String.contains Function //============================================================================ // // Returns true when the string contains the given substring, false otherwise. // version.extensions["String.contains"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // String.prototype.contains = function(substring) { return this.indexOf(substring) >= 0; } //============================================================================ // Array.indexOf Function //============================================================================ // // Returns the index of the first occurance of the given item in the array or // -1 when no such item exists. // // @param item [may be null] // version.extensions["Array.indexOf"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // Array.prototype.indexOf = function(item) { for (var i = 0; i < this.length; i++) { if (this[i] == item) { return i; } } return -1; } //============================================================================ // Array.contains Function //============================================================================ // // Returns true when the array contains the given item, otherwise false. // // @param item [may be null] // version.extensions["Array.contains"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // Array.prototype.contains = function(item) { return (this.indexOf(item) >= 0); } //============================================================================ // Array.containsAny Function //============================================================================ // // Returns true when the array contains at least one of the elements // of the item. Otherwise (or when items contains no elements) false is returned. // version.extensions["Array.containsAny"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // Array.prototype.containsAny = function(items) { for(var i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { if (this.contains(items[i])) { return true; } } return false; } //============================================================================ // Array.containsAll Function //============================================================================ // // Returns true when the array contains all the items, otherwise false. // // When items is null false is returned (even if the array contains a null). // // @param items [may be null] // version.extensions["Array.containsAll"] = {major: 1, minor: 0, revision: 0, date: new Date(2005,11,20), provider: "http://tiddlywiki.abego-software.de"}; // Array.prototype.containsAll = function(items) { for(var i = 0; i < items.length; i++) { if (!this.contains(items[i])) { return false; } } return true; } //}}} /*** !Licence and Copyright Copyright (c) abego Software ~GmbH, 2005 ([[www.abego-software.de|http://www.abego-software.de]]) Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met: Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. Neither the name of abego Software nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission. THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. ***/

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espringer — 2007-12-11

+++[—Syllabus info—|See PHIL 212 syllabus details] ^^[[course description|PHIL 212 course description]]^^ ^^[[calendar]]^^ ^^[[assignments|assignment overview]]^^ ^^[[discussion teams]]^^ ^^[[reading strategies]]^^ ^^[[commentaries]]^^ ^^[[exams]]^^ ^^[[long essay]]^^ === ---- +++[—List Students—|See students by group] <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> <> === ---- +++[—List Dates—|"Date tags, access to commentaries by date"] ^^Click on date to browse^^ [[Unit D submissions|Unit D submissions (Mill & Utilitarianism)]] [[Unit E submissions]]: <> <> <> <> [[Unit F submissions]]: <> <> <> <> [[Previews, by theme|Previews by theme]] === ---- +++[—Using this site—|Logging in and contributing] ~~[[welcome]]~~ ~~[[sign-ups|scheduling commentaries]]~~ ~~[[submitting commentaries]]~~ ~~[[about tagging]]~~ === <>

ListTagMacro

espringer — 2007-12-11

{{{ // allows one to get a list of tiddlers with <> // <> will exclude named tiddler // <> will list tiddlers with all 3 tags // <> will list tag1 tiddlers without tag2 config.macros.list.tag = { handler: function(params) { var tags=params[1].split(/[\+\-]/); var t=[]; for(var i=0;i1){ var i=params[1].indexOf('-')>-1 ? subtract(t[0],t[1]) : intersect(t[0],t[1]); if(t.length>2)t=[i].concat(t.slice(2)); else t=[i]; } var list=[]; var t=t[0]; for(var i=0;i

introductions

espringer — 2007-12-11

All seminar participants are invited to provide a brief profile, including background, interests, pictures (email to espringer at wesleyan dot edu), and links. If a name is //italicized//, no profile has yet been provided, but you can ''click on your name to create'' a profile... Tag your new item {{{private}}} (using the tag space at the bottom of the edit area) to make sure that viewers who are not logged in cannot see it. ---- <>

democracy

espringer — 2007-12-11

Are questions of [[personal identity and choice|PHIL 218 course description]] of special interest to people who live in a ''democracy''? Do we place a high priority on democracy because of the ''self-evident importance'' of freedom and autonomy, or ''do we learn'' to value freedom and democracy ''because'' we are raised in a democratic context?

links

espringer — 2007-12-11

Any item here can [[link|links]] to any other. If it's easy to mention the title of an item in the course of your own sentence, then just put the """[[name between double-brackets]]""", being sure to get capitalization and punctuation just right. If you want to refer to [[formatting tips]], but would prefer to mention them with [[some other phrase|formatting tips]], then type like this: """[[some other phrase|formatting tips]]""". (That's a vertical bar in between.) !The more links, the merrier! !A good place to get started is with setting up an [[introduction|introductions]] for yourself...

philosophy

espringer — 2007-12-11

'Philosophy', in its Greek origins, means something like "love of wisdom". Today, philosophy is the discipline that inquires into questions that escape the particular methodologies and approaches of other disciplines. Philosophy has as its primary method the tools of argument and dialogue.

Contradictions

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"And what was said about another matter? Is the pupil who devotes himself to the practice of gymnastics supposed to attend to the praise and blame and opinion of every man, or of one man only- his physician or trainer, whoever he may be"(Plato, "Crito", p.46)| |" 'You Socrates, are breaking the covenants and agreements which you made with us at your leisure, not in any haste or under any compulsion or deception, but after you hace had seventy years to think of them..."(Plato, "Crito", p.51)| Socrates suggests two apparent contradictions concerning integrity and loyalty. One is to maintain integrity through just actions and veer from that which is evil and unjust, and yet he is disloyal to those who care for him. Socrates asks to whom we should be loyal and why. The apparent contradiction is inherent in the idea of having an individual interpretation of what is just. Socrates also mentions that there is danger in listening to the "many" as opposed to a particular "master," however if death is the just choice in order to abide by the "agreement" with one's state, does this not imply that Socrates is in fact a "slave" to the many? Although in nature the state may represent more of a unified entity than the opinions of the many, Socrates's argument illustrates an inconsistancy.

jehrenhalt

espringer — 2007-12-11

hi, i'm jennie. i like running around, playing music, being outside, and board games. i also like sitting and thinking which is the reason for my interest in philosophy, though i know nothing about it. i am currently working on my third documentary on yellow food, and am excited to get to know everyone in the class.

ebardavid

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hi all, My name is Eyal. I am the oldest of four kids, which means that I am the guinea pig in numerous parental matters. English is not my first languange, second to Hebrew. Last summer, I involved myself in surfing. Of course, this was a completely inopportune time to get obsessively hooked on a new sport, for college was right around the corner. Other things I love include the outdoors, vacationing, astronomy, philosophy, and Ben and Jerry's Double Fudge Brownie ice cream in a warm fresh waffle cone. I'll think of more to say eventually...for now, I look forward to having heated discussions both in an out of class with all of you!

edhouse

espringer — 2007-12-11

I've started this self-introduction about four times now, and am thoroughly frustrated because each of my beginning sentences has been some variation of, "Hey guys! My name is Emily and I'm a freshman from Albany, New York!" That's just a bit too perky and a little too superficial a way to start, but all three facts are true and relevant to this whole introduction thing. I could tell you that I live in WestCo or that I play rugby or that I currently plan to double major in Anthropology and Gender Studies-- but those facts are fairly mundane. So, here: I love the scent of Chinese laundromats in New York city, the way the smell of freshly washed cotton wafts up from grates in the cold cement. I am an avid boogier, a chronic smiler and have a history of loving a well-turned phrase. Apathy annoys me. I love guacemole but hate avocados. I am at my happiest when traveling third-class on trains with only my backpack and journal. And philosophy fascinates me yes, as an academic subject, but actually inspires me because it opens my eyes to interesting discussions I can have with people in the future.

apreneta

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hi everyone, my name is Ania and I'm from Boston, MA. This is my first philosophy class ever and I am excited to dig into this subject for the first time. In my free time, I play tennis a lot, read and I am interested in international relations, possibly majoring in government later on. I really love languages and I speak Polish at home with my family and I'm also fluent in German. I'm not a big speaker in class as you may get to notice, but I love writing, and listening.

Epictetus

espringer — 2007-12-11

[[Epictetus|http://www.iep.utm.edu/e/epictetu.htm]] belonged to the Stoic tradition in ancient Greek and Roman thought, and was born around 55 C.E. Though he began life as a slave, it was not uncommon for slaves to have the means to study, and Epictetus was freed as an adult. Though some claim that Stoicism is a philosophy appropriate for someone such as a slave, without political power, another famous Roman Stoic was the emperor [[Marcus Aurelius|http://www.iep.utm.edu/m/marcus.htm]]; a Stoicism is compatible with political influence so long as one can resist the temptation to become attached to success, ambition, and recognition.

revise

espringer — 2007-12-11

Revisions of commentaries are due on "off days" between main commentary writing, slightly over a week after the original. They should work with [[feedback]] received by [[peers|peer comment]], the [[TA|bbozorgnia]] and/or the [[professor|espringer]]. Please respect the efforts of all of those who offer feedback, and try to improve your work based on what you learn. You need not agree with every comment, but every comment does help illuminate how well your writing has managed to convey your line of thought clearly! ! Note: Generally, it's best not to change the ''title'' of a commentary once there are comments attached, because the bond between the original and the comments will be lost. //If you do change a title//, please include a note such as "(formerly such-and such)" in the body, and make sure to copy and paste or type exactly the previous title. ! The [[revisions]] feature of the site is not much related to the assignment of doing revisions, although we can use that button to see what any item looked like earlier in its history.

Descartes

espringer — 2007-12-11

Often honored (or accused) as the "father of modern philosophy", [[Descartes|http://www.iep.utm.edu/d/descarte.htm]] (1596-1650) heralded a transition from philosophy that appealed to revelation and authority for its premises to philosophy that appealed directly to individually accessible reason and/or experience.

commentary

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Enchiridion, Feb 2:'' <> ---- ''Crito, Jan 31:'' <> ---- <>

Dreams

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"But indeed it is also the same "I" who imagines; for alsthough perhaps, as I supposed before, absolutely nothing that I imagined is true, still the very power of imagining really does exist, and constitutes a part of my thought. For example, I now see a light, I hear a noise, I feel heat, these things are false since I am asleep. Yet I certainly do seem to hear and feel warmth. This cannot be false"(Descartes, p.20, Meditation two).| Throughout Descartes "Meditations on First Philosophy," he discusses the notion of what is true and how one can provide evidence of our existence. The perception of truth gives validity to the claim that because we can "conceive" ideas, because we can think; we exist. Descartes offers insightful rational regarding dreams. I first asked, If we dream unconsciously, how can we exist? Descartes describes how the fact that dreaming is "untrue," may make us skeptical of daily, conscious experiences, however dreaming does not undermine our existence. Although we are unconscious, the mind is present allowing us to dream regardless of the truth that we may search for consciously, existing is a constant.

adfishman

espringer — 2007-12-11

My name is adam. I will edit this introduction later as I am inundated with work and Descartes is wooing me back to my desk. Suffice it to say for now that I love Philosophy and wonder how to (best?) exist in a Godless, senseless universe. I've also been recently operating on the hope/regret that I have a significant amount of untapped intellectual potential. And soon it will hopefully be (more or less) tapped, and I am anxious about this. After I leave college, I want to wander aimlessly around the country like a vagabond.

cbethlahmy

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hey my name is Caitlin and I'm from Seattle. I've never taken a philosophy class before but I'm really excited and encouraged after our first couple of meetings. I am especially intrigued by those times when our philosophy material overlaps with material I am studying for other courses.

objection

espringer — 2007-12-11

An objection, or ''complaint about reasoning'' can be raised either in response to a specific claim (as in a premise) or in response to an inference (a step in an argument). Good philosophical reading requires recognizing actual and potential objections to any proposed line of thought, and it also requires anticipating a reply whenever possible (that is, using charitable interpretation to make the best possible sense of an author's ideas).

feedback

espringer — 2007-12-11

Students who submitted commentaries on 2/21 may have an ''@@extension@@ on revisions'' for another week, since I was away at a funeral this past weekend, and have not yet provided all of you with feedback in time for tomorrow, 3/2. Apologies for the delay! The regular pattern should be that sometime over the weekend, both Behdad (for Thursdays) and I (for Tuesdays) will post comments on the work of the past week. It might be wise to browse through not only your own feedback, but others' as well, so that you have a sense of the range of ideas in the class, and of what kinds of nudges to consider when you revise.

announcements

espringer — 2007-12-11

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syllabus

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume

espringer — 2007-12-11

[[David Hume|http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/humelife.htm]] (1711-1776) was a Scottish philosopher, historian, and public intellectual whose influence in British thought is broad and deep. He combined a skeptical analytical approach to experience with a utilitarian and humanist concern to improve human thought. His skeptical views on personal identity and free will inspired and provoked subsequent generations, including Kant's, to seek new grounds for such concepts.

dates

espringer — 2007-12-11

Elise Springer

espringer — 2007-12-11

Assistant Professor of Philosophy, [[Wesleyan University|http://www.wesleyan.edu]] (See also my [[main homepage|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/]], or email <>)

formatting tips

espringer — 2007-12-11

|!Example|!How| |''Bold Text''|"""''put your text between two single-quote marks on either side''"""| |==strikethrough text==|"""==put your phrase between two pairs of equal-signs=="""| |__underlined text__|"""__include double underline-marks on either end__"""| |//italic text//|"""//type between pairs of forward-slashes//"""| |^^superscript text^^|"""^^Two caret-marks appear at each end^^"""| |~~subscript text~~|"""~~Use two wavy tildes on either end~~"""| |@@color(green):colored text@@|"""@@color(yourcolorhere):type here@@"""| |@@highlighted text@@|"""@@highlighted text@@"""| |@@bgcolor(red):colored background@@|"""@@bgcolor(red):type here@@"""| |{{{Monospaced}}}|"""{{{put your text between triple-brackets}}}"""| |[[point to another item|links]] |"""[[title of item]]""" or """[[paraphrase link|title of item]]"""| |put text in a box, like this box|"""|put a vertical bar exactly at beginning and end of line, no extra line breaks|"""|

reading strategies

espringer — 2007-12-11

Reading philosophy is quite different from other kinds of reading... Students who are new to philosophy may be surprised that the readings are relatively "short". However, the process of reading requires especially detailed attention to the author's method of reaching conclusions. Be sure to familiarize yourself with the basic tools for [[analyzing reasoning|http://parmenides.objectis.net/reason/]]. An excellent strategy for understanding many philosophical texts is to outline its ''argument''. Then, if you find yourself ''disagreeing'' with a text, you should be sure to trace that disagreement back either to something implausible in the author's initial premises, or to a suspicous pattern of inference. If you are inclined to ''agree'' with an author, you'll want to consider where a more skeptical reader would find weak points, and consider how you or the author might address them. An optimal reading [[commentary|submitting commentaries]] will quickly frame the theme that most interests you and raise an apparent problem about it. Then it will go on to anticipate at least one possible way that the author, or some other sympathetic reader, might address your concern.

Writing philosophy

espringer — 2007-12-11

We have discussed writing skills quite a bit during the semester. Still, for a longer essay, you may want to consult the [[philosophy guidelines at the writing center|http://www.wesleyan.edu/writing/workshop/departments/philosophy.html]], and the following list of common errors compiled by [[Elise Springer|espringer]]. //The following points are part of a key to a list of about 200 errors that I find merit "boilerplate" explanations. Please be sure to check with a writing tutor, or with me, if any of these are not clear to you.// |!Common problems that directly affect philosophical or scholarly value:| |@ -- Your reader wants to see some indication of a ''citation'' close by. Where can this be found?| |BI -- ''Bibliography'' is incomplete/incorrect (lacking sources, lacking complete information, or badly formatted). See [[MLA's online guide|http://www.lib.usm.edu/research/guides/mla.html]].| |BN -- "Backup" is needed: you have a claim that shouldn't appear without some ''defense or argument''.| |CH -- ''Charity'': your criticism may be plausible, but you should put effort into seeing whether better sense can be made of the text.| |CX -- ''Connection''? It's not clear why you present these ideas as logically related. If you believe they are, please spell out why.| |FE -- Don't use "I ''feel''" (or "he feels") talk unless you have some reason to talk about gut reactions or emotions here.| |IQ -- ''Include quotation'' or clearly referenced paraphrase. Your critical response will achieve better focus by examining specific passages.| |LS -- What a ''long sentence''! Your reader might be better served by breaking this up into shorter focused claims.| |OS -- ''Oversimplification'': While there may be a problem, you seem to offer too hasty a summary of the position you're criticizing.| |PB -- ''Paragraph break'' is needed: focus each paragraph on a topic sentence and give the reader a breather between topics.| |PL -- Here you settle for leading the reader through the "''plot''" of the text. Where are we going, and why?| |QL -- If a ''quoted'' passage is ''long'', it needs its own separate double-indented, single-spaced paragraph.| |TT -- There's a ''thesis topic'' here, but not a thesis problem or a thesis claim. YOUR contribution to our thinking about this topis is...?| |!Surface problems that mar the quality of your work and distract the reader| |BY -- Correct use of ''"by"'' at the beginning of a sentence/clause is tricky. See a reference work on participle clauses.| |DA -- ''Dangler'': The subordinate clause or modifier should "belong to" the subject of the sentence. [[Learn how to fix|http://owl.english.purdue.edu/handouts/grammar/g_dangmod.html]].| |DF -- A ''differs from'' B, so A is different from B; "different than" is common but [[generally clumsy|http://www.straightdope.com/columns/010316.html/]].| |GM -- The "''generic male''" is dying... some older authors did mean "human" by "man" (etc.), but now the male connotation is undeniable. Sometimes [[restructuring a sentence is required|http://www.cjr.org/tools/lc/heshe.asp]].| |H -- ''Homophones'' (similar-sounding words) have been confused here. [[Learn the difference|http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/errors/errors.html/]]! Spell-checkers can't help.| |JB -- "''Just because'' ... does not mean..." is OK in informal speech, but ungrammatical in form.| |PV -- The ''passive voice'' gets in the way here: why not say directly WHO does/claims this (avoiding "by")?| |Q -- Your words indicate a ''question'' is being asked, and yet you treat the sentence like an assertion.| |RG -- ''Argue'' [this point]: "Argues"� is best used without a direct object. One argues for or against claims, but "argue a point"� is unclear.| |SD -- ''Spell-check disaster'': the only explanation for this irrelevant word is that you chose a [[spell-checker's brainless suggestion|http://www.wsu.edu/~brians/errors/spellcheck.html/]]. Oops!| |TH -- "''They''" is often abused as a neutral singular pronoun in informal speech, but in formal writing it should refer only to plurals.| |WP -- The ''wrong pronoun'' is used.| |YO -- If possible, avoid using "''you''" to mean "anyone". (Especially avoid going back and forth between "you" and "one" or "they"�, etc.)|

long essay

espringer — 2007-12-11

This semester, we have two longer essays, due ''March 9'' and ''April 28''. ! Each student may devote either major essay to a "live problem" of her or his own ''choice'', provided only that the problem be approachable with philosophical methods (to be discussed), and manageable within the scope of ''1200-1500'' words. Though the length is relatively short for a term paper, the density and clarity of your writing should be like the density and clarity of the 120-word commentaries. Thus, it will take much revision to make the long essay reflect as much depth and weighing of considerations as possible. ! You may explore in greater depth an issue raised by one of your commentaries, or you may choose a new theme. However, your theme should not involve speculative rambling, or lots of summarizing of text. Like a good commentary, your essay should focus right in one one "live problem" which requires dialogue with a text. ! @@Preview abstracts are due in advance (see dates at [[semester calendar]])@@ Please use the <> in the tags area at bottom of item. ! For each preview abstract, what you'll need is # A concise ''two-paragraph statement'' of the problem you're considering, with one paragraph devoted to each of at least two importantly different approaches that create a tension or need for further reflection. (Your writing should be clean and articulate, but the abstract is not itself an essay.) # A specification of ''texts'' you plan to discuss. This is not a standard research paper, and you do not need to discuss sources outside of class (though you may, as long as you also centrally discuss at least one text from our syllabus). If you don't know how to format a bibliography, check out the standard //Little, Brown// reference book, or [[MLA's online guide|http://www.lib.usm.edu/research/guides/mla.html]].

PHIL 218 course description

espringer — 2007-12-11

Philosophy 218, ''Personal Identity and Choice'', is a First Year Initiative course, limited to 20 first-year students. The seminar introduces the metaphysical questions associated with identity and with choice, drawing parallels and connections between issues in both domains. We start by exploring classic extreme positions: Plato and the Stoics on the soul and its faculty of choice, Buddha's view of no-self, Mettrie's determinism and Chisholm's argument for the freedom of agents. We then navigate between the extremes by examining the importance of narrative, social identity, complexity of the self, and changes over time. ! We will explore philosophical reflections on the problem of personal identity, and its relationship to matters of choice and freedom. How do certain experiences and thoughts and physical materials compose one self? Am I the same person over time even through complete transformations of experience, thought and material? Can I choose which elements of my existence to count as essential? Some argue the concept of a unified and enduring self partakes of illusion; at the other extreme some argue for the permanent integrity of individual souls. ! Regarding choice and freedom, we find a related debate, ranging from those who deny free will altogether to those who define humanity's essence in terms of choice and agency. Might we coherently say that some human selves can have more integrity, and others less? What gives a measure of meaningful coherence to a person's life? Similarly, can we distinguish some choices as more free than others? What makes for meaningful choice? ! Besides serving as an introduction to philosophical reasoning, the course will draw interdisciplinary connections on themes such as social identities, religious experience, political freedom, and legal responsibility.

initial course logistics

espringer — 2007-12-11

As usual, students who have pre-registered must be present at the first class in order to maintain enrollment, as any openings will be filled by the first of those in line to add. Students ''hoping to add'' the course should send me an email with any details that might help demonstrate that your enrollment would benefit both you and the class. In addition to [[textbooks]] for the class, there will be supplementary readings available in a ''course packet'' (see [[Announcements]]).

course packets

espringer — 2007-12-11

Besides the bookstore's texts for this course, packets with additional readings are available (starting Jan. 19th) at ''PIP printers in Middletown'' (Phone 344-9001. [[Directions here|http://www.google.com/maps?hl=en&lr=&q=pip+printers&near=Middletown,+CT&radius=0.0&cid=41562222,-72651111,804986807049466424&li=lmd&z=14&t=m]].). Pre-enrolled students are encouraged to reserve a course packet and pick it up in advance of the first day of class, if possible. # Go to [[www.pip.com|http://www.pip.com]] # click on ''customer login'' on lower right. # Key Customer login is ''{{{Wes}}}'' and password is also ''{{{Wes}}}'' # Click on login Button # Select easy DOCS Online ordering Button on right side # Shop for your Course Packets and check out your shopping cart like any other online shopping. NOTE: Online orders require a CREDIT CARD, and the charge will be about $26.68 (including tax). If you have no access to a credit card, please email me so that we can work out alternate arrangements.

teaching apprentice

espringer — 2007-12-11

Our seminar TA, [[Behdad|bbozorgnia]] will hold [[office hours|Behdad's office hours]] each week, schedule a review session prior to the exam, and provide feedback on drafts of written work (both [[commentaries|submitting commentaries]] and [[long essays|long essay]]). Email <>.

submitting commentaries

espringer — 2007-12-11

Commentaries are due ''by midnight'' before the relevant class session. Students will need to ''log in'' using the data shared in class. Then, a button to add a ''new item'' will appear in the upper-right menu. (You can also use this: <>) Then, please type in the following: * a title (make it concise and informative, and avoid quotes, ampersands, and other odd characters) * your excerpted passage(s), with the location of each passage in parentheses right after it (inclusion of passage is optional) * your commentary, [[limited to 120 words|Word Count]] (It's probably best to compose it somewhere else, and then copy, paste, and format here.) * tags: in the space below, please indicate the date of the class for which you're commenting. ! For a clean look, put the passage and its location all in one paragraph between | marks, to get the passage in a "box" above your paragraph. Here's an illustration of editing in progress: [img[illustration|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/contribution.gif]] ! Be sure to click the "done" button at upper right afterwards, so that your commentary is entered into the system. You should then see it under the "Recent" tab at right. ! If you're curious about how someone achieved some effect or other, try going into "edit" mode (double-click or use ''edit'' button). Also see [[formatting tips]].

commentary example

espringer — 2007-12-11

|In cases such as this [of John Demjanjuk] the passage of time and radical changes of character and personality seem to invite the notion that one self or person has succeeded another in the same body. (Radden, "Shame and Blame", p. 61)| |If one wrongly beievess oneself to have been the perpetrator of a past act, then one's feelings of guilt is misplaced, at least, if not irrational. (Radden, "Shame and Blame", p. 63)| Radden's idea of a "succession of selves" brings her to question whether a person should always be held accountable for the action of a radically different earlier self, though she believes feelings like guilt generally require a belief in continuous identity. Now since Radden admits that such feelings can also be inappropriate, they cannot be the basis for identity differentiation. She finds the reductionist view convincing: as soon as time passes, one has a different "empirical construct" of self and therefore is not exactly the same individual. Reductionism implies one is responsible for actions only while they are occurring. Radden attempts to modify this by instituting "survival thresholds," yet these provide only an arbitrary basis for drawing lines between identities.

An Alternative View

espringer — 2007-12-11

Socrates, thinking first of justice, chose death over betrayal of the Athenian laws. In so doing he preserved for himself that principle, perhaps called innocence, which is "improved by justice and injured by injustice". I propose a complementary view: The trial and sentence of Socrates is no doubt a great injustice. This weakens the spirit of the laws, which is also "improved by justice and deteriorated by injustice". Socrates loved the law and would have prevented this, yet at his trial words failed to prove his innocence. Choosing death over exile or escape was the strongest statement of innocence left to him, with the hope that the Athenians would then come to see their folly.

titles and tags

espringer — 2007-12-11

!!!Titles: For each of your commentaries, choose an ''informative short phrase'' likely to be unique to your own contribution. Note a title @@''cannot use quotation marks''@@ (these confuse the database engine and result in a cut-off title). !!!Tags: The ''purpose of tags'' is to organize a vast quantity of submissions: To see available commentaries for any student, or all work for any class date so far — and to confirm that your work is properly tagged — click on any student's initials (under ''Student Groups'' at left) or by class date (under ''List By Date'' at left). |{{{onlyAdmin}}}|''Special tag for confidential comments''|Any student who ''wants'' a commentary ''not to be visible'' to others (other than the professor) should add the tag ''{{{onlyAdmin}}}'' (note odd capitalization, and no space) along with ''{{{xx/xx}}}'' date. However, I'd recommend leaving the tag out at first, long enough to make sure that your commentary is saved and appears properly in the index at right. //Once you add the adminOnly tag, not only other students but you yourself might not be able to view or edit your work any further.//| |{{{private}}}|''Show only to those logged in''|Tag your contribution with {{{private}}} and it will be invisible to those not logged in with individual passwords.| |{{{protected}}}|''Keep others from modifying''|Tag with {{{protected}}} to make sure that others can't modify your contribution. (Note, [[previous versions|revisions]] can always be recovered, so this shouldn't be a major concern.| !@@''Precision matters''@@: Each student submission should be tagged with initials and with date. Note that the ''//unintelligent//'' web site code cannot tolerate any typos, differences of capitalization, spaces inserted, etc., within your tags. To see what tags can be used, please open the lists at left. The date should be the //class// date, not some prior day when you submit your work. Use a space between tags, and ''do not'' merge two tags into one with double-brackets.

calendar pdf

espringer — 2007-12-11

[[Download copy of official calendar here|http://espringer.web.wesleyan.edu/phil218sp06calendar.pdf]] (This is the same one that's on the syllabus, but here just for reference.)

Selfishness?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improved by justice and depraved by injustice? (Socrates, "Crito", p. 47)| |Whether we shall do rightly either in escaping or in suffering others to aid in our escape and paying them in money and thanks, or whether in reality we shall not do rightly; and if the latter, then death or any other calamity which may ensue on my remaining here must not be allowed to enter into the calculation. (Socrates, "Crito", p. 48)| Socrates can be read to say that the state of the soul is to be valued above all else, his life and family included. In this sense, this single-minded consideration for his own soul can be taken as a sign of selfishness, as he is looking out for himself without consideration for others. Yet is his sense of justice incompatible with any other, possibly even greater, good? At the end of "Crito", Socrates sets out his argument why his decision is justice with respect to his soul, the laws, and his children. Indeed, perhaps to Socrates' view doing justice by his own soul subsumes justice toward everything else.

A Higher Calling

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"'Now you depart in innocence, a sufferer and not a doer of evil; a victim, not of the laws, but of men...' Socrates: Leave me then, Crito, to fulfil the will of God..." (Plato, "Crito," p.54)| Socrates accepts his death as the "will of God,"? making the distinction that the men who enforce the laws are perverse, not the laws themselves. However, I see a fundamental flaw in his logic ... if God was the driving force behind his decidedly just actions, than why should this God also condemn him to death? It seems that the laws, as formidable as Socrates believes, should in fact provide him with the vindication that he is due. Although he is compelled by a higher law at the hands of God, Socrates chooses to obey what he believes to be unjust at the hands of mere men. Perhaps to Socrates the ideal of Law is more important than absolute Justice.

Government as God?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Well then, since you were brought into the world and nurtured and educated by us [the government], can you deny in the first place that you are our child and slave, as your fathers were before you? (Plato, "Crito", p. 50)| Plato portrays the government and the laws as a high God and master and the citizens as slaves to this power. Throughout the piece, Crito submits to Socrates' voice of the law and as a result of examining these laws, Crito agrees to let Socrates die. Socrates my respond to this by saying that the objective of taking on the voice of the law was to convince Crito that he shouldn't escape, and that in fact he feels some reluctance to identify with the words of the law (and therefore speaks the law instead of explaining the law through his own voice). However, Socrates feels bound to the laws enough that he doesn't escape to save his life.

Power vs. Truth

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Socrates: But why, my dear Crito, should we care about the opinion of the many? Good men, and they are the only persons who are worth considering, will think of these things truly as they occurred.| Crito and Socrates bring up the notion of power vs. truth. To Crito, power is more important because it can determine what is taken as truth, while Socrates believes that the truth is an undeniable essence that no power can hide from the intellectual. Socrates convinces Crito he should not try to escape from jail. Crito should not have been so easily persuaded by Socrates argument. Socrates only proved that he should not try to escape but that did not include Crito taking Socrates against his will. Moreover, Socrates would be saved and would be morally obligated to stay with Crito because going back would mean turning Crito in and you would not wrong the person that saved your life.

Spiritual vs. Physical Salvation

espringer — 2007-12-11

|And will life be worth having, if that higher part of man be destroyed, which is improvised by justice and depraved by injustice? Do we suppose that principle, whatever it may be in man has to do with justice and injustice, to be inferior to the body? (Plato, "Crito", p. 47-48)| Socrates treasures spiritual salvation over physical salvation, and believes that wrong decisions can only be amended by right decisions. Thus, another wrong decision to save his life is not worth the loss of his soul. However, Socrates fails to define what a "right" decision is. While he values justice over more personal matters, such as family and public image, it is questionable to state that blindly obeying the government's laws should take precedence over one more "wrong" that could be a catalyst for many more "rights."� Going against the primal agreement he made with Athens would break the promise he made not only to himself, but to other citizens. This betrayal is too much for Socrates' soul to live with.

Self-Interest

espringer — 2007-12-11

In Crito, Socrates poses an apparent contradiction between doing that which is self-sacrificial and that which simultaneously serves his own self-interest. In choosing to follow the State's laws and fulfill his death sentence, he sets the pedagogical example of selflessly following a path of moral integrity rather than one of personal interest. However, this martyrdom cannot be dismissed as being purely altruistic. Socrates' desire to do what is right stems from a place of self-interest: the wish to act and be perceived as a morally upstanding person, although laudable, is ultimately a selfish desire. Due to his consideration of himself and public's reaction, his motive, although beneficently allowing the political machine operate smoothly, is inherently selfish.

Morals and Rationale

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Are we to say that we are never intentionally to do wrong, or that in one way we ought and in another way we ought not to do wrong, or is doing wrong always evil and dishonorable, as I was just now saying, and as has been already acknowledged by us? (Plato, "Crito")| |...what is the application? In leaving the prison against the will of the Athenians, do I wrong any? Or rather do I not wrong those whom I ought least to wrong? Do I not desert the principles which were acknowledged by us to be just -- what do you say?? (Plato, "Crito")| "Crito" illustrates an interesting discussion regarding the alignment of one's rational standards with one's moral priorities. Disparities exist not because some act irrationally, but because of fundamental differences in individuals' understandings of what is right. Both Crito and Socrates can accept the logic behind Socrates' eventual decision; nonetheless their values are not aligned. According to Crito's moral priorities, the injustice of Socrates' wrongful incarceration would outweigh the immorality of his potential escape from prison, however Socrates reminds Crito of the contractual agreement he entered with the city upon accepting their authority. Both characters have rational objectives, yet discrepancies appear because intentions are dictated by morals. The essential conflict is not whether or not to do wrong, but what qualifies as wrong.

mgreen

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hello everyone, my name is Michael. I am from D.C, but my family is from North and South Carolina. I live in Fauver now. In my spare time I love to write fiction stories. I am in the process of writing a book but it is a very slow process cause I haven't worked on it in a long time. I also do Prometheus which is alot of fun.

personal identity

espringer — 2007-12-11

What makes a person who she or he (or ze) is? This question might be asked with a ''diachronic emphasis'', so that we're concerned about what makes the person the same person over time, or with a ''synchronic emphasis'', so that we're asking what qualities make me one unified being (if I am one!), and what makes me distinct from others...

1/31

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Crito, Jan 31:'' <>

Selfishness? Comment 2006-02-01 15:39:42

espringer — 2007-12-11

----I agree that Socrates appears to be somewhat selfish with his placement of value on justice above everything else. However, were Socrates to go on living in a life beyond the trial devoid of justice, it would not be a life that he felt was worth living. Socrates living what he felt was an injust life would be not only a disservice to himself, but to the people in his life and family as well.

The Pursuit of One's Indentity

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions."| |"You must be one man, either good or bad. You must cultivate either your own ruling faculty or externals, and apply yourself to things within you or without you; that is, be either a philosopher, or one of the vulgar."| Epictetus seems to be telling us that we must commit to one side and from then on, we are to control our desires and suppress our true feelings in order to be what Epictetus says is either a good or bad man. This however, is contradictory. The feelings and desires that we all possess are beyond our control and are not things to be feared, but rather embraced because they are pieces of our identities and make each of us unique individuals. It is impossible to be "one man," and commit to the characters of good or bad human beings. Whether or not we choose to provoke one side over the other, there is both good and evil in all of us.

Does Socrates' Condradict Himself in his Final Choice to Die? Comment 2006-02-01 20:15:29

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your point that it may seem as though Socrates contradicts himself in his final choice to die. However, there is also another way of looking at it. Perhaps Socrates believed that as long as one thinks that one's decision is correct and unwavering with respect to the law, then that person is acting justly. Those who condemned Socrates believed that they were right in doing so, and followed the orders of the law to imprison Socrates. They would have been wrong in imprisoning him, if they believed he was innocent. The same goes for Socrates. Although it seems lame, Socrates believes that despite his probable innocence, he ought to follow the decision of the higher law, and by doing so he is acting as a just man himself.

Spiritual vs. Physical Salvation Comment 2006-02-01 21:18:22

espringer — 2007-12-11

---- You said that "wrong decisions can only be amended by right decisions." I am unclear as to whether or not Socrates said this, or if this is a personal belief you hold. If we are to assume this is true, however, would it be logical to say that by saving his own life, Socrates would opening the door for himself to make many more beneficial and "right" decisions in the rest of his lifetime? Would one decision to almost blindly obey the government be more "right" than the rest of a lifetime of right decisions? Lisa

Virtue vs. Power

espringer — 2007-12-11

|�But if you would both have these great things, along with power and riches, then you will not gain even the latter, because you aim at the former too: but you will absolutely fail of the former, by which along happiness and freedom are achieved. (Epictetus, "The Enchiridion", 1)| |What place, then, say you, will I hold in the state? Whatever you can hold with the preservation of your fidelity and honor. But if, by desiring to be useful to that, you lose these, of what use can you be to your country when you are become faithless and void of shame. (Epictetus, "The Enchiridion", 24)| If power and riches go hand in hand, as Epictetus implies in the first section of the Enchiridion, and pursuing either will lead one to "absolutely fail" to achieve happiness and freedom then what of those who rule the empire, that which Epictetus feels such duty to and respect for? Why would Epictetus ever wish his disciples to participate in a system of government that has a decidedly non-stoic history? Perhaps, if he was optimistic enough, Epictetus could claim that true stoics in the highest registers of power would be perfect for those positions, which to a degree necessitate a robotic sense of morals and judgment.

peer comment

espringer — 2007-12-11

Find an item on which there have not yet been comments, and use the "add your comment here" button to compose a brief reaction. Peer comments should acknowledge some worthy aspect of the work, and make at least one suggestion about how a revision might further develop, clarify, or otherwise improve the piece. ** Make a peer comment in response to the class that you did *not* give an original commentary on. ** Choose one (or more) that does *not* yet have a comment, if there are still any, and use the "New Comment Here..." button below it. ** Make at least one peer comment by the next class (which is the same time as you're submitting your next original commentary). //Please note: The ''default titles'' and tags on comments @@should ''not be modified''@@; otherwise they will get disconnected from the thread of discussion.//

Logical Feelings

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Remove aversion...transfer it to things contrary to the nature of what is in our control...suppress desire...use only appropriate actions of pursuit and avoidance." (2)| |"If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies." (3)| |On seeing a man in distress: "As far as words go, however, don't reduce yourself to his level, and certainly do not moan with him. Do not moan inwardly either." (16)| While Epictetus' above statements are logical, they all stem from the premise that human beings have control over their desires, aversions and emotions. We believe we are naturally drawn and averse to certain things. His essay could have been more comprehensive if he had acknowledged how unnatural this process may seem. Describing techniques on how to prevent one's self from moaning inwardly or falling in love with certain people or things might have prevented some readers from automatically discounting the stoicism he promotes.

Self-Interest Comment 2006-02-01 22:10:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

--- I think you have a valid point here, however, you must not discount the fact that Socrates acted at least partly in his own self interest. He chose to remain true to his beliefs and thus preserve his own integrity, not necessarily for the sake of the state, but out of his own respect for himself and for the state.

Valuable yet sometimes unreasonable advice

espringer — 2007-12-11

Epictetus provides logical and sensible advice in his "Enchiridion", that is largely inspired and influenced by the life and teachings of Socrates. It deals primarily with leading a meaningful and happy life, something which all strive for. He echoes many teachings from other philosophies, such as Buddhism. One such example is his suggestion to limit attachment to impermanent things. |"If, for example you are fond of a specific ceramic cup, remind yourself that it is only ceramic cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed."(3)| While this is good advice that one could put into practice, some of his other points are not so good. There is a fine line between contentedness and complacency, which Epictetus sometimes crosses. In article # 11, he talkes about ownership, or lack there of, saying to not get upset if things are taken from you, even loved ones. This, I do not agree with, since it in a way encourages someone to devalue themselves to accept everything that happens to them, instead of trying to better their situation.

pleasure and pain

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Don't demand that things happen as you wish, but wish that they happen as they do happen, and you will go on well (8)."| |"If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies (3)."| Epictetus envisions a life not of extremes, but instead a world of moderation. Maintaining equilibrium, however, does not end suffering; it only creates a different kind. Instead of trading pain for numbness, we can find harmony between by balancing intense sadness and complete contentment. He advocates viewing everything we love as fleeting (3) in order to ease the pain of loss. Impermanent love loses its strength, though, because we consider true love eternal and eternity is not fleeting. Since pleasure is not achieved without pain, much of the Enchiridion seems unreasonable and pedantic. Epictetus might respond that his philosophy is simply a guide to those attempting to transcend common human dilemmas. His demands are too formidable, however, to assist any imperfect being.

Government as God? Comment 2006-02-01 23:08:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like that you point out the autocratic feel of the image of government that Socrates provides, but I think that in admitting that "the word of one master is more valid than the opinion of all people put together," he is referring not to the word of whoever might be in governmental power, but rather to the opinion of someone, potentially such as Plato's imagined philosopher king, who has obtained a deep understanding of true justice. -Russell

The Cost of Freedom

espringer — 2007-12-11

Epictetus insists that although it is not possible to control the outcome of external events, individuals choose the posture from which they encounter those events. His denunciation of material desire rests on this idea that, through self-control, one can master the inner attachments that hinder freedom. But if one is to abandon commitment to dreams of success and the desire to hold onto those one loves, does one compromise something essential to identity? Epictetus would likely maintain that it is possible to love without becoming dependant upon loved ones, and pursue a willful trajectory without making happiness contingent upon success. Nonetheless, I wonder if a life of hermetic indifference is avoidable if one follows his credo seriously.

A Higher Calling Comment 2006-02-01 23:15:44

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that Socrates' acceptance of his death sentence proves that he answers first and foremost to the "will of God"; however, if he thinks of the laws themselves as a higher power, shouldn't they grant him vindication where it is deserved? The laws are responsible for his unjustified death, yet he still considers them the ultimate authority. Do you think Socrates is contradicting himself there? Jennie

Changing Desires

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Things in our control are opinion, pursuit, desire, and, in a word, whatever are our own actions (1)."| Epictetus' "The Enchiridion" conveys the belief that a person should limit her focus to the things over which she has control.One of these listed elements is desire.Since one can not simply will a desire to disappear or morph and have it instantaneously follow the orders, it may seem as if desires are not under human control and that they happen to a person void of her guidance. How can one alter such an entity? According to Epictetus, it is the dwelling on and following through of these desires which we can master, and by manipulating our wants in this way we exert authority over them and ourselves.

Life Without Love

espringer — 2007-12-11

|With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are... If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are human, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies. (Epictetus, "The Enchridion", 3).| |While he gives [your wife] to you to posess, take care of it; but don't view it as your own, just as travelers view a hotel. (Epictetus, "The Enchridion", 11).| Epictetus talks of things that are valued most in life as if they were nothing more than a transitory experience that affects each person from time to time. A ceramic mug is compared to a loving family, and I believe the comparison itself is enough to question the ideals of stoicism. However temporary many aspects of life are, they still impact us in a way that is irreversible, even if the relationship or the person were to die. This impact others have on our lives is an integral part of who we are. Creating a life through emotions and experiences with others is what proves we exist and substantiates our existence with meaning.

The Scenic Route

espringer — 2007-12-11

|" . . . the former, by which alone happiness and freedom are achieved."(1) "If it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you."(1) "With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are."(3)| Epictetus' ultimate concerns are happiness and freedom, which he sees access to through use of the human intellect. Happiness is based on prosperity. Freedom is based on lack of restraint within one's worldview. His method of regarding anything beyond one's control as "meaning nothing" is a successful method of achieving happiness and freedom, for it shifts one's worldview (and therefore all notions of possible prosperity and restraint) to things under one's control. Perhaps in dealing with things beyond our control we should adopt an air of tranquil acceptance, but his assertion that those things should also lose meaning or should only be regarded in light of their "general nature" is too trivializing of the inherent specificity of human emotional attachment, though not necessarily trivializing of the value of those objects to the person who has lost them. *this was revised earlier in the semester, but evidently not logged as such*

Contradictions Comment 2006-02-02 07:53:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although Socrates may seem a slave to the "many" in abiding by the laws of the state, one can also see how the state is an independent concept which has an air of authority for Socrates comparable to the gymnast's physician or trainer. Socrates has agreed to devote himself to this master (the state), and so perhaps he would see a disloyalty to the state as a disloyalty to himself and thus his comrades who care for him. -Jeffrey

Changing Desires Comment 2006-02-02 15:26:28

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although it may hard or even impossible to change one's desires, it is possible to control the actions dictated by these desires. It is in this light that I think Epicetus believes that we have the power to either carry out or restrain our desires, for I agree with you when you say that the nonexistence of desire is impossible.

pleasure and pain Comment 2006-02-02 15:56:01

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like your point about pleasure not being acheived without pain. Yes, Epictets' philosophy is a guide to his readers, but following his own teaching of disattachment, he doesn't write the book in order to change the world. While he may hope that others will chose to read and learn from his teachings, following his own philosophy, he can't be upset about other people's responses to it. - Ellie

Logical Feelings Comment 2006-02-03 15:35:07

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with you that completely separating "internal emotions from logical actions" might not be realistically possible. However, just because something might be impossible does not affect the 'right'-ness or 'wrong'-ness of it. If, for example, we were able to prove that Epictetus' view is right, then it would be for us to strive to achieve this impossible, to aim for perfection even while accepting that that might forever be beyond our reach.

Life Without Love Comment 2006-02-04 12:36:25

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you make a good point here and although it is true that Epictetus wants to emphasize being conscious of the transitory nature of our attachments, I do not think he is saying that a ceramic mug and one's family have the same inherent value or worth. Perhaps Epictetus is merely attempting to get his readers not to kid themselves, that is, relationships and in fact all aspects of human life are essentially temporary. However does an awareness of impermanence necessarily mean that we can't experience emotions? Is Epictetus saying not to experience emotions or is he saying "experience emotions but with reasonable qualifiers?" Thus if the inevitable occurs you are not surprised and unreasonably hurt. Furthermore I was wondering if you could elaborate on what you view to be the connection between the value or "worth" of life and experiencing love and emotions.

Changing Desires Comment 2006-02-04 12:39:27

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make some good points, however, I have a few rather annoying questions for you. Are desires really unchangeable? Certainly the task of influencing and eventually changing one's desires may be difficult, but does this make it impossible? Furthermore how does the possible difficulty of what Epictetus proposes take away from his argument? Is Epictetus affirming that one should be completely be passive and simply desire what one already has or is he proposing that we should have desires and ambitions to change the world, but simply be aware of the potential disappointment of those desires, as to not be distraught if our desires are unmet and our ambitions fail?

key reasoning terms

espringer — 2007-12-11

More detail can be found at [[this site|http://parmenides.objectis.net/reason/]] * ''argument'': the presentation of assertions arranged to show how one or more ''premises'' support a ''conclusion'' * ''conclusion'': the point, or destination, of an ''argument'' * ''premise'': a starting point for an ''argument''

Logical Feelings Comment 2006-02-04 21:30:42

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although it may be true that emotions are not entirely under our control, does it not seem that we at least have some influence over our emotions? That is, although a person might feel grief at the death of a family member it is up to the particular individual whether to further develop and cultivate that emotion or to suppress it through repeated choices and acts of will (thinking, I include as an act of will). Perhaps we cannot fully control our emotions but Epictetus might argue that we can control our attitude towards those emotions or how we choose to respond to those emotions. On a more petty level the phrase "logically reasonable" is a bit repetitive.

The Pursuit of One's Indentity Comment 2006-02-04 21:43:48

espringer — 2007-12-11

You seem to be making several points here. Firstly, that Epictetus’ argument seems to entail a contradiction because he proposes controlling ourselves yet also proposes "being ourselves." I think, for Epictetus, "being ourselves" entails precisely exercising our faculty of choice and not being moved by emotions. Our identity is comprised of our free choices, not our emotions. This view is held even today, as may be seen when people are acquitted of responsibility due to "extreme emotional distress". With regards to you second point, that it's impossible to be one man because there are both good and evil parts of our identities, I'm not sure exactly what you mean. However since you have a very limited amount of words in which to develop your argument you may want to fully explore one point rather than briefly mention two. Although perhaps I am misunderstanding...

The Cost of Freedom Comment 2006-02-05 11:31:15

espringer — 2007-12-11

This commentary begins with a good succinct characterization of Epictetus' project, raises a difficulty that's undoubtedly worth exploring, and stays under the word limit -- all good! In the process of revising, I'd encourage you to reflect on two things: (1) If one gives up on "holding onto" loved ones, and insisting on "success", is that the same as ceasing to being "willful" and "devoted"? Your last sentence imlicitly construes these as the same. (2) From an empirical perspective, it may well turn out that ''"most"'' people would resist Epictetus' suggestions, yet this point does not have clear evaluative relevance. Do you mean to imply that Epictetus' recommended path would only be wise if it were popular? * Technical note: your tag needs to be 2/02 (see how it's formatted on the left sidebar, and in others' submissions); 2/2 is a completely different "word" from the computer's point of view.

A Higher Calling Comment 2006-02-05 11:40:42

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your observations here are perceptive regarding the moral weight of Socrates' position. In your case, I'd urge your work to lean less towards the summary end of the spectrum, and venture towards raising a critical concern -- some objection or difficult problem for Socrates' view -- and writing the commentary so that you have some space with which to address that concern. Perhaps what you write here is already an "answer" to a concern that someone might have raised. If so, then frame the commentary more explicitly as a way of replying to a reader who has a certain skeptical question or challenge. * Technical note: you're over the word limit by a few. Use the word count feature to check, and revise as necessary, before submitting.

An Alternative View Comment 2006-02-05 12:02:47

espringer — 2007-12-11

We discussed this commentary over email, and I remarked that you were right to perceive it as leaning more than necessary in the "[[charitable summary|charitable interpretation]]" direction. It does a fine job at reflecting on the moral weight of Socrates' position, and the next question is what kinds of problems or challenges might be raised for the position that Socrates takes here? (I realize you submitted a different commentary later. Feel free to revise that one instead.)

Contradictions Comment 2006-02-05 12:08:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

You've raised a classic apparent difficulty here: Does Socrates ''claim that he doesn't'' care about the opinion of the many, and yet ''imply that he does'' care about what the many says, insofar as he undergoes the sentence chosen by the democratic Athenian jury? This is an excellent question to raise. ! Next, I'd like you to try a certain philosophical exercise: call something an [[apparent contradiction]] until and unless you ''can'' articulate exactly which claim is both being affirmed and denied by the same person, and ''cannot'' find any clarification that shows how the two ideas are ''consistent''. ! In this case, I think you'll be able to recognize a way in which what Socrates rejects (the attention "to the praise and blame... of every man") is not identical to what he accepts (that he must follow the law, even as its procedures allow the many to decide verdicts and sentences). ! You may still raise further questions about Socrates' position, but getting clear on whether it's really a "''contradiction''" is a crucial step. *Technical note: you have some awkward grammar, such as "whom/who" confusions, and a preposition at the end of a sentence. In general, your writing might be tightened up a bit: "Socrates [not Plato] asks to whom we should be loyal, and why" would get across the idea of your third sentence very succinctly, for example.

apparent contradiction

espringer — 2007-12-11

The word ''contradiction'' is a red flag in philosophical discussion. Often what seems to be a contradiction is not, on closer inspection. So call something an ''apparent contradiction'' until and unless you ''can'' articulate exactly which claim is both being affirmed and denied by the same person, and ''cannot'' find any clarification that shows how the two ideas are ''consistent''. (See more at [[reasoning site|http://parmenides.objectis.net/reason/#contradiction]].)

Does Socrates' Condradict Himself in his Final Choice to Die? Comment 2006-02-05 12:33:54

espringer — 2007-12-11

You do very well to discuss an [[apparent contradiction]] and reflect on how to read Socrates more [[charitably|charitable interpretation]]. I think you might be even clearer about how it is not a real contradiction (that is, what is it about the masses' opinion that he doesn't care about, and what is it that he does care about?), but the basic project here has the right form. You mention in passing the idea of "act[ing] against ... an unjust ruling" as something Socrates values *less* than the preservation of law. Do you want to say anything about whether this (acting "against" unjust rulings) is in general valuable? Is there evidence that Socrates thinks that it is? *Technical notes: you have a stray apostrophe in the title and on the first mention of Socrates in the body, and there's also a phrase that doesn't work grammatically ("as one entity and interpretation of the law as another"). Also, despite a reference somewhere here to "initials", the tag should include your email name rather than initials, so that we can navigate to your [[introduction|introductions]] item. [[Titles|titles and tags]] should also avoid being too long (system can choke on them): ''Contradiction in Socrates' choice?'' would do...

charitable interpretation

espringer — 2007-12-11

Reading and listening so as to "make the most sense of" a text or speaker is the art of ''charitable interpretation''. Charitable interpretation requires us to summarize some of the ideas behind text and put it into more familiar words. ! Critical response to a text or speaker, on the other hand, requires articulating challenges and imagining how a skeptical and intelligent reader might best raise objections or worries about the ideas being presented. ! Much of the challenge of philosophy is animating a balanced internal dialogue for yourself between charitable interpretation and critical challenges. To have the right amount of charitable interpretation is not to give up on originality and creative thinking, but rather to sharpen your critical thoughts against the best possible contrary thinking.

Government as God? Comment 2006-02-05 12:47:47

espringer — 2007-12-11

Certainly the second passage you choose is particularly provocative (although it may be confusing to think of "master" in the first passage as if it were related to slavery). As I mentioned in class, one might wonder whether Socrates' way of "putting things in the mouth of" the laws indicates some reluctance to identify with those words, and might instead represent a rhetorically effective way of getting Crito to embrace obedience. Yet it's certainly not obvious. In your revision, I'd encourage you to move beyond ''summarizing'' this troubling position (that citizens are like slaves to the government). I suspect that you want to articulate a criticism of this view, and you should also reflect on any evidence that Socrates may *not* accept this authoritarian position in its worst form...

Morals and Rationale Comment 2006-02-05 13:06:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with the statement that, "the essential argument is not whether or not to do wrong, but what qualifies as wrong" because both Socrates and Crito have no desire to harm anyone in planning the escape. Both men agree that those entities that exist most dearly to them deserve the most preferential treatment, but it just so happens that Socrates values the very institution that jailed him more than the people he is closest too as Crito assumes he would.

Self-Interest Comment 2006-02-05 13:11:09

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your commentary shows skill in providing a historical context, and contrasting that context with today's climate of individualist attitudes. This is a good skill, though from a philosophical point of view, I'd encourage you to move towards considering and evaluating the ideas "on their own terms". The fact that most people today now reject an idea that made sense to the Greeks still does not give us a fully critical point of view. People today could be either more or less wise about this than the Greeks were, after all. So, how should we think about this shift? What should we make of Socrates' argument for the importance of the laws? You might present an objection to Socrates as it would come from a modern interlocutor, and then reconstruct how Socrates might reply, making sure not simply to summarize his different position, but to challenge it and engage with its claims.

Does one transgression corrupt integrity?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|If it appears that we shall be acting unjustly, then we have no need at all to take into account whether we shall have to die if we stay here and keep quiet, or suffer in another way, rather than do wrong. (48d)| |And is life worth living for us with that part of us corrupted that unjust action harms and just action benefits? (48a)| |...The most important thing is not life, but the good life. (48b)| Socrates' thorough severity toward himself for purity's sake is encouraging, fostering a feeling of potential immortality and infinity through one's ideals. If one would stray at all from one's ideals, one would become incapable of the "good life", suffering a sort of spiritual death. However, conceiving of a house-of-cards sense of identity appears optimistically grandiose, but inaccurate. To say life isn't "worth living" due to a single act of injustice is a caricature of human experience. Identity rarely rests on the lynchpin of a single inconsistency. Plato's absolutism therefore sounds disingenuous or unattainable at least. Contrarily, perhaps we need living embodiments of ideals lest we lose ethical direction. Moreover, likely for Plato the soul wasn't an abstract realm of motivation, but as real and tangible as the body.

Selfishness? Comment 2006-02-05 14:50:49

espringer — 2007-12-11

There may be a couple of issues intertwined here: (1) Socrates' pattern of reasoning is "singleminded" in that it assumes that certain considerations "trump" others (as shown in the second excerpt); (2) Socrates relies on a premise about potential effects on his own soul as the core of his justification for not defying the law (shown in first excerpt). These two issues are potentially distinct, right? One could think that justice or the greater good "trumps" any consequences for one's own soul, for example. ! Your title indicates that the second concern -- the fact that his reasons are based on what state of his own soul is worth having -- is your main issue. The irony in the notion of "moral selfishness" is certainly worth extended philosophical reflection, and some philosophers today are working on such themes. ! Although Socrates does reason from a concern for his own soul, I'm not convinced that it's fair to say that the greater good plays no role. A case can be made for reading some of the later passages as showing concern for the integrity of the city, for example. Could it not be that for Socrates, justice is a state of the soul which involves ''aligning with'' a greater good than the word "self" usually implies?

Spiritual vs. Physical Salvation Comment 2006-02-05 15:01:33

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your commentary offers an articulate [[charitable reading|charitable interpretation]] of the text: you attend to Socrates' reasoning and reconstruct its valuable aspects. What I'd encourage you to do in your revision here (and in subsequent commentaries) is to push for a more critical angle. Even if you are inspired by a text, you can imagine what skeptical challenge would be most difficult to answer, and seek to show how Socrates might try to respond to criticism about his line of reasoning.

Morals and Rationale Comment 2006-02-05 15:05:13

espringer — 2007-12-11

What you do here is a good first step in philosophical analysis: you reconstruct what the disagreement between two points of view seems to be about. As it stands, this commentary leans a bit in the direction of [[summarizing an aspect of the text|charitable interpretation]]. ! When you revise, I'd encourage you to do two things: (1) Notice that Crito accepts Socrates argument over the course of the dialogue; thus, the characters do not simply "stick to their guns" but rather believe that the tension between their views is worth resolving; (2) Take on a critical voice within this debate. //Should// Crito have given up on his claim that it would be right to escape? In Plato's text, Crito did *not* continue to claim that his view is consistent. Was he wrong about that? * There's at least one phrase here that seemed "heavy" but not so clear: "discrepancies appear because intentions are dictated by morals". Socrates and Crito certainly think that they should intend to do what's moral, and they believe that reasoning can help reveal what is right to do. If you have a clear idea here about why it is that discrepancies appear, you could try to express it more carefully; otherwise, you might let go of that claim. * I think you may want a word like "reason" or "rationality" in your title; "rationale" has a connotation that doesn't quite fit here. (Both "rationale" and "rationalize" are much-abused words these days.) * Watch out for misaligned pronouns, like one's... their...

Power vs. Truth Comment 2006-02-05 15:37:55

espringer — 2007-12-11

As I mentioned in class, I find that this commentary does very well at spelling out an important theme, and illuminating Socrates' position. To move in the direction of a stronger philosophical commentary, I'd encourage you to show [[more of a critical voice|charitable interpretation]] in response to the text and the debate. Socrates tries to convince Crito that truth and justice are more important than power and opinion, and Crito seems to have been persuaded by the end. //Should// Crito have been persuaded? Were there points at which Crito, or someone else, could have challenged Socrates' reasoning? Could Socrates have replied? Let's see some back-and-forth, and then give us some reason to appreciate which position is wiser in the end, and why...

Does one transgression corrupt integrity? Comment 2006-02-05 15:46:12

espringer — 2007-12-11

As mentioned in class, I think this commentary illustrates a critical voice very well, yet could benefit from a bit more [[charitable interpretation]] of Socrates' argument. If you animate Socrates' position for yourself, and find clues in the text about what kind of intelligent replies might come from his side, then you'll come closer to a balance that brings out the most well-honed perspective. At the very least, we will see interesting multiple threads of Socrates' argument, and some of these will be specific to how he understands his own commitments. In sum: articulating an objection is great. Follow through by evaluating and qualifying it carefully. * Please revise to make sure your commentary does not exceed 120 words using the word count feature. * I took the liberty of shortening your very long title; very long titles can create difficulty at the site maintenance level.

The Scenic Route Comment 2006-02-05 16:57:09

espringer — 2007-12-11

I’m not quite sure what you mean by your second sentence, however, I think you’re on to something. Some things to perhaps consider: when Epictetus proposes that we should be aware of the "general nature" of the objects we interact with, does he necessarily mean that we should regard them as trivial? For Epictetus, is there a necessary connection between being aware of something’s impermanent nature and the value we place on it? On a more trivial note, since you have so little space in which to present your argument, you might want to spend less space on presenting Epictetus’ view and more on presenting your own.

Hasty Generalization

espringer — 2007-12-11

|I am certain that I am a thinking thing. But do I not therefore also know what is required for me to be certain of anything? Surely in this first instance of knowledge, there is nothing but a certain clear and distinct perception of what I affirm. Yet this would hardly be enough to render me certain of the truth of a thing, if it could ever happen that something that I perceived so clearly and distinctly were false. And thus I now seem able to posit as a general rule that everything I very clearly and distinctly perceive is true. (Descartes, "Meditations on First Philosophy", Meditation Three)| Our clear conception of a unique "I" forms the basis for Descartes' conclusion in Meditation Two that the "I" exists. This requires the premise that anything we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Yet in Meditation Three the conclusion is used to prove this same premise. Thus I feel the argument suffers from [[circular reasoning|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Begging_the_question#Related_fallacies]]. Descartes might reply that doubting the premise would leave us unable to ever be certain of anything, and that in Meditation Three he is merely putting the premise on firmer basis. Still, that the premise enables his arguments is not reason enough to exempt it from doubt, what is more important is whether there is a valid possibility for doubt. Is there?

Valuable yet sometimes unreasonable advice Comment 2006-02-05 18:46:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you’re making an important point here. How do we draw the line between contentment and complacency? Since space is very limited, I think you should start exploring this point right away in your mini-essay rather than spending time talking about Epictetus and his view. What exactly to do you mean "devalue themselves"? Is there perhaps a way to be content yet actively involved in the world?

Virtue vs. Power Comment 2006-02-05 19:09:01

espringer — 2007-12-11

I’m not quite sure what you’re saying. You seem to be on to something, given Epictetus’s principle of contentment through self-control some tensions do seem to arise when Epictetus’ philosophy is extended into the public and political sphere, however, perhaps you could be more specific about exactly how and why you see these tensions occurring. Perhaps Epictetus is proposing that pursuing power and riches often entails making choices that are contradictory to remaining virtuous and personally contented, however, this does not mean that an individual cannot be involved in government and be a stoic.

pleasure and pain Comment 2006-02-05 19:22:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your make several good points here and it’s very good that you attempt to present Epictetus’ response to your objection. It does seem that without any experience of pain happiness would have no meaning, however, you seem to be giving Epictetus a rather extreme interpretation. Perhaps Epictetus is not envisioning a life without pain, but rather a life in which both pain and happiness are experienced in controlled or "buffered" moderation. Furthermore maybe you could expand on or be more specific in regards to why impermanence detracts from the "strength of love"? Also does not Epictetus explicitly state that those who attempt to gain greatness (in the sense of power and riches) will fail at gaining contentment and stoic virtue?

The Cost of Freedom Comment 2006-02-06 13:12:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your idea that "if one is to abandon commitment to dreams of success and the desire to hold onto those one loves," one may, "compromise something essential to identity." However, I interpreted Epictetus' ideals of freedom from material desires to be more directed at actual materialistic values and possessions used primarily to convey one's success to others, as opposed to freedom from love and one's personal desire to succeed. Additionally, you make a strong point in suggesting that "devotion to loved ones" is an essential component of one's identity, yet I think that Epictetus warns more of cultivating a dependency upon a loved one, rather than of love itself.

2/02

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Enchiridion, Feb 2:'' <>

No understanding w/o senses

espringer — 2007-12-11

|So what was there in the wax that was so distinctly grasped? Certainly none of the aspects that I reached by means of the senses. For whatever came under the senses of taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed; and yet the wax remains. (Descartes, //Meditations on First Philosophy//, p. 21)| |But I need to realize that the perception of the wax is neither a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imagining. Nor has it ever been, even though it previously seemed so; rather it is an inspection on the part of the mind alone. (Descartes, //Meditations on First Philosophy//, p. 22)| Descartes' wax model argues that people come to know things through the intellect rather than the senses. He illustrates that the senses can show us physical characteristics of wax in the solid and molten states, but that they cannot inform us that the two states of wax are the same item. Solely the intellect can make sense of what we perceive. The senses just tell us a bunch of jumbled information. Are these entities really so distant? Descartes might suggest that certain things depend on the senses while others do not. But there would not be a good argument without the basis of fact gathered by the senses. Likewise, without intellect, reasoning about perceived objects would not come about.

Valuable yet sometimes unreasonable advice Comment 2006-02-06 23:11:20

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think that "Enchiridion" is in many ways to be interpreted. Epictetus describes a general "code of conduct" that in its nature is impossible for it to be applied in the same way for all people. Avoiding the work's literal meaning allows the reader to see article #11 as stating that one must seperate the act of something being taken away from its personal value. We can cherish and value certain things and people, however they are subject to expire and leave us. I feel that Epictetus suggests for us to not waste time with the fear of living without something or wallow in the loss of something or someone, but rather acknowledge its role in your life at the present.

Sensory Definitions

espringer — 2007-12-11

|So what was there in the wax that was so distinctly grasped? Certainly none of the aspects that I reached by means of the senses. For whatever came under the senses of taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now changed; and yet the wax remains. (Descartes, "Mediation on First Philosophy," p 21)| |But I need to realize that the perception of the wax is neither a seeing, nor a touching, nor an imagining. Nor has it ever been, even though it previously seemed so; rather it is an inspection on the part of the mind alone. (Descartes, "Mediation on First Philosophy," p 22)| Descartes attributes sensory explanations to objects by divorcing physical perceptions from mental comprehension, thereby downplaying the cognitive relationship between the two. He offers that we recognize a ball of wax based on the physical sensations that it suggests, while I believe that our understanding is achieved only when accompanied by the necessary logical rationalization. The senses are essential in recognizing an object, but the link between physical and mental cognition is central. Different states of an object's existence appeal to different senses, yet the object is still ultimately unchanged. The thought processes involved in recognizing the existence of a being based on the senses and then connecting that to the mental recognition are what I consider the fundamental aspect of our understanding of existence.

Doubting Truth and Deception

espringer — 2007-12-11

|I fall back on my own accord into my old opinions, and dread being awakened, lest the toilsome wakefullness which follows upon a peaceful rest must be spent thenceforward not in the light but among the inextricable shadows of the difficulties now brought forward. (Descartes, 23)| While truth may be reached through enlightenment, at some point, one must take the risk of investing faith in the unknown. This leap is hard to make for fear of being deceived, which Descartes equates to imperfection. Those on the quest for truth would question Descartes' reasoning, but his retort would be that they are just building onto what is already known by inquiring about something that they personally perceived, and perception is deceiving. But how can one learn if everything every thing fundamental is doubted? It is unclear whether truth or deception is worse. Fear of deception and the intrinsic desire to go through life in search of absolute certainty leaves one in a state of continual doubt.

Inherent Flaw in Descartes' Method

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. And thus realized that once in my life I had to raze everything to the ground and begin again from the original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences. (Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy p.13)| |...what about when I considered something very simple and easy in the areas of arithmetic or geometry, for example that two plus three make five...I did decide later on that I must doubt these things, but that was only because it occurred to me that some God could perhaps have given me a nature such that I might be deceived even about matters that seemed most evident. (Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy p.36)| Descartes' method of using ultimate skepticism to derive a solid, underlying reality, seems to be inherently flawed; if one doubts all that is doubtable, including arithmetic (entailing logic), then one has no means to move beyond doubt. Descartes might respond by referring to his method of confirming his existence (that his act of thinking proves that he exists) through doubting all that is not indubitable. However, even this conclusion involves a logical progression, a necessary connection between action and subject, between thought and thinker. Consequently, Descartes has failed to doubt all that is doubtable, specifically, logic and reason. Yet, Descartes might respond that although numbers cannot be completely ascertained, pure logic is an inherent process of the mind equivalent to thinking, and thus cannot be doubted.

The Pursuit of One's Indentity Comment 2006-02-06 23:48:44

espringer — 2007-12-11

I wholeheartedly agree with you that what make us individuals are those aspects of our character that are out of our control. I also believe, however, that Epictetus is not necessarily opposed to our ability to choose what we like, but he advocates our choosing morally whether or not to act on those desires, thereby living a "good" or "evil" life.

Life Without Love Comment 2006-02-06 23:37:06

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you've picked out among the most troubling passages in this reading. I, too, object to the life philosophy presented in the passages you quoted, as they seem to suggest that we should live life itself as mere patrons of a hotel. It would seem that Epictetus would have us treat our experiences as a mere waiting room within which we are to sit, indifferently reading a magazine, living a life without vulnerability-- in short, not a life. While I, who have had a similar reaction to the reading that you had, might read this commentary without objection, I would imagine that a proponent of Stoicism might not be convinced. Stoics represent a significantly disparate, even diametrically opposed, view of a worthy life and to simply assert that they present "a worthless life" that "denies the soul [sic] purpose of existing" wouldn't likely be a sufficient objection for them. I understand this error, as I have previously been guilty of it-- one assumes one's point to be self-evident, but the very existence of Stoicism suggests otherwise. Clearly to Stoics, regarding family as transitory and one's love for it as contingent on their mortality is perfectly rational. In other words, your commentary expresses a fundamentally opposed perspective, but doesn't do much toward explaining the rationale behind the perspective. 120 words is doubtless a major obstacle towards this end, though, and you have a semester to better develop this ability.

You Just Don't Know

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"But because being deceived and being mistaken appear to be a certain imperfection, the less powerful they take the author of my origin to be, the more probably it will be that I am so imperfect that I am always deceived."(p 16)| Descartes hypothesizes that because he is aware of his thought process, he can determine that "he" as a subject exists; however, he also acknowledges the possibility that a deity implanted within him a gross misconception of reality. In conceding this possible manipulation, he undermines his conclusion that this fictional world resembles his current perceived reality. Descartes cannot conclude that he "knows" he exists because he has no basis to comprehend something so foreign and potentially different from his present perception. To this, he would most likely respond that no matter the form the consciousness took, the general existence of self-perception means that somewhere, someone or something was generating that thought and he was thus somehow part of it and existed.

Safari browser note

espringer — 2007-12-11

Recent versions of Safari routinely "hang" on this site if any item uses //curly quotes// (the kind Microsoft Word likes to make by default) or //curly apostrophes// within table box formatting. ! If you're using Safari, please beware of this limitation. ! For the sake of those who have no other browser, please avoid curly quotes if possible.

The Scenic Route Comment 2006-02-07 23:37:05

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your comment that, if Epictetus is arguing that we, as human beings, should completely disregard anything which is not in our direct control, that this is a stereotypical philosophic thought: an idea that is virtually flawless in theory but which cannot be practically applied to the fallible reality of humankind. However, I believe that when Epictetus states "be prepared to say that it is nothing to you," he is not actually saying that it should have no emotional impact whatsoever, but rather, that we should be able to disengage to the point that we are not violently effected by the volatility of our emotions. This is, I think, what Epictetus’ ultimate concerns truly center around: the idea that we should not be slave to anything-- our emotions, desires, nor the physical realm. Essentially, that we live lives of accountability and should not be ruled by our hearts, but by our intellect. This reading should not be seen as a philosophical hypothesis, but rather as Buddhist-like guidelines for what we, as fallible human beings, should strive to attain through rigorous restraint and acquired self-moderation.

Doubting Truth and Deception Comment 2006-02-08 15:57:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like how you expanded on the text, and drew your own conclusions. I would agree with you that it is ultimately fear of the unknown and the desire for certainty that lead to unhappiness. I disagree with you in that these doubts can be resolved. Descartes makes it very clear that there is only really one certainty that a person can have; that they exist. Beyond that, it is very difficult to remove these doubts with a skeptical mind.

Thought and Existance Comment 2006-02-08 16:06:47

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that there cannot be a complete distinction between the mind and the senses. Thinking is most definitely a defining characteristic of existing, but it is not enough to create a tangible life. Perhaps the life Descartes defines is not tangible, but I believe existence necessitates feelings, both physically and mentally.

A Turn of Will

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"...when the will turns away from the unchangeable and common good toward its own private good, or toward external or inferior things, it sins" (Augustine, p.25).| |"What is evil is the turning of the will away from the unchangeable good and toward changeable goods. And since this turning is not coerced, but voluntary, its justly punished with misery" (Augustine, p.25).| |"...I deny that a soul ought to be blamed when this movement pulls it away from the unchangeable good toward changeable goods, if this movement is so much a part of its nature that it is moved by necessity" (Evodius, p.27).| Augustine and Evodius discuss the turn one makes, by their own free will, from a life that is rightly lived to one that is not. Evodius argues that if free will is a creation of God, then the turn towards evil that one makes is thereby a creation of God as well, and is not the fault of the person who had the unfortunate fate of lacking enough discipline to avoid desire, physical pleasure, and material goods. Considering Augustine's argument of will, I believe Evodius raises a reasonable objection. The opportunity God creates to either live rightly or sin is enough to give credibility to Edovius' point of a natural tendency, or at least excuse, for turning one's will.

The function of a dichotomy

espringer — 2007-12-11

If God gave people free will but will inevitably punish those who use it to sin, what use is the ability to sin other than to reinforce that we should use our free will to seek out the unchanging good? What is the use of having a choice to either do good and be rewarded or do evil and be forced to think that it would have been smarter to do good? I suppose Augustine would argue that the ability to sin makes a pious action even more respected and validates the need to give punishment or reward. He could also argue that sin is not some intangible action, many sins result in directly destructive events and while it is not the people’s duty to judge one another it is implicitly visible either to the person or the public when a sin has been committed.

The Power of Choice

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"If the movement of the will by which it turns this way or that were not voluntary and under its own control, a person would not deserve praise for turning to higher things or blame for turning to lower things." (Augustine 29)| |"Whatever God has foreknown will happen, and that he foreknows our sins in such a way that our wills remain free and are within our power..." (Augustine 33)| |"If human beings are good things, and they cannot do right unless they so will, then they ought to have a free will, without which they cannot do right." (Augustine 20)| While God or whoever we believe is the highest being, may foresee our destiny, virtually every action that we take in life is through our own individual free will. Every human being has the ability to change their destiny, even if they believe that it is out of their control.We can either sin or commit acts of kindness, but if mistakes are not made in the process, then it is impossible for an individual to learn from their mistake and find serenity within themselves and move on to a life of good deeds. Some live immoral lives and while "it ought to be the case that no one could use the will to sin," (Augustine 21) ultimately the gift of free will means that there is always a choice. "God gave us free choice in order to enable us to act rightly." (Augustine 22)

You Just Don't Know Comment 2006-02-08 21:07:22

espringer — 2007-12-11

You bring up a good point, and by realizing that Descartes has never established a real truth, all his observations seem to lose their credit. By questioning the nearly unquestionable (his imagination), Descartes seems to halt at a dead end.

rheinemann's untitled post (please don't leave as New Tiddler)

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The very fact that anyone who usesfree will to sin is divinely punishedshows that free will was given to enable human beings to live rightly..."(St. Augustine "On Free Choice of the Will" p. 20| St. Augustine throughout this passage tries to explain to Evodius that God has really given man a will of his own. He makes the distinction between foreknowledge, which he says God must possess, and the idea that God controls our actions. A loving God would have to grant us the ability to choose to follow Him(or Her) or to not, allowing us to willingly accept and return that love. The age old question still remains, however; If God is all-knowing, why do bad things happen in the world?

free will

espringer — 2007-12-11

Outside of academic philosophy, many people puzzle over the concept of free will -- is there some special kind of original and unique capacity to choose that human beings have, something that makes us different from other organisms and complex machines? ! One large body of philosophical work focuses on whether meaningful choice requires free will in a metaphysical sense (one which defies laws of nature, including laws of psychology), and another large body of philosophical work concerns the ''value'' of free will, if it necessarily involves the ability to do things that are not governed by any understandable pattern or principle.

2/09

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Augustine, Feb 9 (tagged {{{2/09}}}):'' <>

An Alternative Route

espringer — 2007-12-11

|But even when we find good things in the body that we can use wrongly, we do not say that they ought not to have been given to the body...so why should it be surprising that there are also good things in the soul that we can use wrongly?-Augustine pg. 22| Augustine makes a faulty analogy in comparing free will to the bodily faculties. Following his logic, both the will and one's hand, for example, are equivalently "good" as vehicles for just action, although they can be employed to sinful ends. But a hand cannot be used wrongly without a willful choice directing it. Free will is not a tool, however, but rather the very origin of choice, both good and bad. Despite his unconvincing analogy, Augustine ultimately concludes that all right and wrong action does stem from the will. This seeming discrepancy between analogy and conclusion brings to light the function of analogies in argumentation: they may serve an explanatory role, but do not prove the argument.

Unintentional Goodness

espringer — 2007-12-11

|If human beings are good things, and they cannot do right unless they so will, then they ought to have a free will, without which they cannot do right.| |The fact that human beings could not live rightly without it [free will] was sufficient reason for God to give it.| Augustine claims that one's possession of free will allows one to do right and wrong. He holds that sin and/or good cannot be created by a person who does not exercise free will. The notion that one cannot do right without voluntarily initiating it seems inaccurate. Does not a rich man who accidentally drops one of his many loaves of bread near a starving vagabond do at least some small measure of good? Augustine might counter by stating that while the incidence was beneficial to the vagabond, it does not constitute righteousness on the rich man's account for he did not consciously commit to the action.

Contradiction in Socrates' Choice?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Socrates:...if, acting under the advice of those who have no understanding, we destroy that which is imporoved by health and deteriorated by disease, would life be worth having?...Crito: Yes." (Plato, "Crito")| Socrates asserts that it is wrong to act under advice that contradicts the opinion of those who have "understanding." Accused of acts which he does not believe to be immoral transgressions, Socrates' acquiescence to the court's unjust ruling seems to contradict his initial claim, since the court is part of those mistrusted masses that lack understanding of true justice. However, in asserting the greater justice of law that thwarts chaos, perhaps Socrates believes that acting against what he knows to be an unjust ruling is not as vital as preserving law and its concomitant authority and their ability to bring peace and order to society. Yet, clearly, acquiescence to unjust laws breeds injustice and validates authority's arbitrary use of power.

You Just Don't Know Comment 2006-02-08 23:52:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that "the notion of misconception is only actualized through the counterbalance of accurate perception,"(well put) but I think that Descartes would maintain that even if he is unable to ever reach true understanding of the world around him, the fact of his searching for understanding is enough to prove at least that he exists.

ignorance is bliss

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"A geometrician has learned to perform the most difficult demonstrations and calculations, as a monkey has learned to take his little hat off and on, and to mount his tame dog."| |"The soul is therefore but an empty word, of which no one has any idea, and which an enlightened man should only use to signify the part in us that thinks."| Mettrie reduces humans to complex machines, suggesting that the soul is a fabrication of these mechanisms. Descartes, however, whom Mettrie himself criticizes, would argue that in order for Mettrie to form these ideas, his mind must first exist to do the forming. Mettrie parallels the human brain performing intricate calculations to a monkey's simpler brain performing basic tasks, and his argument is compelling. But if Mettrie is correct, and humans indeed are only elaborate machines, I believe that most people would choose to remain uninformed and blissfully ignorant. Otherwise, once it is known that free will, identity, desire, and all feeling is operated by a mechanic device, existence would lapse into a hopeless misery.

Solipsism Comment 2006-02-09 00:03:44

espringer — 2007-12-11

It's interesting that you say"solipsism is wrong," because indeed it does feel inherently wrong. But is that because is it fundamentally unfounded, or is it merely because there is something so unsettling about the concept that it forces us to leave the idea to science fiction accounts and convince ourselves that such a thing could not, would not, happen to us?

A Ever Changing Self Comment 2006-02-09 00:57:21

espringer — 2007-12-11

If I understand you correctly, you believe it seems foolish to compare current oppinions and understandings with those held in the distant past becuase they will undoubtedly be greatly changed by the accumulation of knowledge. Descartes was not only challenging complicated notions he held, (such as the example of flight you gave) but such basic concepts as the reliability of the senses and anything that seemed obvious and reasonable. While it is common to look back on misunderstandings of complex phenomena with completely changed perceptions, most humans never challenge so-called obvious oppinions they've held their entire lives, such as whether or not the body exists, the way Descartes did.

Free Willy

espringer — 2007-12-11

|When you do become happy, it will be in accordance with your will, not against your will. Simply because God foreknows your future happiness ... it does not follow that you will be happy against your will.| The question of whether or not the feeling of happiness is against one's will seems irrelevant to me, because if God knew that the happiness was going to happen, then it doesn't matter what we perceive our will to be, because by definition the foreknowledge of all events disproves the existence of a free will. The omniscience of God is different from the predictions of a scientist, in that it is definite and absolute in a timeless sense, to the point that other options simply do not exist. The totality and idealistic infallibility of such knowledge would be so absolute as to form a logical enough basis to disprove the existence of any other options, and thus of choice. I don't feel that Augustine did enough to confront this innate paradox head on, but rather based his whole argument on the belief that god foresees that we will use our will to make certain things happen, so our will must exist because god sees it. But those who don't share this belief have nothing to supersede the reasoning that foreknowledge defies free will, and are therefore left to believe that such omniscience cannot exist in conjunction with free will.

Free Willy Comment 2006-02-09 15:50:17

espringer — 2007-12-11

How does foreknowledge of all events disprove the existence of free will? Knowledge is passive. From mechanics, I can have perfect knowledge of the trajectory of a projectile, yet it is not I nor my knowledge that makes the projectile move just so. Similarly, if Allah is all-knowing, ze can know all the choices that we will make. Yet unless Allah decides to take a hand in changing our decision, mere 'knowing' does not necessitate nor potentiate our decision. Perhaps a better question to ask about free will is this: are my choices causally determined by who I am, the sum of my experiences, and what I am going through, or can I choose differently?

The function of a dichotomy Comment 2006-02-09 16:48:51

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I agree with your standpoint on this issue, that evil exists to draw attention to good, I am rather confused about your meaning when you use the word sin. Is sin and evil the same thing? Is death an evil or a sin? In what way does the existence of sin prove that "it is good to be good"? Can you prove that bad things happen to people who sin?

A Turn of Will Comment 2006-02-09 17:00:14

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that you have a point: you cannot blame the cat for killing the mouse, it is its nature. However, does this apply to humans? The contention that desire, physical pleasures, material goods, and lack of discipline wield such influence on our decisions that we sometimes cannot choose to conflict with them would mean that, in effect, we do not have free will. Your use of 'fate' implies that all has been predetermined by God, and that she might not be so omnibenevolent after all. That said, we return to the question of free will, can humans choose to do other than what is in their nature?

ignorance is bliss Comment 2006-02-09 21:27:31

espringer — 2007-12-11

So your position is that whether or not Mettrie is correct, his position is so abhorrent that we should stick our hands in our ears and go "nah nah nah I can't hear you". I can respect that, I suspect that it is not an uncommon opinion at all. Yet, for argument's sake, lets assume for the moment that we find positive proof that we are only elaborate biological machines. Does that invalidate everything you have ever stood for? Will your awareness of your own existence be any less? All your emotions, dreams, and desires, would not those feelings still be as real to you then as they are to you now? Would humanity then throw away its ideals and civilization revert to barbarism? I say no. So what if deep under the shell of my awareness my every thought and decision is determined by the sum of my experiences, external influences, biological predispositions, and whatnot? The thinking, feeling, doubting, loving awareness that I am now will not so easily change its nature.

The Power of Choice Comment 2006-02-09 22:09:45

espringer — 2007-12-11

Nice summary. You stated that serenity can only be found through the making of mistakes, unfortunately I do not clearly see how the two are related. Perhaps you might clarify.

Unintentional Goodness Comment 2006-02-09 23:20:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

You raised a good point, and suggested a plausible resolution. Holding the opinion that unintended kindness ought not be attributed to the individual does imply, however, that we cannot be held responsible for unintended crimes. Might I suggest you consider if it is possible to be only partially responsible for something? Furthermore, if Allah is to be thanked for the unintended goodness, who do we hold responsible for unintended evil?

An Alternative Route Comment 2006-02-09 23:39:39

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that free will is not a tool wielded like the hand. However, we seem to disagree on a few points. St Augustine stated that both the will and one's hands are good, not that they are equivalently good. Nowhere in the text did he state that free will and the hands share an equal capacity for good. Indeed, as he values the soul more than the body (pg. 22), Augustine arguably places a higher value on free will than the hands. Also, Evodius probably meant that when doing justice, which by definition is good, it is impossible to obtain from it an evil result. For to do good is to do justice, and to do evil is to do injustice. In that sense, it is impossible to use justice wickedly. The choice between justice and injustice you speak of is an application of free will.

Sensory Definitions Comment 2006-02-10 16:17:43

espringer — 2007-12-11

You raise a good point about the link between physical and mental cognition, indeed it appears hard to have one without the other. However I have some trouble understanding the rest, in your first quote I believe Descartes states that the wax is still wax despite changes in its physical characteristic, and goes on in your second quote to opine that it is the mind alone that 'recognizes' the wax. How is that you hold the opinion that Descartes believed that an object is defined solely by those sensations it offers and changes the nature of its existence when it undergoes physical change? As for your last assertion, I understand you to mean that it is fallacious to think that 'bodies' constantly change the nature of its existence. Why?

2/14

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Mettrie & d'Holbach, Feb 14 (tagged {{{2/14}}}):'' <>

The Power of Choice Comment 2006-02-11 12:42:05

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your critique pulls nicely from the different angles of logic Augustine presents in this piece. The second quote you chose demonstrates a compromise that allows for an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God to exist in a world where evil also exists. However, I agree with Eric in that I do not fully understand the sentence about mistakes and serenity.

An Alternative Route Comment 2006-02-11 16:41:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

I’m not sure I understand your objection to Augustine’s analogy, for can it not be the case that the human faculty of choice, that is, freewill is also a tool necessary for the accomplishment of good? Much in the same way that I cannot slap many a high-five without a hand, I cannot do any good, or in fact evil, without choice, for both high fives and moral action entail the involvement of a pertinent hand or freewill. I think the point Augustine is trying to make is that just because a certain human ability can potentially be used for evil ends does not make that ability inherently evil. I’m not sure I understand your objection to the analogy if this is the end it is trying to accomplish. For the second part of you mini-essay, I’m a little lost. I’m not sure what argument you’re referring to and what objection your raising, perhaps you could be a little more clear... sorry for my denseness.

Augustine's Comparison Comment 2006-02-11 17:02:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you may be misunderstanding Augustine’s point in the first quote. Augustine is saying something like, " well if the eye is good, even though you can live rightly without it, then doesn’t freewill have to be good since you can’t live rightly without it?" Also, I think for Augustine the idea of "properly functioning" and "morally just" are related in regards to the will, that is, the proper function of a freewill is to enable human beings to live in a morally just manner. In the same way that the proper function of an eye is to see, the proper function of freewill is to be exercised for the accomplishment of good. You seem to be on to something with the second part of your micro-essay. However, how can one "live both rightly and badly" without freewill. For if we don’t have a choice in what we do how can we be responsible for our actions. Can a bullet be accused of murder? However it does seem that perhaps freewill can have an amoral or "morally neutral nature", your making a very intriguing point here, it would be great if you could elaborate on it.

The Power of Choice Comment 2006-02-11 17:17:08

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm.... Yes, but what of it? You seem to be summarizing some of Augustine's ideas without saying anything for yourself. Do you agree with Augustine completely? Avoid just summarizing the ideas you read, look for points you don't agree with or ideas that seem objectionable in one way or another. For example, how can we have freewill if God has complete foresight of our actions? Since God is the creator, and from the very beginning of creation God necessarily knew who was going to do evil and who was to do good, doesn’t that mean that in a way God decided our destinies for us? Also you seem to bring in ideas that don’t seem particularly philosophically relevant, for example the fact that every human is born with a "pure soul" or individual's finding serenity. Perhaps I'm just not getting it at all.

The function of a dichotomy Comment 2006-02-11 17:28:53

espringer — 2007-12-11

It is true that in Augustine’s universe, it is ultimately in our best interest to utilize freewill for good than for evil. More importantly for Augustine, however, God did not give human beings freewill in order for them to able to sin, but rather for human beings to be able to do good. Freewill, that is, the choice between good and evil is necessary because in order for any action to be properly subject to moral judgment, a free choice is necessary. If rain drops save a man who is dying of thirst, do we say that the rain drops have done good? No because the rain simply does what the rain does, since rain has no choice it cannot be subject to moral judgment.

Unintentional Goodness Comment 2006-02-11 17:47:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

The point you bring up is very astute and intriguing, can actions be dubbed good or evil without the involvement of conscious choice? Does one have to know the nature of one’s actions in order to be morally responsible for them? Perhaps one idea that can help us out is to consider action and intention as distinct but related entities. That is, every action involves the action itself and the intention behind it. In regards the potential response you propose for Augustine, how would Augustine respond to the idea that God can’t be held responsible for the action since the person made the decision to commit the action, even though they were unaware of its moral nature at the time? For example, if a person throws a penny off the empire state building and that penny kills someone, is God responsible?

On the Credibility of Solipsism.

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Nor will I ever get out of the habit of assenting to [ong-standing opinions] and believing in them, so long as I take them to be exactly what they are, namely, in some respects doubtful, as has just now been shown, but nevertheless highly probable, so that it is much more consonant with reason to believe them than to deny them. (Section 22)| |...that there really is a world, that men have bodies, and the like (things which no one of sound mind has ever seriously doubted)... (Section 16)| In presenting solipsism as highly improbable or practically impossible, Descartes may be overlooking a Pandora's Box he opens by throwing into doubt not only one's perceptions specifically but the reliability of perception in general. Once one acknowledges one's perceptions as mere effects of an indeterminate cause, using one's perspective as a gauge of objective reality becomes problematic. Sure solipsism and its variations *feel* wrong, but that very feeling is being used here to affirm its own reliability as a gauge of reality. If we are to step outside the realm of perception to attempt to determine its cause, it appears that we have entered a vacuum: our perspective is too narrow to infallibly perceive its own cause. As Sartre observed, we can't transcend subjectivity here. ! Post-Script: This is probably an uncharacteristic way of responding to feedback on a commentary, but it appears to be the best way. I revised my commentary, but while I agree that grounding my arguments more in the text is something I definitely need to do more in the future, I would like to defend my interpretation of the text here. While it is clear that Descartes took pains to keep all of his perceptions and opinions in a state of doubt, it is my impression that Descartes considered solipsism (or any conception of an objective external world being fundamentally misrepresented by our perceptions) to be a remote possibility, if he considered it at all (beyond a mere means in this exercise of rational rigor). It is also my impression that Descartes' other meditations are commonly regarded as unsatisfying and insufficient proof of existence of what the 2nd meditation established. However, the assumption that is often maintained regardless, echoed by Descartes, is that even if we can't *prove* anything beyond our own minds, it is still highly probable that one's subjective experience is grounded in objectivity when observing the outside world. It is this weighing of probabilities for want of proof that I am trying to call into question. Although Descartes, for the sake of his exercise in rigorous doubt, suspends his belief in the external world, he indicates that he thinks it sound to consider this belief "highly probable"�. I'm saying that once perception itself is doubted, a "Pandora's box" is opened in that so many alternative conceptions of objective reality emerge as possibilities, and one has no scale by which to weigh probabilities and declare the apparent conception of reality most probable -- it would appear that any conceivable (or inconceivable) notion of reality is equally possible in that our conventional methods of weighing probability (intuition, sensation, etc.) are themselves being subjected to doubt regarding their utility to gauge objective reality (and consequently weigh possibilities objectively).

2/07

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Descartes, Feb. 7:'' <>

A Ever Changing Self Comment 2006-02-12 19:01:01

espringer — 2007-12-11

Early on, it seems when you refer to "Descartes' point" you mean his argument (not a single point but the drawing of a conclusion based on premises) that all of his opinions must be doubted because he has found that he had false opinions in his youth. Yet his premise is not only that he had false opinions (like thinking of flight as magic) and thus should question his beliefs now, but also that many of his current beliefs were //built upon// earlier beliefs, like buildings on shaky foundations. ! I sense that your central insight here is that perhaps this "building" metaphor for the relation of some beliefs to others is not a good metaphor -- perhaps you would suggest that often newer beliefs simply replace earlier ones? This is certainly an intriguing idea. Considering this line of thought in light of Descartes' overall project, I would encourage you to ask: Would recognizing this possibility would have saved Descartes from the spectre of radical doubt that he faced? * Writing notes: a couple of times here, you reach for a word or phrase that's //almost// what you want, but not quite. For example: **"an unchanging self hitherto by continuous principles" seems to be a phrase with a word left out. ** To define of redefine something is to specify its meaning, yet what Descartes is doing is not //redefining// his opinions, but //re-evaluating// his beliefs (perhaps in the process he redefines "knowledge", so that knowledge no longer means whatever seems obvious to him, but instead means only what passes the test of radical skeptical doubt.) ** Is what Descartes is doing "comparing" what he believes now with what he did in the past? It seems he's arguing that what he believes now has been built on his earlier beliefs. I think this is the idea that you're challenging. Still, the issue seems not to be about ''comparison''... ** Your title would need to be ''An Ever Changing Self''.

Doubting Truth and Deception Comment 2006-02-12 19:18:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

What you offer here is something like a reflective gloss on the text, with some rhetorical flair. Your work here shows that the text inspired you to make various connections among ideas in the text, and it emphasizes charitable interpretation, which is one important ingredient in philosophical reading. However, for the sake of philosophical writing, I'd encourage you to adopt an additional angle of approach. As you read, imagine where a reader might not be persuaded by Descartes. Try to discern where an intelligent reader might disagree with his conclusions, or find his claims in need of clarification. If you can raise an objection to his argument, then you can go on to consider how Descartes might reply. This sort of back-and-forth between critical reading and charitable reading is the core of the commentary skill I'm encouraging us all to develop this semester. * As far as writing goes, you lose clarity a bit with the sentence about "Fear of deception AND intrinsic desire... OR the absence of certainty". There are multiple ways to read a sentence strung together with mixed ''and''s and ''or''s. The sentence (if you keep it) could be restructured for clarity.

Dreams Comment 2006-02-12 19:36:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

You bring up some intriguing themes here, although the focus seems somewhat scattered -- perhaps because you were not yet sure what to make of the reading and how the parts connected? (In that case, leaving enough time to consult with a TA so that you're confident you're reading clearly //before// writing might help. ! In the process of writing, if you stop to read what you've written -- as if with new eyes -- you may recognize places where what you've said isn't quite what you meant. For example, does Descartes' have an "explanation of dreams"? (He uses the idea of dreams to explain something else -- namely, why he does not feel confident that he can trust his common-sense experiences.) Does he worry that "if we dream unconsciously, how can we exist?" He wants to argue that if we can dream ''false'' things, then we are less confident about what we seem to know. Yet being asleep for him does not undermine his confidence in the existence of the mind. Do you think it should? ! I'm not sure of what to make of your fourth sentence, including "the act of perceiving what we know is the truth when we are conscious, while unconscious...". I suspect you may have a very interesting idea here, but I'm not following it. I'm also not sure whether you are at that point summarizing Descartes, or adding a critical reflection of your own. * You use an argument indicator (thus) in your second sentence that seems not to work. From the mere fact that Descartes "discusses" the notion of truth, it doesn't seem to //follow// that the perception of truth supports a certain claim. Your writing can make clear that one claim Descartes makes supports another claim (by the end of that sentence you do get to show how one claim is supposed to support another, but this can't be what you're referring to earlier in the sentence with "thus"). * I fixed your formatting, and added the tag "commentary" so that your work would show up properly and be able to accept peer feedback.

Hasty Generalization Comment 2006-02-12 19:50:13

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your work here has the strength of focusing right in on one problematic argument and articulating an objection. You might be right that Descartes commits a mistake, but it's not a good idea to announce it confidently without taking the time to cross-examine. As usual, my suggestion will be that you should try to leave room to anticipate a likely reply. How do you think Descartes might answer your worry? ! In fact, the symbolic representation here, while a valiant attempt, is not quite right. On the level of formal symbolization, X and Y don't work as independent propositions. You need a more complex quantificational structure to allow {{{Y}}} to refer to the "//that// something" that's mentioned in your {{{X}}}. Further, it turns out that logical claims about the objects of certainty and perception actually resist formalization in a very stubborn way. ! At any rate, we can get at your point on the informal level. //Does// Descartes merely "jump" from the specific claim to the general? Well, he claims that he is certain of these two things: (1) P provides sufficient reason to believe Q. (2) The only possible //explanation for// P being sufficient for Q lies in the reliability of the "light of nature" by which clarity and distinctness are appreciated. ! He thus justifies his confidence in this "light of nature" by which clarity and distinctness are appreciated. Now, further objections might well be raised. Yet I suspect that you are really likely to find fault with even claim (1) if you doubt the general claim. After all, if the general claim is dubious (that the light of nature is reliable), then it's unclear what would justify (1). No?

Inherent Flaw in Descartes' Method Comment 2006-02-12 20:14:59

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your commentary here focuses right in on a problematic aspect of Descartes' reasoning, and pushes an objection fairly persuasively. I would encourage you to take a reflective look, after writing, and see what might be said on Descartes' behalf, in the name of charitable interpretation. It strikes me that there are several "faces" to your objection here, and some are more powerful than others. For example, Descartes might argue that "logic and reason" are specifically //not// doubtable -- he tries but //fails// to doubt them. Logic as such may have an even more privileged status than the arithmetic and geometry that he doubts earlier. This privilege may itself be worth challenging, but it would make sense of Descartes' multiple assertions. ! I do suspect, however, that aspects of your objection here will survive beyond the first exchange of replies from Descartes. In particular, the "obvious" connection between action and agent -- something that Descartes seems to pick up as if it were a matter of logic, deserves scrutiny. Might Descartes literally be right that //he could not// doubt such things (namely, the notion of a "substance" beneath all appearances and changes, whether in the case of wax or in the case of mind)? One line of thought we migth pursue here is that people may well be //differently able// to doubt such things! Of course, this would salvage the integrity of his personal meditations at the cost of undermining the "firm and lasting foundations for the sciences", which presumably are not to depend on the idiosyncrasies of what we can and cannot manage to doubt as individuals!

No understanding w/o senses Comment 2006-02-12 21:04:54

espringer — 2007-12-11

You do well at reconstructing Descartes' position through the first several sentences here. Next, you remark on a point of disagreement with Descartes, showing a point for critical discussion. ! As it stands, your objection ("the intellect and the senses... are not as separate as Descartes sees them") comes out as a flatly contrary assertion. //Why// should we think they're not so separate? I think your last sentence is intended to support this claim -- and yet what the last sentence shows is that the intellect //depends on// the senses when it comes to our conception of material things. It seems Descartes can agree that we wouldn't have a concept of wax without the senses, and yet there's no difficulty for him in maintaining that the intellect is //distinct from// the senses, and that the unified concept of wax as such can be grasped only by the intellect and not by the senses. Can A be distinct from B despite depending on B for certain things? ! In general, when you present and objection, it's a good strategy to leave a bit of room to consider a possible reply (even if you're not entirely convinced by it). In this case, Descartes might suggest that while //certain// ideas depend on the senses, still others may not. Logical and mathematical ideas, for example, (such as concepts of negative number, //i//, infinity, or zero) may be present to the intellect but not to the senses. While some philosophers will indeed argue that no idea can occur to us except as they enter through the senses, this claim is at least a difficult and complex one to defend...

Thought and Existance Comment 2006-02-12 21:20:01

espringer — 2007-12-11

I believe you may think there's more disagreement than there really is between your ideas and Descartes' here. Notice that for Descartes, the word "thinks" (the best our translation can do for the latin "cogito" //covers// all sorts of mental experience: |A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, and that also imagines and senses. (p. 20)| Descartes can agree that experiencing certain sensory things is as much a proof of one's existence as is asking oneself an intellectual question. Whether one's sensation is //accurate// (or really is "physical") is of course open to doubt. But if one has a sensation, then ''one'' is around to have it, and thus exists. Are there other dimensions of your concern here that remain, once this broad concept of "thinking" is taken into account? * Point of writing clarity: you speak about what would "justify my existence" and what "justifies [Descartes'] existence". It's likely you mean to speak of what justifies //belief that// you, or Descartes, exists. To justify someone's existence is to show that someone's life is worthwhile or deserving. Clearly, the theme in this text is about justifying beliefs about existence, rather than "justifying people's existence" directly, no? * Writing note: you've misspelled //existence// in your title.

Sensory Definitions Comment 2006-02-12 21:32:35

espringer — 2007-12-11

It's clear that you're taking a critical stance toward Descartes, and the themes you discuss are worthwhile. So far, however, the commentary seems either to misunderstand Descartes or to set off on an independent direction of asserting things without trying to keep Descartes in the conversation. ! Here's what seems to be a misunderstanding: You claim Descartes "ues sensory explanations to classify objects" -- yet it's not clear that he's doing anything like //classifying objects// according to the senses -- where did you get that impression? On that basis, you believe you're asserting something "contrary" by saying that "an object is not defined solely by those sensations that it offers". Yet the second excerpt you included above shows Descartes agreeing with that very claim: it is "inspection on the part of the mind" (and not the senses) that yields the concept of "the wax itself", beyond all the sensory notions of it. ! The last bit seems to set off on a different issue, though I'm again not sure that you're recognizing Descartes' position correctly. Descartes claims that even if things undergo changes, our ability to think there //is// a //thing// there, beneath all the changes, shows that our concept of a thing is of something //unchanged// despite appearances. * Language point: especially in the context of philosophy, a fallacy is a bad pattern of reasoning. A "question" then, is not potentially fallacious, though an argument might be.

You Just Don't Know Comment 2006-02-12 21:52:33

espringer — 2007-12-11

Let's imagine how Descartes might respond (as it's always a good idea to reflect on your objection in light of how the author could reply): Has he asserted that he can verify what is and isn't true //without experiencing reality//? He granted that an "evil genius" might have deceived him about the things that seemed most certain to him in the past, particularly about what we might call "the external world". Yet Descartes does not claim that //past// misconceptions about reality prevent him from having any //true// conception of reality in the present, so long as he makes sure that his conception in the present does not depend on bad assumptions (such as the assumption that his senses are accurate, or the assumption that there is no evil demon). ! It seems we can read Descartes "cogito ergo sum" argument as revealing that there //is// an aspect of reality that he's in touch with (namely the reality of his own mind), and whose vivid presence serves as a yardstick for all other appearances, in just the way you seem to be suggesting. Thus, Descartes would mostly agree: he'd insist one certainly //can// "conceive of what one hasn't yet experienced" (such as dragons), the //basic ingredients// of our experience (sensations, concepts, feelings) are beyond doubt... or so he argues. Do you still find a point of disagreement, then? (If so, see if you can articulate it //and// imagine Descartes' potential reply!)

On the Credibility of Solipsism. Comment 2006-02-12 22:04:18

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm. It seems to me that you've read your excerpts out of context. The second excerpt here is of course from the Preface, and though it shows Descartes distancing himself from solipsism, this is on the basis of arguments late in the meditations that we have not yet read, and the //main point// of that section of the preface is to say that we could build up to such confidence //only through// knowing our own minds. Thus, one central launching-point for solipsism -- the idea that I know myself more certainly than I know anything else -- remains a cornerstone of Descartes' view. Now the //first// excerpt here is also a sentence that occurs between disclaimers. Descartes is trying to //resist// this impulse to "reasonableness". So, looking at the passage in context, I'm just not sure why you would claim here that Descartes is "ignoring the Pandora's Box". Clearly you have a robust impulse to take Descartes' themes seriously and to speculate about them in your own ways. In the process of reading and writing commentaries, though, I'd suggest that you slow down and focus on one section of argument within the text and evaluate it in context before getting into high gear. Ultmitately, such focus on detail will help you in your ambition to articulate your own ideas more clearly.

Unintentional Goodness Comment 2006-02-13 17:17:39

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like your example about the rich man dropping the bread. It makes your argument very easy to understand. In the reading Augustine talks about humans doing good and doing bad, but does every action fit under one of these two categories? Is there a separate catagory for accidents? Are accidents that a person doesn't think about considered free will? If God did not grant humans free will, would there still be human accidents or would all of those "mistakes" be attributed to God's doing?

The function of a dichotomy Comment 2006-02-13 17:41:15

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with you that it seems that a primary reason for the existence of sin is as a "reiteration of the righteous part of free will." After all, much of the world, including righteousness, is relative; without sin, there would be no counterbalance to accentuate the goodness of goodness. However, I am not sure that I see how the ability to sin "reinforce[s] that we should use our free will to seek out the unchanging good[.]" Ability to sin alone, it seems to me, does not serve as a persuasive agent in either direction. Perhaps what you mean is that the punishment of sin serves to reinforce good. If this is the case, a slight clarification is all you need.

Human Judgment

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The human body is a watch, a large watch constructed with such skill and ingenuity... (Mettrie, Man a Machine, 5)| |...the soul is but a principle of motion or a material and sensible part of the brain, which can be regarded, without fear of error, as the mainspring of the whole machine, having a visible influence on all the parts. (Mettrie, Man, a Machine, 5)| Mettrie argues that humans are machines with mechanical parts working together to function. This is a very scientific view of the human form that examines the physical pieces of the system and attributes thought, judgment, and feelings to components of the brain. While these complex emotions do distinguish humans from other beings, I am not sure they come solely from the brain. For the brain can process information and spit out ideas, but there must be something else in us that connects all of these ideas to elicit motivation and emotion. Mettrie might say that the physical body is what creates these responses, but is there another aspect of this machine that influences the physical responses of the body?

More than Machines

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The soul is therefore but an empty word, of which no one has any idea, and which an enlightened man should only use to signify the part in us that thinks (Mettrie, 3).| Humans can distinguish right from wrong, an ability that machines are incapable of. However, Mettrie would argue that this does not mean that we are not machines, for judgment and emotion stem from experiential and biological influences, so they are processes by which we as machines make decisions. But, we must be more than machines, for we can feel and choose. But what proportion of this perception of control comes from our soul compared to our environment? Maybe we cannot control our will, an ability that seems to determine how machine-like we are, and all of our choices are already made for us through cause and effect. Without freewill, maybe Mettrie was right to analogize us with machines.

Augustine's Comparison Comment 2006-02-13 21:52:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

I too believe that St. Augustine differentiates between the "good" in free will and in one's hand, however I also agree with your statement regarding "willful" choices directing both good and evil actions. In terms of Evodius's "unchangeable truth," justice is inherently good and when one utilizes free will to act justly, he or she recognizes this choice and understands that evil ends are impossible with just means.

Free will

espringer — 2007-12-11

|That man should have free-agency, it were needful that he should be able to will or choose without motives; or, that he could prevent motives coercing his will.? (2, d'Holbach)| |If at this moment it is announced to him, the water he so ardently desires is poisoned, he will, notwithstanding his vehement thirst, abstain from drinking it; and it, therefore, been falsely concluded that he is a free agent. (1, d'Holbach)| D'Holbach argues that the concept of free will is a false notion. We do not make choices free from outside forces, which produce motives and the only reason one makes choices are because of motives. Therefore, one can see the logic behind d'Holbach's argument. Though will is controlled by motives, motives are not completely controlled by outside forces. If will was completely controlled by outside forces then everyone that have very similar outside forces will behave very similar but in reality that is not true. Alone outside forces do not affect us but only the perceptions of the forces. Will is free in the since that our own unique perceptions are what give us motives based off outside forces.

Willful Self Conservation

espringer — 2007-12-11

|In short, the actions of man are never free; they are always the necessary consequence of his temperament, of the received ideas, of the notions, either true or false, which he has formed to himself of happiness: of his opinions, strengthened by example, forfeited by education, consolidated by daily experience. (d'Holbach, System of Man's Free Agency; p. 4)| |[Man] is not the architect of his own conformation; this he holds from Nature, he has no controul over his own ideas, or over the modification of his brain; these are due to causes, that, in despite of himself, very frequently without his knowledge, unceasingly act upon him; he is not the master of not loving that which he finds amiable; of not coveting that which appears to him desirable; he is not capable of refusing to deliberate, when he is uncertain of the effects certain objects will produce upon him; he cannot avoid choosing that which he believes will be most advantageous to him. (d'Holbach, System of Man's Free Agency; p. 8)| D'Holbach asserts that men do not have free will because they do not have the ability to control their preferences or their inclinations. He also claims that our efforts at 'self conservation' keep us from making any decision from which we would not directly benefit. In response to this I am forced to ask: "what else would it mean to possess free will if we were not able to choose options in our best interest?" I hardly see our choosing the most beneficial actions as proof that we do not have free will-- if we had the choice, why would we act any other way? D'Holbach seems to see 'self-conservation' as getting in the way of our making free decisions, yet these tactics serve as evidence that we do in fact have power over the choices we make.

Predetermination?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|...motive is always either the immediate or ultimate advantage he finds or thinks he finds in the action to which he is persuaded...(d'Holbach, System of Man's Free Agency, pg 2)| |...by essence man tends to conserve himself, to render his existence happy... (d'Holbach, System of Man's Free Agency, pg 6)| d'Holbach elucidates that since man's actions can always be rooted to self-preservation, man is no more than a machine guided purely by necessity, and thus his life is essentially predetermined. However, man is capable of rationally acting out of his favor, a power that is incompatible with the abilities of a machine. d'Holbach would contend that a man who acts in such ways does so as necessarily as any man commits any ordinary act; yet man does in fact possess the capacity to choose, which clearly distinguishes him from the purely mechanical and undermines any predetermination of his life, for certainly it is impossible for destiny to control man when he is able to control himself.

The function of a dichotomy Comment 2006-02-13 22:54:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

An Alternative Route Comment 2006-02-13 22:58:36

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that free will is not merely a tool by which good or evil can operate; however, when one uses his free will to make a poor decision, he ultimately makes the willful choice to do so. I too didn't agree with Evodius's statement that justice can never be used wrongly. Yet Justice is defined as fairness or rightness, especially in the way people are treated or decisions are made; in this light, it is true that one cannot choose to be Just and commit a sin.

Motives Necessitate Man

espringer — 2007-12-11

|To be a machine, to feel, to think, to know how to distinguish good from bad, as well as blue from yellow, in a word, to be born with an intelligence and a sure moral instinct, and to be but an animal, are therefore characters which are no more contradictory, than to be an ape or a parrot and to be able to give oneself pleasure.... (Julien Offray de La Mettrie, "Man, a Machine", p.3)| |Education, then, is only necessity shown to children: legislation is necessity shown to the members of the body politic: morals is the necessity of the relations subsisting between men, shown to reasonable beings.... (Paul Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, "Of the System of Man's Free Agency", p.7)| |What is the object of morals, if it be not to show man that his interest exacts he should suppress the momentary ebullition of his passions, with a view to promote a more certain happiness, a more lasting well-being, than can possibly result from the gratification of his transitory desires? (Paul Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, "Of the System of Man's Free Agency", p.7)| Mettrie claims that there is no contradiction between a deterministic view of life and being able to lead a moral life. If we are machines acting out a program, and free will nothing but an illusion, how can we be held responsible for our actions? d'Holbach's concept of motives provides a solution. By rewarding 'right' behavior and punishing 'wrong', we set up motives to bring order to life. Society subscribes to, and enforces, the convention of a moral code of personal responsibility. The mutual cooperation thus fostered pays off in the long run, as suggested by the [[Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma|http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prisoner's_dilemma#The_iterated_prisoner.27s_dilemma]]. The deterministic claims of Mettrie and d'Holbach are therefore consistent with a moral view of life.

Faulty Defintion of Free Will?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|It is pretended he [man] is a free agent, or that independent of the causes by which he is moved, he determines his own will; regulates his own condition. (Paul Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, "Of the System of Man's Free Agency" p.1)| |Action always being the effect of his will once determined, as his will cannot be determined but by motive, which is not in his own power, it follows that he is never the master of the determination of his own peculiar will; that consequently he never acts as a free agent. (Paul Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, "Of the System of Man's Free Agency" p.2)| |In nature, where every thing is connected by one common bond, there exists no effect without a cause. (Paul Henri Thiry Baron d'Holbach, "Of the System of Man's Free Agency" p.8)| The popular conception of free will, successfully refuted by d'Holbach, is the ability to choose independently of uncontrollable environmental and internal (genetic) factors. However, d'Holbach's denunciation of this extreme conception is also too radical, since he then claims that all choices are determined by uncontrollable causes. Obviously, it is not conceivable to remove one from contextual elements -- the attempt would produce a cipher, a nonentity. Yet, a person must be more than a powerless reactive object, more than just a pen acted upon by gravity, since a person can be aware of causal forces that influence hir. Awareness can then allow one to act on hir own choices, to choose alternatives. Still, d'Holbach might respond that awareness is simply another causal force pushing an individual toward a particular choice.

Oversimplified Soul

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The soul is therefore but an empty word, of which no one has any idea, and which an enlightened man should only use to signify the part in us that thinks. (de la Mettrie, Man, a Machine)| |Wherefore the soul is but a principle of motion or a material and sensible part of the brain, which can be regarded, without fear of error, as the mainspring of the whole machine, having a visible influence on all the parts. The soul seems even to have been made for the brain, so that all other parts of the system are but a kind of emanation from the brain. (de la Mettrie, Man, a Machine)| Mettrie argues that the concept of a soul is essentially moot because humans are simply intricately wrought biological machines. I think that Mettrie over-simplifies the concept of the soul when he attributes it solely to "the part in us that thinks"; rather, he should define more precisely what he means by this term. Were it argued that the electrical input one generates from hir environment was processed uniquely yet mechanically through the brain, and it was that distinctive yet biologically mechanical interaction of signals that yielded our exceptional manifestations of personality, I would readily agree with Mettrie. However, as he oversimplifies the individuality of the human machine, thus undervaluing the "soul" I shirk to agree with his philosophy.

Willful Self Conservation Comment 2006-02-14 00:04:25

espringer — 2007-12-11

You raise a good point. If an option is in our best interest, does it mean that it is necessary that we choose it? Or do we choose it from free will? Which happened first, the chicken or the egg? If we choose it from free will, however, it would also mean that we can choose in the opposite direction. Can we choose an option that is detrimental to our interests? Surely we can! So free will exists! ! But wait, d'Holbach might say we only choose options against our self interest when there is some greater motive at work, as in a mother sacrificing for her child. We are still choosing the best option from our value judgement, which d'Holbach maintains is determined by all the etc stuff. So... can we ever choose other than what we think is best?

More than Machines Comment 2006-02-14 00:35:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I appreciate your view that it is because we possess emotion and judgment that we are not machines, I find I have to disagree with your argument. Humans can, sometimes, distinguish between right from wrong. Yet we judge right and wrong based on values, morals, and our unique view of life. All of which, d'Holbach would contend, is shaped by the environment, our past experiences and influences, biological predispositions, and whatnot. We feel emotions, yet what emotion we feel is shaped by influences external and internal, how strongly we feel is biology. Emotion, judgment, and even reason are then the processes by which the machine that is man arrives at a decision.

Human Judgment Comment 2006-02-14 00:49:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

You have surely struck at the heart of Mettrie's arguments, for he does indeed seem to have neglected any mention of emotions, spirituality, and the rest of the things that you mentioned. Of course, with so much taken out from the text we are reading, perhaps it got lost somewhere among the excised portions. For now, let's give him the benefit of doubt (Tee hee). d'Holbach, however, does have more to say on this subject. The 'motivation to live' would fit right into d'Holbach's arguments, and I can imagine him claiming that there are influences external and internal that determine emotions, thoughts and judgment. Our emotions, thoughts, and judgments then become processes by which the machine that is man operates, i.e. the software.

Free will Comment 2006-02-14 01:06:41

espringer — 2007-12-11

I appreciate your confidence in your position. Do I read you right in saying that you agree that we do not have free will? Since it is impossible to make choices free from motives, therefore it is impossible that man has free will. Also, the term 'initially flawed' implies that while d'Holbach might have made a mistake, he was right in the end.... Furthermore, d'Holbach might extend your last idea with the following: Your will is powered by your motives. Because your motives, and all the other external and internal influences, dictate to you which choice is the best choice, that will be the choice that your will wills. Therefore, while you do have a will to do the willing, it is not free will.

Oversimplified Soul Comment 2006-02-14 01:49:16

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with you most heartily that it would be arrogant to assume a biological disconnect between humans and animals. However, what are these 'compiled characteristics' that set each person apart? Could you articulate them for me, so that I may decide for myself whether I agree with your use of the term 'soul' more than de la Mettrie.

Free Will comes Naturally Comment 2006-02-14 01:56:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

You raise a tricky point about human nature and free will, and I think it merits a lot more thought. However, d'Holbach might respond to your first question by stating that 'we do not have any choice in whether to be guided by necessity nor our own natures, and that is why we do not have free will'. Unfortunately, I do not understand your second question here well enough to offer any insight.

The function of a dichotomy Comment 2006-02-14 01:04:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

I believe that you are dead-on with your interpretation of Augustine's philosophy regarding the relationships between free will, good and sin, and think that yes, the ability to enact sin is the only way in which one can know to enact good. Without consciously making the distinction between that which is good and that which is not, one simply has mindless action. The creation of the distinction was to know and evaluate the good and the sin and begin living life conscientiously, being aware of the choice and the following consequences. Your commentary also generated other questions for me. So, if God is promising humankind a reward for acting well and punishment for acting poorly, does that not invalidate the authenticity of an action's genuineness? Are doing good and sinning evaluated simply on the acts themselves or rather on the intentions and motives behind those actions? If one does good only because ze desires a reward or fears punishment, doesn't that invalidate the integrity of hir action? Can you truly do good if it is simply for selfish purposes? These are not questions that you needed to address, obviously, but they would be interesting to explore, nonetheless.

Unintentional Goodness Comment 2006-02-14 02:34:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

I would for potential clarity point to a subtle distinction between "doing right" and expedience. While the phrase "do right" in the first quotation is ambiguous and you validly point out its ambiguity, it appears that Augustine would distinguish "right" from "expedient". It would certainly be expedient if the rich man dropped the loaf of bread, but righteousness connotes a conscious agency-- one must commit to righteousness rather than merely stumble upon it.

In Defense of Determinism

espringer — 2007-12-11

|It is the great complication of motion in man, it is the variety of his action, it is the multiplicity of causes that move him, whether simultaneously or in continual succession, that persuades him he is a free agent: if all his motions were simple, if the causes that move him did not confound themselves with each other, if they were distinct, if his machine was less complicated, he would perceive that all his actions were necessary, because he would be enabled to recur instantly to the cause that made him act. (p. 5, d'Holbach)| |At length human vanity accommodated itself to an hypothesis which, unquestionable, appears to distinguish man from all other physical beings by assigning to him the special privilege of a total independence of all other causes. (p. 1, d'Holbach)| As the intricate, subtle, and sometimes-irrational functioning of the human mind shrouds the path from cause to effect into obscurity, it becomes increasingly tempting to replace the idea of mental machinery behind decision-making with the amorphous concept of "free will". Purely-spontaneous, lawless whimsy acts as a medium between motive and action, the public consciousness seems to suggest. Our will either arises from exterior causes or nothingness -- arising as prima causa. Just as we were compelled into existence by external events, so, too, was our will. It arose as part of our existence which in turn was formed entirely from without. So how could the will render itself "free" from the factors that formed it? Or could the will be disparate from the events causing our existence?

d'Holbach

espringer — 2007-12-11

Paul-Henry Thiry (Baron [[d'Holbach|http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/holbach/#1]]) (1723-1789) participated in the blossoming of the French Enlightenment, and articulated a materialist and determinist account of human action. His [[System of Nature|http://homepages.paradise.net.nz/freethought/holbach/system/0syscontents.htm]] (1770) is the most central and widely read of his works.

kosaekwapong 2006-02-14 13:38:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

I definitely agree with your argument that d'Holbach denies us of having free will because I was very back and forth with the point he was trying to make, during class. However, I think that d'Holbach would respond to your argument (and mine as well) with the statement that he made in the beginning of his piece: [Man's life is a line that Nature commands him to describe upon the surface of the earth: without his ever being able to swerve from it even for an instant. He is born without his own consent] I also am interested to see where you were going with the question that you asked at the end of your commentary because I'm now left wondering if God is what is truly holding us back from 'acting to our advantage' as you have stated.

Behdad's office hours

espringer — 2007-12-11

Our TA, [[Behdad|bbozorgnia]], holds office hours in the ''Davenport Campus Center'' Mondays and Wednesdays. Drop by between ''8pm and 9:30pm'' to discuss the readings, weekly assignments, and expectations for the course.

site note

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Eureka!'' I've discovered the source of Safari's problems with our site. It seems to "choke" when ''curly quotes'' and ''apostrophes'' (the ones that look different for starting and ending a quote, which Microsoft Word loves to "fix" for us) appear within table-box formatting. Since many people were pasting in excerpts within boxes (as invited to do!), and including quote marks at either end (which wasn't necessary, but was a common choice), this situation was happening frequently. ! If you know how to turn the "smart quotes" feature off (Tools Menu —> AutoFormat —> AutoFormat As You Type) in Word, it will result in text that's more internet friendly, not only for this site, but for email as well (where curly quotes often get mangled into strange characters.) ! Of course, in the meantime, I'm agitating for a fix among people who can address both how the site's basic code works, and how Safari has trouble with something that shouldn't be such a problem. ! At any rate, you should continue to follow guidelines for [[titles and tags]], which should never use funky characters because of how they often end up confounding the handling of text between servers, databases, and end-users.

log in

espringer — 2007-12-11

Please log in (see link at upper right) using your email tag and your individual password (as emailed to you). Once you are logged in, you will see a list of class members here: <> <>

weekly assignments

espringer — 2007-12-11

• [[Compose a commentary|submitting commentaries]] on the reading (proofread and check word count), for Tuesday or Thursday, according to the <>. • Make a [[peer comment]] on at least one submission from a previous class • [[Revise|revise]] commentaries by your "off day" a week later. For example, a commentary turned in on Jan 31 needs to be revised in response to peer/TA/Professor feedback by Feb 9. (Exception: if you have //not// gotten any feedback from professor or TA at least a day before the revision is normally due, you have an automatic extension for a week.)

The Right to Choose

espringer — 2007-12-11

|But these efforts are all in vain; and whatever capricious and irregular actions we may perform; as the desire showing our liberty is the sole motive of our actions; we can never free oursevles from the bonds of necessity (p. 64).| |Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them, they infix themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil (p.66).| Hume points to necessity as the underlying premise for all action and behavior. He says one cannot be blamed for their actions because they are not in the control of the person to whom they belong. Humans are unified by common characteristics present regardless of cultural or social station, but the differences are what create a personal identity in each person. Perhaps the necessity Hume describes can be attributed simply to human consciousness and nothing further. If it is true that there is a degree of necessity in each person, then this degree forms the basis of one's identity. Necessity is what causes people to act the way they do. A person needs to act, so they will do just that.

An Ever Changing Self

espringer — 2007-12-11

(formally called "A Ever Changing self") |Several years have now passed since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus how doubtful were all those that in my youth I had subsequently built upon them. (p.13)| |At last I will apply myself earnestly and unreservedly to this general demolition of my opinions. (p.13)| Descartes re-evaluates his opinions because he believes that in light of new realizations his old opinions were misguided and must be reconsidered. Descartes' argument only holds true if he believes in an unchanging self hitherto in a fixed mental state by continuous principles and the only change is in the perception of these principles. In reality, the principles in which we hold opinions on constantly change. Descartes mistakenly finds fault in some of his earlier beliefs. It was not that he wrongly thought he had trustworthy senses, when now he is unsure, but rather he changed his definition of trustworthy senses from senses that showed what he perceived, to what happened according to some omniscient being.

Predetermination? Comment 2006-02-15 18:06:56

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your first assertion that man's ability to deviate from the path of self preservation for some greater purpose is something that seperates him from a machine. Your next statement, however, that it is not "advantageous for one to ...risk one's life to save others," is somewhat unclear. Advantageous to whom, and in what ways? Along your same line of thought, d'Holbach does not offer a sufficient explanation for the phenomenon of large groups of people dying for a cause in which they believe. Yet these assertions do not offer a contradiction to d'Holbach's claim that our paths are predetermined, just to the idea that we are comparable to machines.

lost and found

espringer — 2007-12-11

The following items have not been tagged and/or titled properly: * [[ignorance is bliss]] * [[rheinemann's untitled post (please don't leave as New Tiddler)]] Other loose ends: * something mistakenly entitled """[[jehrenhalt]]""" (If you put the brackets INTO the title, then brackets can no longer help us //refer to// things by putting their titles in brackets.) * Comment that got its labels removed, so got "stranded" from the thing it was about: [[kosaekwapong 2006-02-14 13:38:52]] //If you are the owner of such a contribution to the site, please fix! Thanks!//

informal reasoning quizzes

espringer — 2007-12-11

Since this course meets the [[Philosophy Department's|http://www.wesleyan.edu/phil/]] introductory expectations for competence in informal reasoning, we will often dicuss key reasoning terms and associated skills. Please make sure to be prepared for quizzes (three during the course of the semester) to confirm these skills, and visit [[Behdad's office hours]], or mine, if you have questions about this aspect of the course. ! @@Answers to quizzes so far: * [[Hume diagram on liberty and necessity]] * [[Chisholm argument]]

Free Will comes Naturally Comment 2006-02-15 19:53:53

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make an interesting assertion, saying that there is little difference between human nature and free will. They definietly do have a relationship, but maybe instead of them 'being the same thing', perhaps human nature affects the choices one has because of free will? d'Holbach's reference to God, certainly adds to his arguement, but I would say it makes it a bit stronger? If we do not have free will, but "are guided by necessity", could the necessity possibly be God's influence?

The ability to change the inevitable

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Every object is determin'd by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction of its motion, and can no more depart from that precise line, in which it moves, than it can convert itself into an angel, or spirit, or any superior substance. (Hume 58)| |Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing...the action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not responsible for it...tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. (Hume 66)| Hume discusses the underlying consistency of necessity and free will and argues that because we have predetermined destinies, we should not be deemed responsible for our actions. I believe that we are the creators of our own future and we have the ability to change the outcome of what is seen as the inevitable. Therefore, the actions themselves should not be at fault as Hume states, but we, as individuals need to take responsibility whether or not our actions are based on desire or necessity because we are in control of the actions we make.

Liberty?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|It will be equally easy to prove, and from the same arguments, that liberty, according to that definition above mentioned, in which all men agree, is also essential to morality, and that no human actions, where it is wanting, are susceptible of any moral qualities, or can be the objects either of approbation or dislike. For as actions are objects of our moral sentiment, so far only as they are indications of the internal character, passions and affections; it is impossible that they can give rise either to praise or blame, where they proceed not from these principles but are derived altogether from external violence. (pg 83) | Basically, what Hume is saying in the aforestated paragraph is that one cannot blame or praise another individual for that individual's actions. The actions themselves are not the ones to blame or praise, because they are not triggered by internal morals, but in fact learned from the external environment. I have a problem with this. Actions, although sometimes impulsive and not coming from within, are generally, triggered by an individual's passions, and these passions are responsible for the actions. Consequently, the actions are to blame. If one commits a crime, it is due to an internal inflammation of emotions, and not simply because his environment forced him to do so. This crime must then, give rise to blame.

Motives Necessitate Man Comment 2006-02-15 20:18:47

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that the institution of a moral code brings order to life. The question of who should be blamed for our constant indiscretion if we do not have complete control over our will is irrelevant if any social order is to exist. Being that a God, at least in many religions, is purely ideal it makes sense that people who physically inhabit the material world will be punished for crimes in that world. In this way society joins mind and body for the purpose of responsibility.

Benevolent God?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The very fact that anyone who uses free will to sin is divinely punished shows that free will was given to enable human beings to live rightly..."(St. Augustine "On Free Choice of the Will" p. 20| St. Augustine throughout this passage tries to explain to Evodius that God has really given man a will of his own. He makes the point that God must have foreknowledge of, but not necessarily control, our actions. God would have to grant us the choice to follow Him or not; to willingly accept and return that love. The question still remains; if God is all-knowing, why do bad things happen? In reply, St. Augustine may say it is the free will of men (and natural forces) that causes "bad" things to happen. The doers of these bad acts are to be punished by God. Thus, if we do have free will, we can and will be held responsible for actions

Secret Opposition

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Our idea, therefore, of necessity and causation arises entirely from the uniformity, observable in the operations of nature; where...the mind is determined by custom to infer the one from the appearance of the other," (70).| |"From the observation of several parallel instances, philosophersform a maxim, that the connexion between all causes and effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming uncertainty in some instances proceeds from the secret opposition of contrary causes," (73).| If "secret opposition" exists, as Hume states, then his argument that uniformity is "observable" is weakened. "Secret" implies that these causes are not seen. The notion of uniformity includes not only outcomes, but their causes as well. To know that uniformity of outcome will exist, one must be able to see every cause. These hidden causes could produce unexpected outcomes, but their expectability is unknown because causes are not observable and cannot be habitually linked to specific outcomes. His central argument of necessity and causation is thus undermined, as the first quotation states that these ideas "arise entirely from the uniformity; observable in the operations of nature..."

Predetermination? Comment 2006-02-15 21:07:54

espringer — 2007-12-11

I would agree with you as well...not all of our actions can be boiled down to necessity. To combat this point, I think d'Holbach would say that outside forces and conditioning throughout an individual's life, have influenced them in such a way so that they think they are not acting out of necessity, and being spontaneous, whereas it could be just the opposite.

Benevolent God? Comment 2006-02-15 21:15:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

I don't really see the connection between your quote and your commentary. The quote focuses on why were were given free will, but in your passage you write about the all-knowing power of God. I like how you challenged the statement that free will was given to do right by presenting the argument that evil exists in the world. However, the quote also states that anyone who does sin is punished, which means that free will can be used to sin, even if that is not what it is intended to be used for.

A Short Fuse is Still a Fuse

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Men are less blamed for such actions as they perform hastily and unpremeditately, than for such as proceed from deliberation. For what reason? but because a hasty temper, though a constant cause or principle in the mind, operates only by intervals, and infects not the whole character. (p. 81)| In stating that people are blamed less for unpremeditated actions, Hume is inserting the element of time as a variable for judgment. The brevity of thought given to an action should have no significant impact on how severely it should be judged. Allowing there to be a discrepancy is to favor those with short tempers by giving them the benefit of doubt that the action really was not premeditated. Deliberation is relevant when a person knows a motive to possibly be sinful but must weigh the options of action or inaction, which historically can be seen as a crime. It is however impossible for any other person to know with complete accuracy whether an action that injured them in some way was deliberate or not.

Thought and Existence

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"...thought exists; it along cannot be separated from me. I am; I exist --- this is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking; for perhaps it could also come to pass that if I were to cease all thinking I would then utterly cease to exist." (Descartes, "Meditations on Philosophy," Meditation 2)| |"...even bodies are not ... perceived by the senses or by the faculty of imagination, but by the intellect alone, and that they are not perceived through their being touched or seen, but only through their being understood..." (Descartes, "Meditations on Philosophy," Meditation 2)| Descartes postulates that the act of thinking alone maintains and justifies the reality of his existence; without thinking, he would not exist. My abilities to think and reason are essential for my existence as a unique and free-willed individual. Bereft of the capacity to think, man would be robotic, mechanically functioning and devoid of identity. Yet I disagree with Descartes' premise that sense and perception alone cannot fully allow for true comprehension of an object or body - if something is there to be perceived, surely it must exist, even without intellectual consideration. However, Descartes might warn that I must be wary of the possibility that what I sense may in fact be nothing more than simulations in a dream. (formerly [[Thought and Existance]])

Forms of Consciousness

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume argues that the will is nothing more than the necessary outcome of a collision of multiple forces, similar to the fruit inevitably produced from a particular species of tree. But the factors in question that are experienced by the consciousness that wills -- "pride, humility, love and hatred" -- are not equivalent to the public property designated by the words used to symbolize them, but are rather unique forms of such emotions reflecting the singular mental structure that has produced them. This distinction may not ultimately contradict Hume's determinist causation, but it means that no two instances of a particular emotion should be regarded as interchangeable or equivalent, as stable causal forces that can be expected to operate in a consistent manner.

Oversimplified Soul Comment 2006-02-15 23:27:40

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like your characterization of the soul as "those compiled characteristics that set each person apart," but I'm not sure why you proceed to the conclusion that this individuality "make[s] hir more than just a biological machine." It would seem consonant with your argument to propose that perhaps there is nothing in a person that transcends biology, but that the distinctiveness of each brain means that there can only be one such "machine" ever produced.

Deity Objection

espringer — 2007-12-11

|I...dare venture to affirm, that the doctrine of neccessity, according to my explication of it, is not only innocent, but even advantageous to religion and morality. (p 65)| |When an opinion leads to absurdities, it is certainly false (p 80)| |The ultimate Author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world...a Being, infinitely wise and powerful. (p 82)| |the Deity...that Being...who can intend nothing but what is altogether good or laudable. (p 83)| |These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she must find herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy.(p 84-85)| Hume claims to prove necessity, all events being causally determined, does not clash with the prevalent religious thinking of his day, but allows it to function. For how could a Diety hold one morally responsible for one's actions if those actions and one's character were not intertwined? Yet wouldn't this omnipotent, omnicent and omnibenevolent Creator Hume describes be the ultimate cause of evil actions? Hume anticipates this objection and accepts that it does pose problems by its absurd nature. He counters with the notion that understanding of this complicated issue resides beyond philosophy's current grasp, but this appeal is not similar to his earlier analytical rationalisms. The weak argument seems to be an attempt to pacify the tempers of Church leaders.

rethinking the entire victory

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"After we have perform'd any action; tho' we confess we were influenc'd by particular views and motives; 'tis difficult for us to perswade ourselves we were govern'd by necessity. (p.63)"| |"We may imagine we feel a liberty within ourselves; but a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstance of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition (p.640)."| Hume claims that although the chooser is responsible for making a choice, hir preferred course of action will always be predictable because it is merely external forces that determine the "best" decision and it is never random. He attempts to account for hypothetical objections by providing further support for his argument, but as possible objections are infinite his argument can never be entirely convincing. Hume argues that actions are predictable if the circumstances are known; however, that fact does not prove that the chooser has no role in the decision-making. Additionally, could it not be sometimes simply fortuitous? I would like to know what Hume would say about eenie-meenie-miney-moe.

Faulty Defintion of Free Will? Comment 2006-02-15 23:57:02

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that we feel, to ourselves, much more than pens acted upon by gravity, but is not our objection to being pawns of external factors a result of external factors itself? Maybe it is not possible to know just how much we ourselves determine, if any, and how much outside forces determine us. The issue is linked closely to nature vs. nurture, which also does not appear to be reaching a solution any time soon.

Faulty Defintion of Free Will? Comment 2006-02-15 23:58:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I feel that you adequately constructed D'Holbach's response to your assertion above that "because of hir awareness of the self in relation to the environment; implementation of one’s own subjective perception impacts one’s surroundings" and I do agree that a human being must be more than a cipher, I do not know if I would neccesarily consider it by definition.

The ability to change the inevitable Comment 2006-02-16 00:08:32

espringer — 2007-12-11

Nice, respectable beliefs you have there. Yet do you have an argument for why I should believe your thus far unsubstantiated claims over Hume's copious reasonings?

Forms of Consciousness Comment 2006-02-16 00:15:30

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your second sentence there seems to contain a very intriguing idea. Unfortunately it is beyond my grasp. What factors? What is this public property you speak of? Could you please clarify? Also, that the individual consciousness may not be repeatable has no bearing on whether it was causally determined by factors external and internal.

rethinking the entire victory Comment 2006-02-16 00:29:03

espringer — 2007-12-11

Indeed, Hume does seem rather confident about his position. However, I do not think Hume ever claimed that choice is outside of the chooser's control. By definition, it is the chooser who is making that choice, and while making it that choice is in ze's control. Hume points out that what necessity means is that the choice that will be made by the chooser is a foregone conclusion, determined by the experiences, education, mood, preferences, morals, and everything else that make up the chooser, which ultimately may be traced to external factors. While this might not be the definition of free will and choice that you might like, it is my understanding of the one he worked with, and to enable discussion I feel we ought to work with it in pointing out any inconsistencies or irregularities in his argument. Humes did go to much pains to point out that discourse under differing definitions often lead to big, hairy messes. Also, I was wondering what sort of evidence you would consider to be 'direct evidence'?

The Right to Choose Comment 2006-02-16 00:56:04

espringer — 2007-12-11

Do I read you right in saying that that you identify yourself only in relation to how you differ from others? Hume might say that character is built up from the experiences and natural predispositions, education and peer influences presented upon the individual. These mix uniquely to distinguish one personality from another. To your last remark, Hume might say that we exist, we live our lives from day to day and find pursuits with which to fill our lives with meaning. We feel, we love, we dream. This would be as true whether or not reality is truly deterministic.

Deity Objection Comment 2006-02-16 01:13:59

espringer — 2007-12-11

Interesting argument. Hume does seem to shrink from the implications his position might have for religion. This does weaken his argument somewhat. However, I would also suggest that perhaps you are arguing from the biased position of already believing in an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent Creator, and so see the implications as absurd.

2/16

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Hume on Liberty and Necessity, Feb 16 (tagged {{{2/16}}}):''<>

A Short Fuse is Still a Fuse Comment 2006-02-16 13:32:54

espringer — 2007-12-11

You bring up a nice point and a valid point when you say "a person does not need to know an action is wrong or right in order to perform it." This is true, but does the action a person performs hastily or by mistake hold as much weight as a planned out and deeply considered action? For example, if a person accidently knocked a bucket of paint off a ladder while painting and it spilled on someone would that be considered the same as if a person deliberately planned out how to cover another person in paint? Also, instead of just referring to Hume's claim in the quote, try to try to explain his position in your piece.

semester calendar

espringer — 2007-12-11

|1/24| |<>|Introduction| |<>|Plato's Crito ([[packet|course packets]], A1)|<>|Epictetus' Enchiridion (packet, A2)| |<>|Descartes' Meditations 1 & 2 (packet, A3)|<>|Augustine, "On Free Choice of the Will" (in Pereboom, ed., Free Will, pp. 19-33)| |<>|Mettrie, "Man, a Machine" (packet, B1); d'Holbach "...Man's Free Agency" (packet, B2)|<>|Hume on necessity & liberty (in Free Will, pp. 57-87)| |<>|Hume, "Of Personal Identity" (packet, B4); "Second Thoughts" (packet, B5)|<>|Chisholm, "Human Freedom and the Self" (in Free Will, pp. 143-155)| |<>|James, "The Will to Believe" (packet, B6) <
> ''••Essay Abstract Due••''|<>|Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment" (in Free Will, pp. 119-142)| |<>|Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" (in Free Will, pp. 167-183)|<>|Skinner, "Beyond Freedom and Dignity (packet, B7)<
> ''••Essay Due March 10 by midnight••''| |!3/14-3/23|!Spring Break|! |! | |<>|Sartre, "Existentialism" (packet, C1) |<>|Goffman, "Performances" (packet, C2)| |<>|Scheibe, "Psyche and Socius" (packet, C3)|<>|Hacking, "Making Up People" (packet, C4)| |<>|Rahula, "The Doctrine of No-Soul" (packet, C5) <
> ''••Second Essay Abstract Due••'' |<>|DuBois, "Of Our Spiritual Strivings (packet, D1); Appiah, "The Uncompleted Argument (D2)| |<>|Birt, "The Bad Faith of Whiteness" (packet, D3) Haslanger, "Gender and Race..." (packet, D6)|<>|Scheman, "Queering the Center..." (packet, D7); Ficera, "Queer By Choice?" (packet, D6)| |<>|Shusterman, "Jewish Identity..." (packet, D5) Bilgrami, "What Is a Muslim?" (packet, D4)|<>|@@[class cancelled]@@<
>''••• Expanded Essay due by 4/28, 11 pm •••''| |<>|Brison, "Outliving Oneself" (packet, E1)|<>|Radden, "Second Thoughts" (packet, E3); McFall, "Integrity" (packet, E4)| |<>|MacIntyre, "The Virtues, the Unity of a Human Life, and ... Tradition" (packet, E2)|||

Faulty Defintion of Free Will? Comment 2006-02-18 17:41:20

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although we haven't read d'Holbach's contemporaries, he's clearly seeking to dissuade people from thinking of free will in a way that is currently popular; thus, it's not "his assertion" that's at stake here so much as popular conceptions. Those who defend that extreme sort of free will, on the other hand, might take reasonable objection to your second sentence: they need not claim that individuals are //removed from// their situations, but only that surrounding (and internally mechanistic) factors are not //fully// able to determine human action. It seems you get to your //real// issue a bit more than halfway-through: that something about self-awareness might be the most important variable in making human choices potentially more valuable than other events. Perhaps your last sentence intends to point out that this would not affect the truth of determinism, but would only suggest that some determined events are more complex and interesting than others?

Free Will comes Naturally Comment 2006-02-18 18:20:24

espringer — 2007-12-11

The approach of your reply is a familiar and tempting one: you point out what d'Holbach claims, and then assert your points of disagreement in contrast. Although noticing where you're inclined to disagree is a good starting point, it will be helpful to dig right in with exploring what d'Holbach's argument is, rather than just taking sides about his conclusion. What are the premises he advances in support of his conclusion that human beings' actions are fully caused by things ultimately outside our control? ! Toward the end, you raise a second issue. In general, I would encourage you to stick to one issue... but if you choose to focus on religious issues, then one question is: what *claim* is d'Holbach making about religion here? The mere //reference// to religion cannot be enough to undermine his argument, but perhaps you find something he says //about// religion to be at odds with the argument against free will? Yet I think if you look at the context of your excerpted passage above, you'll find it's an ironic treatment of others' religious claims, rather than an assertion of religious belief on his own part...

Free will Comment 2006-02-18 18:45:54

espringer — 2007-12-11

The core of your commentary is that d'Holbach's conclusion is flawed because he "ignores the fact that we still have a choice". Does d'Holbach really deny that we make choices? His claim is simply that those choices are //determined// by factors such as motives. If you agree that choices are never made except because of motives, and if what motives we have is determined by yet further things that aren't simply matters of direct control, then of course your challenge is to explain in what sense we should still call the will "free", as Eric points out in his comment. I suspect you may be hoping to explore a way that motives could //influence// a choice without fully //controlling// it. Yet explaining how this can work requires more than simply asserting that d'Holbach is ignoring something... This commentary, like your second, leans in the direction of disagreeing with an author, and would benefit from reflecting on how that author might best respond... Although you need not agree with d'Holbach, you should be aware, at each turn of your argument, whether the author anticipates your concern and has ideas that answer to it. You're also over the word count by a few...

Human Judgment Comment 2006-02-18 18:55:20

espringer — 2007-12-11

You acknowledge near the beginning that Mettrie doesn't //simply// neglect emotions and motivation, but rather sees them as results of "cultivation of the brain". Thus, your real objection comes near the end here: you want to insist that "there is ''more'' powering human actions ''than the physical responses of the brain''" (and presumably that "something more" is not what Mettrie already recognizes -- namely, the various ways that the rest of the body has impulses to action). Thus, it seems you would like to present something that is //not// at all part of the body as having influence on human behavior, yes? How might you not only //assert// this view, but show reasons to believe it, for someone who does not already agree? If you imagine how Mettrie might respond to your thoughts here so far, the real question comes between your penultimate and last sentences: Mettrie does acknowledge that ''thought, judgment, and feelings'' play a role in distinguishing humans from other beings... and locates these things in the body (specifically the brain). So: what should motivate us to claim that those things are //not// a complex phenomenon of our bodies, and most specifically of our brains? Though you need not agree with Mettrie, you want to show a dialogical appreciation of just how Mettrie's views are likely to respond to your challenge.

More than Machines Comment 2006-02-18 20:35:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

You've identified the major point on which you'd like to object to Mettrie. The next major step in refining your commentary is to think about Mettrie's likely responses, and see how to take your reasoning to the next level by addressing the best of what his reasoning has to offer. ! You write that "''distinguishing right from wrong''" is [something] ''machines are incapable of''", and Mettrie need only suggest inserting the word "other": it's something of which //other// machines are incapable. You conclude with the claim that "Emotion and judgment set humans far from machines" and again Mettrie can almost entirely agree, just insisting that such things set us apart from //other// machines. ! We know that the venus fly trap can do things that //other// plants don't do, and that bats can do things that //other// mammals can't do... What should dissuade us from thinking (as Mettrie does) that humans are indeed rather //special// machines, with some exceptional abilities that emerge out of the complexity of our brains?

Motives Necessitate Man Comment 2006-02-18 20:48:30

espringer — 2007-12-11

The basic problem and response here are both insightful: Mettrie's position embraces moral concepts, and this will seem paradoxical to some who will claim his determinism leaves no room for them. The response must be that our moral reactions (blaming, praising, rewarding, and punishing) are themselves part of the causal workings of human interaction. ! The last sentence seems to take off on a slightly different direction: what is at stake in the question of whether so-called "selfishness" pays? The attitudes of moral blame and so forth can play a causal role in a deterministic universe //whether or not// cooperation always benefits individuals, right? ! It seems you're mostly responding to your second excerpt, from d'Holbach, in which d'Holbach claims that moral concepts illustrate some necessary features of human relations. An earlier quote might help your case here: |What is the object of morals, if it not be to show man this his interest exacts he should suppress the momentary ebullition of his passions, with a view to promote a more certain hapiness, a more lasting well-being, than can possibly result from the gritification of his transitory desires? (7a)| Still, Mettrie is committed only to the idea that those who preach morality aim to "show" such things; whether such things are true or not doesn't directly affect the determinist claim, right?

feels that

espringer — 2007-12-11

We should be wary of using this phrase in summarizing a point of view -- it's only appropriate when one is speaking of an emotion or sensation. In speaking of an idea that can be subjected to discussion and considerations for and against, we do better to use a verb that shows openness to cognition. See [[this list of suggestions|http://courses.umass.edu/klement/100/101.html]]

feel that

espringer — 2007-12-11

Predetermination? Comment 2006-02-18 21:17:15

espringer — 2007-12-11

You've pointed out an issue of controversy -- whether d'Holbach is right to think of human action as driven by self-conservation -- and you've also done well at noticing how d'Holbach is likely to respond. In particular, it turns out that the thesis of determinism does *not* necessarily depend on the general truth of any "selfishness" hypothesis, so long as altruistic or foolish actions could be explained in terms of some kind of mechanisms. ! Thus, the real issue of disagreement comes toward the end: "yet I don't believe..." Unfortunately, you're left writing in "confessional mode" -- testifying in an assertive way that you are committed to a view that differs from d'Holbach's. //Why// should we resist the idea that our actions are determined? Perhaps this is the real issue you want to focus on?

Willful Self Conservation Comment 2006-02-18 21:30:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

You're engaging with an important question here... Yet It seems to me that your challenge question, "What good would... free will be if we did not choose ... in our best interest?" doesn't create any real difficulty for d'Holbach, any more than the question, "But what good would Santa be if he couldn't get down the chimney?" could convince someone that Santa exists. Of course, belief in free will is much more respectable than belief in Santa! But d'Holbach's reasons for doubting that it exists are not directly touched by whether we would appreciate having free will of one kind or another... ! To say that 'self-conservation' "gets in the way of" making free decisions (on d'Holbach's view) might be misleading, because it implies some //obstacle// to doing what we want: he claims that our decisions are determined, but not that we aren't making decisions or don't have any power. ! At the end, you resort to the assertion that you "see things" differently. Indeed, many people do! Ideally, however, we'd want to hear about //why// it might make more sense to reject d'Holbach's views, or //where// in the steps of his reasoning you find his reasoning to be poor. And (as always), how might he respond to your line of thought?

rheinemann's untitled post (please don't leave as New Tiddler) Comment 2006-02-18 21:51:05

espringer — 2007-12-11

The bulk of what you write articulately summarizes some themes from the text. You leave your critical question for the very end. It is indeed a classic question, but you need to do more than invoke it. The next step, of course, is to recognize that Augustine is grappling with this very question, too, and to reconstruct from the text as best you can a sense of what kind of reply is open to Augustine. By thinking not only of what objection you want to raise, but how to make the most sense of what Augustine will say in reply, and then further articulating your concerns, you'll capture the dialogical activity that makes a commentary effective. ! This commentary fell through the cracks previously (in peer feedback and TA comment rounds) because it was both *untitled* (left with the default "New Tiddler" in the heading) and without any tags for date or commentary status. Please retitle it when you revise... ! At 90 words, it's also considerably shorter than what the 120-word space invites. Thus, it seems not to have been very carefully submitted. What happened?

Motives Necessitate Man Comment 2006-02-19 00:44:09

espringer — 2007-12-11

I have no objection to the determinist claim, and thus directed my attention to its moral ramifications. My last sentence was intended more as a suggestion for why society advertises personal responsibility instead of selfishness: because it is better for the whole and the individual. You are right, of course, that whichever system we subscribe to its 'causal role in a deterministic universe' is essentially the same.

Benevolent God? Comment 2006-02-19 01:00:26

espringer — 2007-12-11

I commend your belief in God, you are of stronger faith than I. If it does not seem too blasphemous of me, however, I should like to enquire as to the manner by which Allah so divinely punishes those who sin. I would also like to understand better the argument behind your contention that for God to be loving she would have to grant us free will.

A Short Fuse is Still a Fuse Comment 2006-02-19 18:51:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your argument seems to cover a lot of subjects. You seem to be making a legitimate point, however, I would look again at the context in which Hume makes such a comment. What exactly is Hume saying? Seems to me he is analyzing a popular notion in order to affirm the necessary connection he proposes between an agents necessary commitment of an action and an agents moral responsibility for an action, he does not seem to be greatly concerned with deliberation, moral awareness, and responsibility. I think Hume is talking about judging the actions of people, not the people committing those actions. Although it may be true that a person does not need to know the moral quality of their actions before they perform them, when moral judgment is being passed on them, their knowledge of the nature of their own actions seems rather relevant, don’t you think? For example we judge a crime of passion differently than a premeditated one. Furthermore I think I would better understand your micro-essay if I knew what you mean by "impulse"? Also does Hume think that people act only on the basis of "impulses"?

Deity Objection Comment 2006-02-19 18:59:06

espringer — 2007-12-11

The point you’re making is very true. Simply claiming that a contradiction is a divine mystery seems like a big cop-out. But I would look more carefully at Hume’s change in tone in the last part of his essay. That is, given his extreme analytical skepticism in the beginning of the essay, doesn’t an invocation of divine mysteries sound a little quirky? Does it seem to you that he absolutely believes what he is writing, or is he just trying to please religious authorities?

Forms of Consciousness Comment 2006-02-19 19:06:29

espringer — 2007-12-11

It’s true, however, I don’t think Hume posits that emotions are external influences; in fact, I think he claims that emotions are internal causal forces. However, does Hume think that each individual or individual consciousness is inherently on unique, that is, born unique? That is, doesn’t he seem to claim that all human beings are governed by a universal set of laws in regards to thought and consciousness? Do you think that such laws exist and if they do, do they affect everyone in the same way?

Liberty? Comment 2006-02-19 19:18:00

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm... I think the point you are making is sound, however, I do not think you are objecting to Hume. He seems to be very much in agreement with you. I think what Hume is saying in the quote you give is that if actions proceed from "external violence" then they are not "indicators of the internal character, passions, and affections", thus the person who is subject to external violence cannot be morally judged for actions cause by the external violence. Hume is saying that there needs to be a necessary connection between person and action without external compulsion in order for a person to be held responsible for that action. Also on a more petty level, I would avoid "I", just because it takes up precious words and if you have a problem you can go right a head and just say it.

comment for Isussman on Hume

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think what Hume is saying is our notion of causality comes from what a perceived uniformity amongst events. The notion of causality is that there can be no effect without cause, or that everything that happens is caused by something. Our mode of thinking is so governed by this notion that even when we do not see a "casual event" in close conjunction with a "effective event", we claim that we are simply ignorant of the cause not that there isn’t one. For example if Scooby and the Gang see that a factory owner has disappeared they do not think that he just vanished into thin air without cause but that something caused him to disappear, for example a resentful employee

The Right to Choose Comment 2006-02-19 19:37:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm..you make a good point here, however, does Hume think that people can’t be blamed for their actions because actions are necessary? Doesn’t he seem to be saying that if actions weren’t necessarily caused, then people couldn’t be blameworthy for them? I think Hume would agree with your objection, that is, actions need to be the necessary result of a person’s character traits in order for a person to be held responsible for those actions. I would look more carefully at the context from which you took your quotes, because I think Hume’s actual claims are consistent with your objection. Furthermore, how does Hume define the idea of "necessity"? Doesn’t he claim that people actually do choose the course of their actions?

The ability to change the inevitable Comment 2006-02-19 19:44:39

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm...I would look more closely at the context from which you took your quotes. Hume often assumes a certain proposition the proceeds to conclude the opposite of it. That is he takes on the guise the side he is trying to disprove, so sometimes when he seems to be saying one thing he is actually claiming the opposite. It may be the cause here. Also on a more general point, in micro-essays you probably don’t just want to state your opinion. Why do you hold such an opinion? Can you provide any reasons your opinion is more likely true than the position you’re opposing? If you can, write about those and how they might interact with the position you’re opposing.

rethinking the entire victory Comment 2006-02-19 19:55:36

espringer — 2007-12-11

I’m not quite sure what you are asserting in the first part of your micro-essay. Hume is a tricky writer and often takes his reader on a journey, if you stop at a point before the journey has come to its final end you might not be getting Hume’s actual claims. I would take another look at Hume’s definition of necessity. I think that Hume claims that our actions are predictable and they result from our choices, however, the choices we make do not come out of nothing, but rather they are caused by various factors and are thus necessary.

General Comment on Hume

espringer — 2007-12-11

It's undeniable, Hume was a tricky porky Scottish man and I often get completely lost as to what he is trying to actually say. It is really important to read carefully and try to get at Hume's actual conclusions not simply a means that he uses to get to those conclusions. That way you can object to Hume's actual claims instead of objecting to a premise which he does not actually believe in.

ebardavid 2006-02-19 20:46:59

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with you that human thought and emotion are not external entities. However, I think what Hume is saying is not that they are external, but rather that they are inevitable internal reactions to external situations. Thus, that although everyone might react differently, it is only the uncontrollable external precipitating factors that spark our thoughts and emotions (consequently removing the room for will that is truly free and independent). In general, I think you should try to respond to your criticisms from the philosopher's perspective, no matter how much you do not believe it.

Important note about peer comments

espringer — 2007-12-11

Apparently there's been some uncertainty about posting peer comment feedback... * Make sure you post it using the "New Comment Here..." button under the item you're responding to. * @@''Do not alter the default title and tags'' for your comment.@@ Otherwise, the system cannot keep it linked in the right way. I've found a couple "loose" comments, and tagged them <> (click on yellow tag to see more). So, this is ''not'' like your original commentaries, where you need to add the date and the tag "commentary". For comments on other items, the system sets the title and tags it needs, as long as you're using the "New Comment Here..." feature. ! And a general reminder: please attend to capitalization and other details in any links, titles and tags.

2/21

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Hume on Identity, Feb 21'' <>

2/23

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Chisholm on freedom, Feb 23'' <>

Secret Opposition Comment 2006-02-19 23:06:42

espringer — 2007-12-11

think what Hume is saying is our notion of causality comes from what a perceived uniformity amongst events. The notion of causality is that there can be no effect without cause, or that everything that happens is caused by something. Our mode of thinking is so governed by this notion that even when we do not see a "casual event" in close conjunction with a "effective event", we claim that we are simply ignorant of the cause not that there isn’t one. For example if Scooby and the Gang see that a factory owner has disappeared they do not think that he just vanished into thin air without cause but that something caused him to disappear, for example a resentful employee

Perception creates Reality

espringer — 2007-12-11

|For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I can never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (David Hume, Of Personal Identity, p. 162)| Awareness of the external and the internal is only arrived at through perception enabled by our senses. Perception determines our reality, yet it is imperfect, for perception is inevitably tainted by preconceptions and biases. It is questionable, therefore, to take our inability to perceive directly the existence of a distinct self as evidence that it does not exist. Hume would reply that, perception being our only measure for reality, it is pointless to talk of something we cannot directly perceive. Still, this does not resolve whether there really *is* a self, it only says we will not find out through perception. It is no wonder then, that some people turn to that other element of our reality: Belief.

More than Machines Comment 2006-02-20 12:49:00

espringer — 2007-12-11

Here's another idea...

The Self and How We Perceive

espringer — 2007-12-11

|...our identity with regard to the passions serves to corroborate that with regard to the imagination, by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures. As memory alone acquaints us with the continuance and extent of this succession of perceptions, 'tis to be considered...as the source of personal identity. (David Hume, Of Personal Identity, p170)| |...memory does not so much as produce as discover personal identity, by showing us the relation of cause and effect among our different perceptions. (David Hume, Of Personal Identity, p171)| Hume explicates that the notion of identity arises from the relations between memories of past perceptions as applied to present and future concerns. However, it is evident that different agents can perceive identical conditions in different ways, implying that perhaps identity arises from an intrinsic source of self that exists independently of perception and governs one's nature. Hume would argue that only prior reception can give rise to the self, yet if this is true, wouldn't those who share identical experiences throughout their self-development have essentially identical identities? It appears to be that a slight yet unique defintion that one's being intrinsically posseses prior to any perception may allow for these obviously differing identities to develop.

Feb 23: Philosophy Talk on Walter Benjamin

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Eli Friedlander'', is Associate Professor of Philosophy, Tel-Aviv University, currently Fellow at the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University, and Author of 3 books: * //Signs of Sense: Reading Wittgenstein's Tractatus//, Harvard University Press, 2001, * //J.J. Rousseau: An Afterlife of Words//, Harvard University Press, 2004, * //Expressions of Judgement: Reintroducing Kant's Critique of Judgment//, Harvard University Press, forthcoming. Lecture Topic: |"Walter Benjamin: Autobiography and the Realization of the Past"| February 23, 2006 ''4:00pm''-6:00pm at the Millet Room - ''Russell House''

Perceptions strengthen identity

espringer — 2007-12-11

|For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (David Hume, Of Personal Identity, p. 162)| |An oak that grows from a small plant to a large tree is still the same oak, though there be not one particle of matter or figure of its parts the same. An infant becomes a man, and is sometimes fat, sometimes lean, without any change in his identity. (David Hume, Of Personal Identity, p. 167)| Hume asserts that self identity is based on one's perception of self and that those perceptions are constantly changing. The eyes are always focusing on different things and varying our perceptions. Therefore, there is no single power of the soul that doesn't change. But what is it that gives rise to these ever-changing perceptions? Isn't there some essence that withstands all this change, like the growing oak tree that is still the same tree as when it was a seedling? Hume may say that the identity of the oak tree (or the changing human) is only an assumption. But if we hold fast to this argument, what are the consequences of not inferring that we have an identity at all?

Beyond Perception

espringer — 2007-12-11

|When I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself oat any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep, so long am I insensible of myself and may truly be said not to exist. (David Hume, "The Abandonment of Personal Identity" p.162)| Hume's claim that when we do not perceive something then that thing can be said not to exist, is true when based on logic. However, Hume is mistaken in assuming that logic is equivalent to reason. Using these terms interchangeably, Hume fails to recognize that logic is purely in the abstract while reason assumes certain fundamental facts about the structure of the world that make it intelligible, such as the forward progression of time. Thus, reason, which can assume accuracy of perception, is a more a relevant and applicable tool to deal with constructs that are not solely abstract, such as identity and self. Hume might respond that there is nothing that separates this notion of reason from unsubstantiated faith, and that surely, utter faith is no grounds for a sound argument.

Imagination and Identity

espringer — 2007-12-11

... must not the frequent placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, placing of these resembling perceptions in the chain of thought, convey the imagination more easily from one link to another, and make the whole seem like the continuance of one object? In this particular then the memory not only discovers the identity, but also contributes to its production, by producing the relation of resemblance among the perceptions (The Abandonment of Personal Identity, Hume, p. 170). Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All perceptions are distinct. (The Abandonment of Personal Identity, Hume, p. 174). Unlike free will, I feel as though identity lends itself to a more logical discussion. Hume illustrates the idea of perception being the foundation of recognizing one's identity, and in theory perceptions are individual interpretations of what is seen, heard, and felt. I agree that the discovery of the self is feeling the "connexions among distinct existences"(p.175) however are all existences really distinct? Hume argues that the imagination can facilitate understandings of identity but are there not universal meanings among these existences? Or does Hume stress the notion of contiguity to illustrate how we can see a chair as both something part of a continuim of familiariteis as well an individual exisiting entity.

The Right to Choose Comment 2006-02-20 22:37:28

espringer — 2007-12-11

I fully agree with you that neccessity does not, in fact, determine all of life; if this were so, than everything in life would be predetermined. Hume, however, might say regarding his claim that humans can choose the course of their actions, but that they cannot make these decisions without the influences of many things that they cannot control, such as their environment and past experiences. It is this distinction that I think that most of us have trouble agreeing with Hume on- the difference between Choosing the more favorable of two things out of a predictable neccessity, which is the point that Hume argues, and Choosing the more favorable of two things because of our personal identity.

A Short Fuse is Still a Fuse Comment 2006-02-20 22:49:04

espringer — 2007-12-11

I see the point that you are trying to make, however I disagree about deliberation only being designated to actions that could potentially be sinful. Possibly the fact that one does not know whether an action is wrong or right is reason enought for deliberation. Lastly, if impulse is just as unavoidable as the non-existance of free will, would you not also say that whether or not we enact these actions is already decided regardless of choice?

More than Imagination?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariably the same, through the whole course of our lives; since self is supposed to exist after that manner. But there is no emotion constant and invariable. (p. 162)| |I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception. (p. 162)| Hume declares that human identity is incapable of combining perceptions into one with indistinguishable parts, but rather it depends on resemblance, contiguity, and causation to unite separate objects. Imagination and the ability to link discrete events helps define self-identity. But how one defines oneself is also a result of how others identify one. How can others create opinions on something so internal, like imagination? Hume would argue that how others identify one is only another perception that one observes. Perceptions are variable, so they cannot solely be used to define the self. Furthermore, the perceptions of others can only be known sometimes, so while they may affect how one sees oneself, something more internal must constitute one's true identity.

Liberty? Comment 2006-02-20 23:37:12

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I agree with you for the most part in your interpretation of Hume's quote, isn't it also possible that the external environment is the cause of the inflammation of emotions (which you state leads to actions that are the fault of the individual, not his environment)? It is hard to distinguish that which is purely internal and that which is influenced by the environment, but I don't think it is possible for one to live exclusively outside of the context of society, so while one should be responsible for one's actions, the external environment should be looked at as a possible motive for a particular instigation.

Identity at a Second Look

espringer — 2007-12-11

|...we suppose the whole train of perceptions to be united by identity, a question naturally arises concerning this relation of identity, whether it be something that really binds out several perceptions together, or only associates their ideas in the imagination-p 168 Of Personal Identity.| Hume thoroughly dissects the idea of identity. In his examples, he gives the basis for which identity should be based, but the identity of something does not have to be based on the obvious properties of the object. Hume ignores the personal aspect of identity. At the core of every perception, there is a unique piece that holds it together, so changing exterior aspects may not affect its identity at all. The identity of a church for someone may not be based on its architecture or the preaching inside, but on something random that they associate with church. Identity actually follows logic in that if the core piece is changed then so will the identity.

Perceiving Identity

espringer — 2007-12-11

|...Though the change of any considerable part in a mass of matter destroys the identity of the whole... we must measure the greatness of the part, not absolutely, but by its proportion to the whole. (Hume's The Abandoment of Personal Identity, p. 165)| |A change in any considerable part of a body destroys its identity; but 'tis remarkable, that where the change is produced gradually and insensibly, we are less apt to ascribe to it the same effect. (Hume's The Abandoment of Personal Identity, p. 166)| The aspect of Hume's argument that I call to question is his idea that finite proportional changes in an object can amount to the altering of its existence as a whole. I believe that the disconnect in Hume's argument appears in his claim that an object can undergo extreme change quickly thereby changing its identity, while also being able to transform gradually while maintaining its perceived existence. I think that Descartes addresses this idea very succinctly with his example of the melting ball of wax and his question of how we utilize the relationship between our senses and our mental capacity to characterize an object. Hume appears to utilize a more concrete theory in his understanding of metaphysics, yet Descartes appears to have pointed out a fallacy in Hume's logic by noting that it is simply our human understanding that is unable to adapt to the sudden change, and the actual change does not differ in nature.

rheinemann Comment 2006-02-21 00:00:27

espringer — 2007-12-11

Simplicity of Perception

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The whole of this doctrine leads us to a conclusion, which is of great importance in the present affair, viz. that all the nice and subtile questions concerning personal identity can never possibly be decided, and are to be regarded rather as grammatical than as philosophical difficulties (p. 171).| |From this similarity of operation we attribute a simplicity to it, and feign a principle of union as the support of this simplicity, and the centre of all the different parts and qualities of the object (pp. 171-172).| Hume argues that, although one may postulate about the intersecting creative forces of identity, the action is virtually moot due to the human tendency to simplify. He would agree with the stance that humans create the idea of identity out the need for mental efficiency, as it's strenuous to consistently conceive of "identity's" multiple facets. Yet, ought we to fight this inherent categorizing, as it leads to limiting social binaries? Hume would respond that, specifically considering philosophy, we must utilize greater meticulousness than in-general; I, however, believe that we must acknowledge the superficiality of the concept of 'identity' but, having no other medium in which to comprehend matters, we must accept our binary inherency in order to further address it.

An Objection to Hume

espringer — 2007-12-11

|All ideas are borrow'd from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, therefore, are deriv'd from that source. Consequently no proposition can be intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with regard to perceptions. But 'tis intelligible and consistent to say, that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common simple substance or subject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can never be absurd with regard to perceptions. (p. 174)| The term "perception" is perhaps defined incompletely here. The first moment of perception is sensation, and indeed in the process of sensation we sense objects as distinct and independent, and our identity is absent here. However, the second moment of perception is interpretation—contextualizing this distinct sensation within a worldview and consciousness. The "common simple substance" of identity lies with this subjective interpretation, the unique hue applied to the lens through which we understand "distinct and independent" sensations and synthesize them into a worldview—resulting in the unique engagement with the world in which "I" is most manifest. While objects (objectively) exist distinctly, our identity involves a deviation of perceptions from objective existence (subjectivity). Hume might consider this objection too grounded in feeling; he'd prefer a cohesive principle.

Secret Opposition Comment 2006-02-21 09:23:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

I understand your point that how can you adequately say there is uniformity when causes are "secret". However, I disagree with the statement "To know that uniformity of outcome will exist, one must be able to see every cause” One can see uniformity of outcome without knowing the cause. One can see the uniformity of outcome in babies crying without knowing why they cry at that instance.

Hume diagram on liberty and necessity

espringer — 2007-12-11

|2. In nature, when we agree that everything that happens is necessary, we mean (1) there's uniformity (constant conjunction) in the succession of events, and (2) the mind is led by this uniformity to predict the course of nature, to predict what effects will come from the events we experience. (p. 69-70)|!|!|!| |3. //If// we agree that human voluntary action shows (like nature) (1) patterns of //uniformity//, accompanied by (2) the mind's custom of //predicting// actions based on what we experience, //then// we agree on the doctrine of necessity with respect to human action. (70)|4. We agree that //human action is uniform// (as much as nature is). (70-74)|5. We agree that we regularly //predict// human actions based on what we experience (as much as we predict natural events). (74)|!| |>|>|6. (So) we agree that the //doctrine of necessity// (with respect to human action) is correct. (75)|7. (And:) all men //agree about liberty//, that it only means a power of acting or not acting according to the determinations of the will. (79)| |>|>|>|(I hope to show that:) 1. all men agree on the doctrines of //both liberty and necessity//. (p. 69)|

Deity Objection Comment 2006-02-21 10:04:45

espringer — 2007-12-11

I am so glad that you chose to respond to this because I, too, was really bothered by the abrupt lack of reasoning on Hume's behalf. Most likely this is meant to assuage the ruffled feathers of the Church, as Behdad suggests, but assuming for a moment that this is pure philosophic thought, you are correct when you point out the insufficiency of Hume's assertion that understanding the role of causality and God. As it stands, God must not have one of the three qualities that you described: omniscience, omnipotence or omnibenevolence; the question is, which one is it?

Identity at a Second Look Comment 2006-02-21 21:20:56

espringer — 2007-12-11

You seem to have stated two ideas. First, you say that identity is based on a piece which exists "at the core of every perception." This is an interesting point, but I am confused by what you believe is the nature of this core, and what evidence we have for its existence. Your example about the church, however, seems to say that identity for individual objects is formed from one's perception of it; "by something random that they associate with the church." By this logic, every object or person would have as many identities as there were people who percieved it, or associated it with something. Do you beleive identity exists in the "core" or in our associations with whatever we percieve?

Who Can Be Held Accountable?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|It is true, of course, that if the man is responsible for the beliefs and desires that he happens to have, then he may also be responsible for the things they lead him to do. But the question now becomes: is he responsible for the beliefs and desires he happens to have? (Chisolm, p.145)| |If the [firing of the shot] was not caused at all, if it was fortuitous or capricious, happening so to speak out of the blue, then, presumably, no one—and nothing—was responsible for the act (Chisolm, p.147).| Chisolm discusses responsibility for actions by trying to identify their causation. When something occurs, through some agent and course of actions, it has consequences regardless of the events that led to its occurrence. The motives behind the action do not excuse it, but perhaps they can explain it and to some level exonerate the agent. When a person is mentally ill, can they be charged in a murder over which they had no control? If a so-called "normal" person may or may not be responsible for their actions, then it would seem wrong to ignore other extenuating circumstances surrounding actions performed by an agent. Guilt and punishment are readily distributed, while innocence seems to be rarely granted.

The Self and How We Perceive Comment 2006-02-22 19:31:51

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that it seems a little too simple for our identity to be based solely off our perceptions and memories thereof, at first I would argue that different people naturally have a tendency to feel certain emotions more than others and therefore would recall things or percieve things in a certain light that varies between everyone. However, I think the arguement is at least partly refuted based on the idea that this 'natural tendency' may not really be a tendancy at all but a result of a person's surroundings and therefore his perceptions. Still, I do feel that there must be more to identity than just perceptions.

Perceptions strengthen identity Comment 2006-02-22 19:40:03

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you draw a very thoughtful conclusion based of Hume's writing. I fail to see how changing perceptions may strengthen our idea of self, and wish you had elaborted. I would have to be cautious and agree with Hume, however, that our identity is based on our perceptions of ourselves, and that these perceptions are constantly changing. Is your self-image now the same as it was when you were three? I think therefore it is more accurate to say that the only real self identity is that which perveives, and nothing more, since different perceptions in essence lead to different selves.

Simplicity of Perception Comment 2006-02-22 20:10:32

espringer — 2007-12-11

It is interesting that you believe the idea of identity is created out of "mental laziness." According to this theory, I suppose that if one perceives for example the forest as pleasing to the senses, then a "lazy minded individual" would automatically claim that he is "a nature loving person" and this would add to his identity. Although I do agree with you, and for that matter with Hume, that perceptions are ever changing and that one cannot group these perceptions into one solid identity, but many and changing identities, I cannot agree with you that this grouping is due in part by "mental laziness." I believe that humans create the idea of identities because human nature forces us to take what we uniquely perceive as part of our personalities and consequently identities.

Oversimplified Soul Comment 2006-02-22 20:22:06

espringer — 2007-12-11

I wonder whether your commentary actually represents any substantial objection to Mettrie; it seems what you're indicating here is that Mettrie is basically right about the workings of human beings, but that you'd prefer that he use the //word// 'soul' (or rather the French word being translated here as 'soul') differently. Is there something at stake in this choice, besides which word or phrase we use to indicate this level of complexity that makes individuals significantly different from one another? Or, is there another respect in which you mean to raise a difficulty for Mettrie's determinism?

Science of Man

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The Hobbist approach is the one that is generally accepted at the present time, but the Kantian approach, I believe, is the one that is true. According to Hobbism, if we know, of some man, what his beliefs and desires happen to be and how strong they are, if we know what he feels certain of, what he desires more than anything else, and if we know the state of his body and what stimuli he is being subjected to, then we may deduce, logically, just what it is that he will do (p 152)| |according to the Kantian approach...and this is the one that I would take, there is no such logical connection between wanting and doing, not need there even be a casual connection. No set of statements about a man's desires, beliefs, and stimulus situation at any time implies any statement telling us what the man will try, set out, or undertake to do at that time...though we may 'reason from men's motives to their actions, and in many cases, with great probability', we can never do so 'with absolute certainty'.(p 152)| |For at times the agent, if he chooses, may rise above his desires and do something else instead. (p 153)| His apparent uncertainty in reasoning men's actions from their desires leads Chisholm to state that there can be no science of man. While I would hold that this conclusion is true, it is because of the utter complexity a science of man would involve. How could science possibly know all the different degrees of desires a man has? Chisholm states that an agent may rise above his desires and do something else instead, but is this not a desire to do that something else? If this desire were known to us among all other factors influencing the decision, however small and however distantly in the past, wouldn't we be able to reason the actions of this man?

Where should responsibility ultimately be placed?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|It is true, of course, that if the man is responsible for the beliefs and desires that he happens to have, then he may also be responsible for the things they lead him to do. But the question now becomes: is he responsible for the beliefs and desires he happens to have? If he is, then there was a time when they were within his power either to acquire or not to acquire, and we are left, therefore, with our general point.| |We may say that the hand was moved by the man, but we may also say that the motion of the muscles was caused by certain events that took place within the brain. But some event, and presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other events.| We come back to the idea that factors and events act as motive for what we do, deeming us not responsible for our actions. However, Roderick Chisholm argues that what we should be responsible for are our desires and beliefs because those ultimately trigger our actions. He then questions whether or not we should hold ourselves responsible for our beliefs and desires, but if we cannot be held accountable for aspects of ourselves that we have control over, then what will we be blamed for? There are only so many events that can take place in our brains that have forced us to cause an action to occur, before we finally come to realize that the only thing responsible for all actions, are we the individuals ourselves.

In Defense of Determinism Comment 2006-02-22 20:32:22

espringer — 2007-12-11

Though your phrases are colorful and intriuging, your discussion here after the first sentence seems to "take off" on its own direction without particularly engaging with Mettrie's reasoning. When you write {{{This built-in distinction from the web... protects in own dubious concept... from scrutiny}}}, I'm not sure I follow. How does appeal to something beyond mechanistic cause insulate itself from *philosophical* criticism? Someone who proposes such an idea certainly insulates herself from the notion that her idea was inevitable... but it seems believing in free will need not involve believing that ideas need no reasoning to back them up... Perhaps you could explain more fully what you have in mind here and -- as always -- what's at stake, and how Mettrie would likely respond. ! One other thought I have is that there are two ways in which you present the appeal of ideas -- in an early passage there is an appeal to the collective unconscious (is this technical Jungian term doing any work here?), and in the later passage a claim about what's more consonant with reason... yet it seems we could ask: *Why* should determinism seem more consonant with reason than lack of causal explanation (and *Is* the dilemma, as expressed here, accurate and exhaustive)? ! * Writing clarity note: the poposal at the end of the first sentence surely woludn't be {{{"to replace the mental machinery... with the amorphous concept..."}}}. Rather, we would replace the *theory* that mental operations are machine-like with the notion that something like free will explains our actions. (In other words, you want to be clear that one idea is being replaced by another idea, not that *our actual mental machinery* is being replaced.)

Prime Mover

espringer — 2007-12-11

| On a man firing a gun..."Even though he did fire it, he could have done something else instead. (He didn't find himself firing the shot 'against his will', as we say,)" (pg. 144).| |"Every movement both of the will and of nature proceeds from God as the Prime Mover," (St. Thomas Aquinas, pg 145). "This may be a bold assertion...but I must say that I have never encountered a single good reason for denying it," (pg. 145).| Chisholm attempts to legitamize his assertion that man has a choice in whether or not he fires a gun with his statement that the action was not performed "against his will." The fact that it was not against his will, however, does not prove that he could have acted otherwise. There is no evidence which proves that his will was not determined by some greater force, or Prime Mover. Chisholm even proceeds to say that there is no reason to deny the theory of an omnipotent God. Thus, we are faced with two contradictory ideas, and is there really any way to prove that he could have acted otherwise if we cannot travel back in time and give him the option once more?

Kantian vs Hobbist approach

espringer — 2007-12-11

|According to Hobbism, if we know, of some man, what his beliefs and desires happen to be and how strong they are, if we know what he feels certain of, what he desires more than anything else, and if we know the state of his body and what stimuli he is being subjected to, then we may deduce logically, just what it is that he will set out to do--or just more accurately, just what it is that he will try, set out, or undertake to do.....But according to the Kantian approach to our problem, and this is the one that I would take, there is no such logical connection between wanting or doing nor need there even be a causal connection. (152)| |This means that, in one very strict sense of the terms, there can be no science of man. (152)| The Kantian approach, agreeing with Chrisholm, seems more fitting. The Hobbist approach appears questionable. If a child wants something as simple as an apple, the desire does not generally mean that the she will take the actions to get what she wants. The child can supress wanting the apple as she knows she will never be able to get up the tree, and walk away. The desires will be cast away, discrediting the Hobbist approach. However, a Hobbist could argue that these feelings of supression are only temporary, and upon seeing an apple tree again, for example, the child's desires may reemerge. Chisholm ends his analysis questioning the the existence of the "science of man." There is virtually no way of pinpointing the decisions of individuals with a standard prediction. Although the Kantian approach is more appealing, the Hobbists cannot be completely dismissed.

Feels like Free Will Comment 2006-02-22 21:12:58

espringer — 2007-12-11

Please indicate what your title was before, so that we can re-attach comments that were made before you revised and changed title. Thanks!

Guns Don't Kill People

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Human beings are responsible agents; but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human action...; and it also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action ... (Chisholm p. 1)| |If a flood caused the poorly constructed dam to break, then, given the flood and the constitution of the dam, the break, we may say, had to occur and nothing could have happened in its place. (Chisholm p.2)| Chisholm approaches free will via the idea of causality. He illustrates the point that every action can be traced back to an earlier act that can be said to have (directly or indirectly) caused the event to happen. He doesn't commit to this view, however, arguing later that man may be a prime mover himself. His view is hard to follow and I agree more with his later thinking; of man as the prime mover, and thus can bear responsibility. I disagree with the analogy of the poorly constructed dam will fall before a flood. Although this may be a tendency in weak-willed individuals, I do not see how this could remove responsibility from someone, since they ultimately pulled the trigger. Responsibility should therefore be placed on the actor, and not the circumstances.

Hobbes, Kant, and predictions

espringer — 2007-12-11

|According to Hobbism, if we know, of some man, what his beliefs and desires happen to be and how strong they are, of we know what he feels certain of, what he desires more than anything else, and if we know the state of his body and what stimuli he is being subjected to, then we may deduce, logically, just what it is that he will do—or, more accurately, just what it is that he will try, set out, or undertake to do.| |There is no such logical connection between wanting and doing, nor need there even be a causal connection| |If we are thus prime movers unmoved and our actions, of those for which we are responsible, are not causally determined, then they are not causally determined by our desires.| Hobbes's approach sees humans as ultimately rational and logical, as an extension of the predictable, transeunt, world around us. But say a poor man encounters a gun and another man walks by; what number of desires and stimuli are sufficient to predict that the poor man will rob the other man? It is quite accepted in our society however, that it makes perfect sense to advise another person not to go to a certain part of town because it is "dangerous." This is proof that Hobbes really does prevail in the present time. However, in reality, the sheer number of traits a person possesses makes it impossible to use a strict rubric to predict possible actions.

Perception creates Reality Comment 2006-02-22 22:30:13

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that if holding causality to be true, the fact that we think, feel, love and doubt does require a real reference, but then what is the reference of this reference? And if that reference is found, following causality, what is its reference? It can go on and on like this forever. Could there be a point in which something exists without a reference? Could it be our own identity? I don't know, but if perceptions in general are considered imperfect, our perception of causality must also be imperfect.

Where's the Crux of the Argument?

espringer — 2007-12-11

Chisholm presents the notion of "the prime mover unmoved," whose agency amounts to something more than a sum of impelling forces. Chisholm seems to agree with Leibniz that such forces âinclineâ but do not ânecessitateâ the agent's faculty of immanent causation. Citing Kant, he perceives this capacity to be located somewhere in the disconnect that can exist between what the individual desires, and what ze does. Chisholmâs construction may be the only scenario in which moral responsibility makes sense, but his conclusion is hardly satisfying. Ultimately, perhaps he is not actually attempting to garner support for the viability of his version of free will, but rather suggesting that the debate rests on purely metaphysical grounds.

thinking about thinking about thinking

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"We may say that the hand was moved by the man, but we may also say that the motion of the hand was caused by the motion of certain muscles; and we may say that the motion of the muscles was caused by certain events that took place within the brain. But some event, and presumably one of those that took place within the brain, was caused by the agent and not by any other events (p.148).| Chisholm's last statement assumes that although one can trace causation through transeunce, eventually the catalyzing agent will be found. I objected to this statement, thinking that if one followed the theory, there would always be a cause behind a cause and never an initiator. Chisholm's response is that it is never proved that the agent is not the root of the activity inside the brain. Yet, the question of consciousness remains troubling—if the agent is not aware of its influence, does it still have the power to choose? Either way, this quandary keeps the argument from complete soundness. The search then delves into metapsychology, although thinking about thinking only offers further obfuscation because concrete answers can never be found.

More than Imagination? Comment 2006-02-22 23:57:32

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think that your point about the role that the recognition of others plays in forming self-identity is interesting, but do you think that maybe Hume would include the opinion of others in the catagory of "perceptions?"

Perceiving Identity Comment 2006-02-22 23:52:14

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like your clear explanation of Hume's arguments, and it was very insightful that you compared our perception of identity via what we see to Descartes perception of objects as a result of sensory information. However, I am not really sure why or how you are objecting to the idea that large sudden changes in an object can alter its identity. Are you equating the two instances which Hume described, in which case it would be nonsensical to draw different conclusions?

Forms of Consciousness Comment 2006-02-23 00:01:51

espringer — 2007-12-11

Imagination and Identity Comment 2006-02-22 23:59:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think it's really interesting that you bring up whether or not "existences are really distinct," specifically because it relates to our previous class discussion. For instance, if two people have an identical memory of a cake, do they in some ways share a part of the same identity? Furthermore, are two identical memories even possible? I would argue that no, even seeing the cake from a different perspective, with different haptic, emotional, etc., cues, counts as a completely different memory. That is, even if the same general idea is the same. But I think that it's up for interpretation.

Kantian vs Hobbist approach Comment 2006-02-23 00:40:21

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I respect your opinion, it seems to me that you are being a tad too quick to dismiss the Hobbist approach. Your arguments about the child being physically unable to reach up the tree and of the adolescent who bows to reality are, from a Hobbist point of view, part and parcel of the 'state of his body' and other external factors which together suppress, for the moment at least, these wants and desires that you speak of.

Imagination and Identity Comment 2006-02-23 00:57:48

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your idea that there are universal meanings among the identities is intriguing. Chairs come in a variety of different designs and materials, yet we still retain that idea of a 'chair'. We do not hesitate, however, to differentiate between two chairs, attributing to them distinct existences. Perhaps Hume might say we have the idea of chairs, a category under which all chairs fall under, and an idea of the identity of a particular chair. The two ideas do overlap, but does this weaken Hume's arguments?

Simplicity of Perception Comment 2006-02-23 01:12:53

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I agree with most of what you said here, Ania, I fail to understand how the example of that lazy-minded, nature-loving person serves as a counter-example to Emily's assertions. Also, might not 'mental laziness' be part of this 'human nature' that you speak of?

Perceptions strengthen identity Comment 2006-02-23 01:18:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I respect your opinion, it seems to me that Hume is unlikely to agree with your final statement. In what way does the changing perceptions add to our idea of self? Hume would argue that these ever-changing perceptions are a basis to question the very idea of personal identity. We perceive light, sounds, touch, etc, but the self is arrived at through inference, that is, indirectly.

The Self and How We Perceive Comment 2006-02-23 01:30:37

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I respect your opinion, it occurs to me that your argument should present Hume with no difficulty. That different people perceive differently need not necessarily be attributed to the actions of an independent personal identity. Indeed, could we not just as easily attribute it to biology? As an example, individuals who are color-blind would perceive the world differently compared to individuals who are not color-blind.

An Objection to Hume Comment 2006-02-23 01:46:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

You posed a convincing opinion, and I appreciate the way you differentiated between sensation and interpretation. I wonder, however, if your exposition has had any effect on Hume's argument. Is not this 'hue' of yours similar in effect to Hume's 'connections between perceptions'? Interpretation is never completely under our own control either. The raw data that flows through our senses undergo a preliminary round of processing that is not under our control, as for example the various optical illusions with which we amuse ourselves. What effect might this have the idea of an independent self?

His Logic Stems From Opinion

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The only answer, I think, can be this: that the difference between the man's causing A, on the one hand, and the event A just happening, on the other, lies in the fact that, in the first case but not the second, the even A was caused and was caused by the man. (p. 150)| I do not disagree with Chisholm's logic here, nor the assertion that the task of differentiation between causation and the lack thereof is inherently problematic. Causation is a notion of human invention -- an abstract concept which may be hard to accurately recognize. Perhaps causation is ultimately an issue of opinion. Then is Chisholm's argument based on an opinion: there can be unprompted causation, or, that indeterminism exists? Chisholm would probably respond by saying we first need to understand the concept of immanent causation before we could interpret transeunt causation. A response to this, however, is that coming first does not guarantee validity, and so these two schools of thought are still unresolved.

Wishful Thinking?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Our conception of action, therefore, should be neither deterministic nor indeterministic. Is there any other possibility? (Roderick Chisolm, Human Freedom and the Self, p. 147)| One possibility not examined is that responsibility according to this definition simply might not exist. Taking this opinion of responsibility a priori as a basis for arguing about determinism strikes me as wishful thinking, for the abductive reasoning to work it need first be shown that this version of responsibility is true. Wanting it to be so is not enough. Chisolm might reply that what we can know is ultimately limited by our imperfect perception. The question of determinism might never be adequately answered, but his explanation best allows for morality. Is this reason strong enough for this concept of responsibility to dictate how reality really works? Not by a long shot, but that is just my opinion.

Guns Don't Kill People Comment 2006-02-25 18:20:08

espringer — 2007-12-11

You seem to be making several points here regarding the development of Chisholm’s ideas. Since micro-essays are meant to be short and compacted with cohesive ideas that successively increase in depth, it might be better to isolate a single concept and think through that concept by a process of objections and responses. For example, you might want to focus on exactly why you disagree with the analogy of the dam, then attempt to come up with a potential response to your point of disagreement. That is, although you might say that pulling the trigger is ultimately a matter of choice, an objector might propose that emotions can greatly influence and perhaps overwhelm the faculty of choice. Thus making the emotion, and ultimately not the person responsible for a certain decision. Furthermore if a person is “weak-willed”, are they necessarily responsible for such a condition?

His Logic Stems From Opinion Comment 2006-02-25 20:14:43

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although Chisholm’s ideas may ultimately based on “opinion”, he doesn’t simply present his opinion as such, he provides reasoning and argumentation to build evidence to support his ideas. Therefore what are his reasons for the opinion he holds? In regards to these reasons, where do you agree, where do you disagree? And also why? On a more petty level, it may be to your advantage to not write in the first person for the genre of philosophical writing.

Science of Man Comment 2006-02-25 23:57:49

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make a good and well thought out point here, however, I believe Chisholm is suggesting that even with a very complex science of man, we can only calculate probability of a person’s choice, never a necessity. Thus since you might know that I love candy more than life itself you might be able to say that I probably will eat some candy when some is presented to me. However, it is never the case that I have to eat the candy which is presented to me. There’s a subtle yet very significant difference between high probability and necessity. Therefore is free agency still possible? What would the nature of such free agency be?

Where should responsibility ultimately be placed? Comment 2006-02-26 00:05:47

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make a sound series of points here, however, I don’t believe you are actually providing any objection to Chisholm. I think he would agree with you, in that human beings are ultimately free agents who have the power of immanent causation thus making them responsible for their actions. Since you don’t want to just summarize a philosopher’s argument, it might be helpful to look for parts of the text that you find disagreeable or perhaps unclear. Then based on the text think of an objection, for example, is the idea of being an uncaused cause sensible? Does it make sense to bring about an even without having been caused by another event?

Where's the Crux of the Argument? Comment 2006-02-26 01:03:39

espringer — 2007-12-11

You bring up a very good and well put point. However is Chisholm actually making a metaphysical claim regarding the existence of freewill or is he simply providing the version of freewill upon which moral responsibility must be based. Above all, Chisholm wants to believe in the existence of moral responsibility, thus he creates an account of freewill in accordance to our notion of responsibility. I think he withholds judgment in regards to the actual metaphysical existence of his version of freewill. Do you agree that his account of freewill is necessary in order for moral responsibility to exists?

thinking about thinking about thinking Comment 2006-02-26 01:11:23

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm…frankly I am a bit confused about what you’re saying. Perhaps I would understand better if I you could articulate your visceral objection? Although the point you bring up about consciousness is rather intriguing, I’m not quite sure what you mean by your statement. What do you mean by “not aware of its influence” and in what way is that related to immanent causation? Furthermore if metapsychology can provide an answer what would it be?

Wishful Thinking? Comment 2006-02-26 01:19:26

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make an astute and important observation, Chisholm is committed to the idea of moral responsibility, and he bases his conception of freewill upon such a commitment. What do you think are the reasons for Chisholm having such a strong commitment to moral responsibility? Perhaps you can assume that moral responsibility is a misconception and then deduce a set of possible consequences. Perhaps “wishful thinking” is preferable and even necessary.

Hobbes, Kant, and predictions Comment 2006-02-26 01:23:56

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your objection to Hobbes seems quite valid, however, is it not precisely what Chisholm states? You might want to avoid summarizing an author’s point of view, for the sake of providing objection to actual claims of the text. Are there any other objections to the Hobbsean point of view? What about Chisholm? Is his response to Hobbes sufficient?

Kantian vs Hobbist approach Comment 2006-02-26 01:25:16

espringer — 2007-12-11

Yes, your counter-example to Hobbes seems quite sound, however, don't you think that Chisholm feels a bit neglected by your commentary? You provide a good objection to a Hobbsean standpoint referred to by Chisholm, but what about Chisholm himself and his ideas? Are there any possible objections to his claim regarding the impossibility of a science of human beings?

Who Can Be Held Accountable? Comment 2006-02-26 01:35:47

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make an interesting point, however, I would take a closer look at the text. Chisholm doesn’t seem to actually hold the position you are assigning him and consequently objecting to. He posits that freewill entails a looseness in regards to the faculty of choice, that is, the ability to do otherwise. I would take another careful look at the text in order to find out what Chisholm is actually saying, as to be able to object to his actual argument rather than a position he himself seems to oppose.

thinking about thinking about thinking Comment 2006-02-26 16:58:30

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like the quote you used about the causation of brain signals through the arm, though I am not sure what you are calling your objection in this response. Are you saying that you don't agree with the passage and that you also find that later in the text the author also objects to that passage? Do you mean that you agree with the author? The idea of thinking about thinking is perplexing and sort of makes my brain hurt to think about. If you cannot think of a thought or how it came into being, did that thought really exist? Is it possible that there isn't something before the brain that caused the brain to signal the movement in the arm?

Shaking the Fence

espringer — 2007-12-11

James argues that it is better to be mistaken than to lose the truth for fear of being duped, and when reason proves impotent, to turn to belief and feelings for an answer. Is it necessary that our passions always point us one way or another? James would say yes, and insist that those who plead indecision are just too afraid of being wrong to make that leap of faith. Yet are there not situations where our passions may conflict, and fluctuate about uncertainly? James demands that we take sides, and he may be right that some fence-sitters are in denial and ought to come down, but what about those who want to choose, but cannot decide?

Safari bug nixed, I believe

espringer — 2007-12-11

After much consultation with [[the code-genius behind our web site|Tim Morgan]], I think we have a workaround that makes ''Safari'' safe again. So, if you prefer to use Safari, please feel free to try it again, and let me know if you experience any trouble. ! By the way, the [[Safari glitch|Safari glitch diagnosed]] was triggered by non-standard characters, such as curly quotes (probably imposed by MS Word), especially within tables (boxes). [[Titles|Titles and tags]] are also sensitive to such characters. Although curly quotes and apostrophes are now specifically converted for the sake of avoiding the Safari glitch, it would still be wise to avoid all such characters (including magic "dash" characters and special ellipsis characters, etc.).

Epictetus Limits Control

espringer — 2007-12-11

Epictetus' work, "Enchiridion" promotes a stoic lifestyle. A stoic lifestyle seems reasonable and in some ways desireable in order to lead a happy life. I think Ecpictetus leans too much toward complacency and to accepting what happens to an individual. As I stated in my post relating to this document earlier, there is a fine line between contentedness and complacency. Epictetus has a good point with realizing what is out of one's control and that we should not fret over these things. He might respond to this argument by saying that many things, such as property, are out of our control an that they can be taken from us at any time. This is true, yet setting out with an attitude saying many things are out of your control may in fact reduce what is in your control or under your influence, thus making you very deeply affected to the changes of the world around you.

What is it to Know?

espringer — 2007-12-11

I am concerned with the concept of knowledge. Is there a basis for knowledge, or is all that we know, in the end, nothing but belief? Descartes in his meditations laid down the basis for a knowledge of the existence of the self, yet even this first and most basic of ideas can be called into question. If there is no single nugget of truth for which there can never be doubt, whence comes knowledge? Is there even a difference between knowledge and belief? Can the edifice of knowledge be built from a foundation of belief? Perhaps, in the end, there is nothing to be found undoubtable, in which case we need release our iron resolve for absolute truth. How then can we be sure that there are even universal truths beyond the limitations of our knowledge? Furthermore, with only personal truths within our grasp, how do we reconcile our concepts of morality and human responsibility with a world of disparate realities? In my essay I shall draw upon the texts we read by Descartes, Hume, Chisolm, and James.

Chisholm argument

espringer — 2007-12-11

The ''implicit conclusion'' of section 2 was: //If// a man is responsible for a certain event, //then// that event was brought about by some act, //which// could not have been caused or determined by any event that was not itself within his power either to bring about . ! The answer to the objection at the end of section 2 is: although we speak of people who "cannot do wrong," we must usually not really mean that they are //unable// to do wrong. If someone like Cato //was// genuinely unable to do wrong, that would be nothing praiseworthy. ! In response to the compatibilist argument at 3, Chisholm's response is: Premise 1 is false: (a) and (b) are not equivalent. Rather, (a) is not implied by (b) //unless we add// the further claim (c): that the person in question really //could have ''chosen'' otherwise//. ! In response to second objection in section 8, Chisholm's reply is: this point is ''granted'' -- but it is a disadantage faced by other ideas about causality as well. (Hume, for example, also cannot really explain how "X just happened" differs from "X was caused or determined to happen".)

Faith without Facts

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"But if we are empiricists, if we believe that no bell in us tolls to let us know for certain when truth is in our grasp, then it seems a piece of idle fantasicality to preach so solemnly our duty of waiting for the bell. Indeed we may wait if we will, - I hope you do not think that I am denying that,--but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we believed."(734). In James's "The Will to Believe" he introduces two fundamental ideas that humans idealistically wish to achieve: 'believe truth' and 'shun error,' the latter of which he later opposes. In order to avoid being 'duped' there is the option to believe nothing, unless there is extensive (scientific) evidence. James supports the idea of faith, which combats the theory of believing nothing because believing is a choice. One can choose to rely on faith with or without the 'bell' and without neccessarily being succeptible to beleiving falsehoods. I agree that fear of skeptisism should not prevent one from having the confidence to believe, however I see a potential problem with relying on this 'bell,' which I feel James suggests to represent instincts. He encourages an 'intellectual republic' however is this not too subjective?

Who Can Be Held Accountable? Comment 2006-02-27 19:48:12

espringer — 2007-12-11

I also agree that Chisholm does not make the argumnent that people will never be 'deemed responsible' for their actions, but rather we have the will to act or not act within the realm of causation.

Knowing Oneself

espringer — 2007-12-11

In light of the title of the course, I wish to explore to what extent can one know oneself. The discussion of identity, existence, and free-will, will be imperative in the process of coming to some form of a conclusion to this question. Is one's consciousness the only means of understanding oneself, or is it the acknowledgement of other beings that allows a person to have an introspective view of they are? Furthermore, one's perception is unique, however what are the forces that force us to percieve the world a certain way, unlike anyone else; does this suggest that an omnipotent and omniscent being exists? Lastly, there is the metaphysical idea of dualism that plays a vital role in identifying what a person "owns," that is, what are the ingredients of their existence in relation to the mind and body. It is possible to know oneself, although we may only percieve to understand an illusion of ourselves because we do not necessarily have free-will to do so otherwise. In order to support the claim that one is capable of knowing oneself, or at least has the ability to understand who one is, I plan to discuss Descartes's "Meditations on First Philosophy," as well as d'Holbach's "Of the System of Man's Free Agency." Hume's "Of Personal Identity" and "Second Thoughts" will also be fundemental to my paper as he illustrates most evidently the "problem" of knowing oneself. side note- I am wondering if my "problem" is not intriguing or original enough to explore, does it look as though it may just repeat Hume's works?javascript:;

Predetermination vs. Free Will

espringer — 2007-12-11

d'Holbach makes a rather convincing argument that one’s life is essentially predetermined. It is evident that humans do under most circumstances act in their best interest, striving ultimately for self-preservation, or at least for that which is desired. Every decision that a man makes seems not to be a result of some personal and intrinsic choice of one option over another, but rather these decisions result from external influences over which man has no control. In choosing one thing over another, the ultimate factor that sways man is whether or not he will benefit from his choice; self-preservation ultimately necessitates that one choice be made over the other. If this is true, then man’s actions clearly are derived from necessity. It follows then that if all of man’s actions are derived from necessity, man’s life is in fact predetermined. However, as human beings we believe that we have free will -- the ability to make choices and decisions based on personal and intrinsic preference, uninfluenced by external sources or that which is out of our control. Yet if the life of a man or woman is ultimately predetermined, then ze obviously does not possess this freedom of will that ze believes to have. Depending on one’s definition of "choice," the human free will to choose may or may not be compatible with predetermination If our lives are in fact predetermined, then nothing that we “choose” to do actually matters, which in itself seems to conflict with the doctrine of necessity. Can any action be “necessary” if all consequence leads to the same place? Perhaps the most perplexing question is: Does our consciousness of “choice” confer to us the freedom of will that we are so sure to possess? or are our lives actually predetermined, and we are simply wrong in our assertion that we are free agents?

Our Definition of the Self

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume argues that we have no notion of self and that every idea we possess as individuals comes from perceptions. Therefore, the self cannot exist. Hume also argues that the self comes from different impressions or experiences we encounter throughout our lives, but the problem is how do we know what connects all of these impressions together? Contiguity often allows us to make connections because humans often assume that every event that happens simultaneously, must belong together due to causality. On the one hand, Hume essentially argues that we have no notion of self because we only experience a series of different impressions and experiences. On the other hand, we define the self through causality and the assumption that connections are apparent between impressions, although we have not observed these connections.

Where does the blame lie?

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume suggests that actions, not the agents of actions, are to blame, given that these actions emerge from character. Blame will only be given to man if this act deceives internal character. Hume concludes his thoughts asking if external factors influence choices, then how can we assign blame to man? Contradictory to Hume's beliefs, free will seems to exist. With this free will, even if external factors appear to threaten one's free will, one possesses the ability to make a choice whether to be or not to be influenced by these external factors. Blame ought to be assigned to the agents of actions. If man is naturally evil, he ought to not simply be forgiven, given his actions follow his character. Proponents of Hume’s argument may claim that external influences take away one’s free will, therefore the agent cannot be held morally responsible for the actions taken. What if man, who has a naturally good character, makes an immoral decision, excluding external factors? What, if anything, caused this action, and is he to blame?

Causal Morality

espringer — 2007-12-11

I will discuss morality, its relationship to causality and what this relationship highlights concerning notions of morality. Hume proposes an idea of causality and necessity in the natural and human world. If we exist in a state in which every event is a product of some previous event and the determinist outlook is correct, how can a person be held responsible for hir actions? Is there such a thing as complete responsibility and to what extent can it exist? What exactly does morality mean in such a context? On the other hand, the fact that a person's actions are determined by hir desires, urges and inclinations can lead to the belief that ze becomes more responsible for hir actions and susceptible to some sort of "punishment" because these actions portray elements of hir character. If causality exists, doesn't ze have no control over how these desires are obtained and how ze's character develops? What does the nature of morality become when a person holds onto rigid causality and finds ze responsible for hir actions? Can morality even exist? I will engage with texts written by Hume and Augustine.

The Problem of The Self

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume makes concludes many things about the self, including ideas of a self that cannot exist. On one hand, the self is supposed to exist through life. A person exists because of the self they were born, and that self evolves throughout a lifetime. Beliefs may change, a body will change, but certain qualities and unique characteristics mold the self who we are will stay. Through perceptions we balance what we know and what we think we know and which things are the most important. Our self is the same one we were born with and the same one that we will grow into over the years. On the other hand, Hume also leads us to believe that identity only seems to stay the same. It is impossible for us to have a real, clear notion of the self because there is no such thing. The self comes only from a series of perceptions we are constantly exposed to and the impressions these make on us. The self is simply a product of the experiences it encounters and those experiences are what shape this ever-changing self. There cannot be one inherent, unchanging self that exists within us from the day we are born until the day we die. The self is an impermanent illusion we create from things we believe to be real and permanent.

Fact or Fallacy?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|There is this, -- there is that; there is indeed nothing which some one has not thought absolutely true, while his neighbor deemed it absolutely false...the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be truth or no. (William James, The Will to Believe, pg 726)| |There are, then, cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming...where faith in a fact can help create the fact. (William James, The Will to Believe, pg 731)| James writes that there are instances where, without initial faith, fact cannot be formed, and that there may be no way to know for certain when actual truth is found. This is problematic to those who consider life as a quest for an ultimate truth, as according to James, this may be impossible to achieve. If faith in a fact is required for that fact's creation, perhaps nothing may be concretely known to be real, regardless of whether or not one believes something to be. Without an infallible reality, the delicate balance of right and wrong upon which our existence perpetuates is disturbed, as these concepts are intrinsically dependent upon the fact that unquestionable truth exists apart from faith.

The Will to Truth

espringer — 2007-12-11

William James argues that, however objective one attempts to be, every opinion is influenced by one's "passional nature." He thus concludes that with questions which elude the grasp of reason, such as the existence of God, one's desire to believe can be accepted as a necessary factor in the choice one makes. I wonder, however, why James doesn't recognize that this natural desire to seek comfort in a faith in cosmic lucidity is itself a strong reason to be skeptical of any divine order to the universe. James' point should nonetheless not be disregarded, and rather than relying on pure reason, the skeptical position should attempt to grapple with and examine the intuitive foundations of belief.

Wishful Thinking? Comment 2006-02-27 22:28:45

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you make a very good point by bringing up the possibility that the concept of responsibility may not exist. Because personal responsibility is such a rooted foundation of our thought (in government, justice etc) do you think you might be able to suggest what the ramifications of this possibility might be?

Where should responsibility ultimately be placed? Comment 2006-02-27 22:30:27

espringer — 2007-12-11

I completely agree with your concernt over where responsibility should ultimately placed. While I also believe that one must be held accountable for all of his actions, despite the origin of the action's motives, it does not seem to me that humans can be in control of their beliefs and desires. For whatever reasons, whether they be external or intrinsic, passion has always fallen just outside of the control of man. Yet this is not suffiecient reason for man to escape responsibility for his actions.

A Larger Reality

espringer — 2007-12-11

By making it clear that actions conform to external and internal circumstances beyond an individual's control, that every choice has a separate uncontrollable cause, D'Holbach states that human beings are bound in an inflexible deterministic fabric that eliminates free will. In agreeing that human action is based on reasons and motives that are in the uncontrollable context of a person's existence, I seemingly must agree with this argument. Furthermore, the argument is made more appealing by D'Holbach's implication that predetermined destiny or fate is not the only counter-argument to "free will." However, my personal world-view drives me to reject that reality is inextricably tied up in a perfectly predictable (in theory), algorithmic series of causes and effects. When I broaden my perspective beyond the search for individual causes for individual choices, my view of "external" context shifts to see the inter-connected, yet self-contained wholeness of reality as a single entity; nothing "outside" can be a cause of the way in which this reality progresses. Thus, the "being" of reality, the Transcendentalists' Oversoul, is a primary mover. Furthermore, since everyone is a necessary part of a reality that cannot be fragmented or compartmentalized, everyone must be a prime mover as well. In this light, it seems that a determinist can maintain his philosophy only because ze chooses to maintain a limited perspective. I will use mainly D'Holbach's "System of Man's Free Agency," and I might borrow from Hume and Chisholm as well.

Series of impressions

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume argues that we can observe no self outside a series of our impressions. Every idea about ourselves comes from our perceptions and these perceptions are constantly changing. When these perceptions are removed, we may be said not to exist. Our notion of self is an assumption of connections between these impressions. But is there not a sense of self that exists throughout all of these perceptions? Though we may not think of self as an absolute identity, we can have a notion of self over time. Individuals perceive the world around us differently, so is our notion of self derived from these different subjective interpretations.

Guns Don't Kill People Comment 2006-02-27 22:51:33

espringer — 2007-12-11

You bring up a very interesting point when you say that perhaps uncontrollable internal/external causal forces provide a "tendency" more than an utter deterministic truth. I also disagree with absolute determinism, however, I don't think that Chisholm does either. He argues both determinism and indeterminism only to find that neither provides room for responsibility. Thus, I think Chisholm might even agree with you that causal forces are more like influencing forces. Also, perhaps you should specify why it is precisely that you don't agree with the dam analogy.

The Worth of Skepticism

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"...he who says, 'Better go without belief forever than believe a lie!' merely shows his own preponderant private horror of becoming a dupe. He may be critical of many of his desires and fears, but this fear he slavishly obeys. (James, "The Will To Believe" p. 727)| James implies that scientists, in segregating their desires and fears from research, are hypocritical, for they act on their own fears of believing a falsehood, just as a believers act on their desire to believe. A true believer may be unlikely to change hir belief in a truth, even in the face of new evidence. The practice of skepticism, however, is still valuable, since it is inherently resistant to unsubstantiated beliefs. James might respond that even unsubstantiated beliefs, despite that they might be more choice worthy with evidence, are only a different species of beliefs based on faith. The scientist uses the scientific method to discover truths, while the believer, in acting in correspondence with a belief, can also help bring about truths.

An area in the middle

espringer — 2007-12-11

If everyone followed the doctrine of Epictetus, which is an almost implausible notion, one might argue that the lack of compassionate, pro-active individuals would leave the world a dreary and inhuman place. If Epictetus' true beliefs were followed, however, there would be no need for compassion as everyone would be able to self medicate. This ability would spring from the unattached way in which stoics view everything. This unnatachedness allows emotions to flow freely through a person, meaning undesired sensations, such as greif, are transient. The fact that the notion of everyone becoming a stoic is nearly implausible leads to the conclusion that not everyone is capable of living unattached, and is thus incapable of self-healing. With this in mind, the strict doctrine of stoicism, as a way of living for a portion of the population, is lacking. One is instructed not to moan with a man who mourns. If, to this Epictetus added the practice of understanding the inability of some to live as he and other stoics do, from this would spring compassion and selfless aid.

Do Not Doubt Free Will

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Can we by any effort of our will, or by any strength of wish that it were true, believe ourselves well and about when we are roaring with rheumatism in bed, or feel certain that the sum of the two one-dollar bills in our pocket must be a hundred dollars? We can say any of these things, but we are absolutely impotent to believe them..." (The Will to Believe, James. Page 719)| |"Free-will and simple wishing do seem, in the matter of our credences, to be only fifth wheels to the coach." (The Will to Believe, James. Page 721)| James makes a strong point in stating that we do not have complete control over what we believe. James states that it is the minds destiny to seek truth. He proves that people cannot use their free will to fight directly against truth, but he gives the human ability to use free will less credit than it does deserves. People can find ways to control what they believe. When one does not want to believe something, they can find ways to convince themselves otherwise. If a person is given a camera that shows aliens walking amongst humans that person can decide if they want to believe it or not regardless if it is true or not.

The Freedom of Determinism

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume's tri-part deterministic concept of the free will of thought is one that is engaging on several levels. To begin with, it recalls the debate regarding the determinism of humankind's actions, which rise from the very building blocks of biology. If our very biological processes, from the macromolecular level on up through that of the corpus, clearly delineate a causal train of signal input and transference to physical action, then how can one deny that the thought process, which stems from that biological basis, could be any different. Dare we be so arrogant as to say that our thoughts transcend our biology? There are arguably very definitive, causal interactions that create the patterns of thought: contiguity, resemblance and causation. I will go into further detail over the course of my paper, and for now will simply state that this is the argument that backs the deterministic view of free thought: that, similar to the biological world, there can be no spontaneous act or generation of thought- everything has at least one clear link to that which germinated the intellectual or physical response. Thought does not supercede biological determinism. On the other hand, perhaps there is choice, even in the manifestations of our determinism. Although one can argue that a human being never makes a choice that ze isn’t motivated to make, unless consciously making that choice simply to prove that ze can do so, perhaps there is more freedom within determinism and causation than credit is given for. It is arguable that, when given a plethora of choices, one may consider them all, find cause to choose each, and, in accepting that there are contributory factors to choose any of them, find the freedom to decide. In this way, one may actively play a role in the direction hir life takes, rather than determining that ze is simply a biological, sensory puppet. This is the idea with which I plan to engage: what are the subtleties of determinism, and is it possible to find intellectual freedom within the basis of causation, despite our biological tendencies?

set of standards

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Our faith is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters that is most the case. Our belief in truth itself, for instance, that there is a truth, and that our minds and it are made for each other... (pg. 722)| James argues that beliefs are based in individuality. Not everyone has the same beliefs. The main belief is that truth exists. There is not one standard of Truth with a capital T. Often times our faith that our beliefs are true is based on another individual's faith. But is there such a thing as a universal truth when an individual's sense of truth is based on faith? James might respond by saying that people depend on each other to develop the truth and go beyond it. Social organisms require trust of other individuals to take risks along the way to reach truth. Whether or not there is universal truth, individuals strive to attain it.

What is in our Control?

espringer — 2007-12-11

Epictetus clearly defines that which is in our control and that which is not. Opinions, desires, and our own actions are some of the things Epictetus sees as in our control. Although it is difficult to see how our emotions can be controlled, Epictetus presents a logical argument to defend his statement. To him, emotions are cultivations, and we can control them because at some point we chose to linger in them and let them overtake us; it is only in the present that they seem incontrollable. Furthermore, we tend to attach responsibility to the choices we make and how we choose to act. We are how we act, and if actions are not in our control, then who are we really? On the other hand, isn't there a reason why we allow ourselves to become overwhelmed by emotions? While I believe that we should be held responsible for our opinions, desires, and actions (some of the things Epictetus considers controllable), I do not think that these are always completely under our control. Epictetus says that other people’s actions are out of control, but the actions of others and the context of society affect our own actions and decisions, which convolutes the clarity of what actually is in our control. Maybe only the expression of what we feel is controllable, and not the feeling itself.

Causation

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hume argues that causation is inferred from the observation of objects connected together through resemblance and contiguity. As it is impossible to observe the actual quality of causation in itself, our capacity to ascribe causal relationships rests solely on the memory of patterns that we witness to be uniform, and cannot be proven as more than a faith that such patterns will remain unaltered. Even Chisholm, who attempts to find fault in Hume's determinism, concedes that our imperfect understanding of causation precludes any satisfactory answer to the dilemma of free will. Causation, nonetheless, is generally taken for granted, and is a foundational principle of daily life and consciousness. Is there any way to arrive at greater certainty in regard to causation? Specifically, I would like to examine whether, as Alexandre Kojéve describes in his "Introduction to the Reading of Hegel," in the initial volition when the individual constructs the idea of an “I” -- of itself as a subject–there is also created an understanding of this subject’s ability to cause. If this notion of the individual’s initial understanding of causation is viable, does it amount to true knowledge of causation? I don’t know what the answers to these questions are. Sources: Chisholm, Roderick. Human Freedom and the Self in Free Will. Ed. Derk Pereboom. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997. David Hume. Of the Will and Direct Passions in Free Will. Ed. Derk Pereboom Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1997. Kojéve, Alexandre. In Place of an Introduction in Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. Ed. Allan Bloom. Trans. Hames H. Nichols Jr. 1947

To Know Truth

espringer — 2007-12-11

|When as empiricists we give up the doctrine of objective certitude, we do not thereby give up the quest or hope of truth itself (p. 726).| It is not always that the journey to discover truth is more important than truth. For example, discovering evidence to alleviate a person from guilt is an example of a time when the end product of truth may be more valuable than the quest to find it. Although, James might argue that if this evidence was found through methods that were possibly harmful or immoral, then the process of uncovering the truth could create a shadow over the soundness of the information. The fear of being fooled can prevent the actual truth from being revealed. James would disagree with this absolutist view. Faith should be put into the process of searching for truth, not into finding the end product.

epictetus & desire

espringer — 2007-12-11

Stoicism, upon first glance, appears an ideal solution to many of the issues humans face on a daily basis. It advocates removing oneself from the endless cycle of suffering by ceasing to desire. Epictetus states that what we should do is limited by what we can do, and therefore people should not waste time worrying about things out of their control. The stoics state that self-control can lead to detachment from distracting emotions, and attachment to that which is fleeting yet is considered permanent for the sake of emotional comfort. With diligence and strict observation, this method could lead to a deep transcendence and a selfless desire to help others, since the philosophy promotes being the change one wants to see in the world. On the other hand, many would argue that even if it were possible to live an ascetic, chaste existence, it would not be a superior alternative. Perhaps the pain and torture is worth the ecstasy of complete contentment, even if the feeling of permanence is a deceptive illusion. Selfless altruism has been cited as the greatest emotion one can experience, but it has yet to be proven tenably superior to egotistical greed. The former, however, is infinitely more beneficial to society, as no one else benefits from self-satisfaction. Without a choice concretely established as superior, we are forced to pick a path before we know the consequences of our actions—perhaps there is a way to solve this dilemma. I do not yet know the way.

Comment on Prime Mover by lnussbaum

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with you about how there is no way to prove whether or not the man could have acted otherwise, or even for that matter what his will was. If the man did not want to shoot the gun, but was forced to by some omnipotent God or Prime Mover, than wouldn't this action be against his will? If someone else determined his will, it was not truly his will to begin with, and therefore he could not have done otherwise.

2/28

espringer — 2007-12-11

Note: abstracts should ''not'' be tagged with {{{2/28}}}; they should be tagged with your login name and <>. ''James on the Will to Believe, Feb 28 (tagged {{{2/28}}}):'' <>

Essay Abstract

espringer — 2007-12-11

Free will does not seem to have a solid standpoint. The inconsistence with the notion of free will makes it hard to accurately debate upon. On one hand, free will takes an anti-religious view. If there were no free will then all of man's perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and actions would be the product of a previous force. In theory, man would then have the power of God in being able to control people's actions by exposing them to curtain forces. This downplays the omnipotence of God, and gives no reason to believe in an all-powerful being that has the same power as man. On the other hand, not having free could also prove that there is some all-powerful being behind our every move or at least the initial starter of the chain reaction sequencing of events. To make a valid attempt to argue for or against free will, there must be a common ground where both sides agree. Even for the argument of the big bang theory vs. God's creation of the heavens and the earth, they agreed on point in time where they did not exist and that there had to be a starter of there existence. Free will itself conflicts with religion, the idea of human responsibility, and even some aspects of science. At every proven point, there seems to be a deniable aspect, but for one side or the other to be proven there has to be a point where there is no deniable aspect. There needs to be a solid foundation in the idea of free will.

The importance of Truth in the mind

espringer — 2007-12-11

In his lecture "The Will to Believe", James repeatedly asserts that skepticism is an unfortunate belief system because it does not allow for the belief of something that may someday prove to be false. The basis of this argument however relies on the idea that there is a way to actually discern absolute Truth from the world around us. What caused the ancient Greeks to decide that it was better to disbelieve everything before believing anything and did society have a role in the precautionary nature of skepticism? Furthermore, James states that science and religion arose from similar backgrounds of uncertainty, and therefore one cannot be said to have found any more True than the other. What then makes science and its necessary skepticism so appealing to the human mind? I will use James' lecture and the works of Hume, Plato, and Epictetus in my essay.

Defining Free Will

espringer — 2007-12-11

In d'Holbach's essay System of Man’s Free Agency he suggests that man does not have free will because he is unable to dislocate external factors from his decision-making. D’Holbach argues that we lack this ability because our actions "are always the necessary consequences of [our] temperament[s]." He notes that there are both factors that we are aware of and those that affect our sub-conscious mind that influence our decisions and give meaning to our actions. According to d’Holbach, the fact that we have certain inclinations which it is out of our power to control implies that we do not have free will. Though I do not disagree with any aspect of d’Holbach’s logic, our perspectives differ at the most fundamental level—the definition of free will. I believe that the essential aspect of free will is our ability to make decisions that align with our desires. If we did not have desires, of what good would free will be? Though this perspective does not prove the existence of free will by d’Holbach’s standards, it clarifies the argument by stating an alternate definition for free will under more applicable terms.

The Virtue of Dissent

espringer — 2007-12-11

|As a matter of fact we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how or why. Mr. Balfour gives the name of 'authority' to all those influences, born of the intellectual climate, that make hypotheses possible or impossible for us, alive or dead...We see into these matters ["dead" matters, or matters which we all believe in] with no more inner clearness, and probably with much less, than any disbeliever in them might possess. His unconventionality would probably have some grounds to show for its conclusions; but for us, not insight, but the prestige of the opinions, is what makes the spark shoot from them and light up our sleeping magazines of faith. Our reason is quite satisfied, in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of every thousand of us, if it can find a few arguments that will do to recite in case our credulity is criticised by some one else. Our faith is faith in some one else's faith, and in the greatest matters this is most the case. (Section III, p. 721-722)| James seems to be unwittingly upholding philosophical inquiry, in addition to challenging its vital assumptions of knowable objective evidence and certitude. James speaks of "dead hypotheses", which he suggests are dead in their hopeless opposition to often-groundless and unquestioned underpinnings of society, foundational to the realm of "live" hypotheses, in which "practical" innovation occurs, but are themselves quite fallible in their establishment, assigned a collective unshakeable faith that is a mere "faith in someone else's faith". I believe it is the duty of the philosopher to revive these "dead" assumptions and make them into "live" problems. Blind to the "prestige" of certain opinions—the social or psychological "authority" they command—philosophers are charged with subjecting the assumed—to which the weak-minded feel thoughtless allegiance—to a crucible.

The Problem of Personal Identity Over Time

espringer — 2007-12-11

To what extent can one's existence be defined by a continuous and cohesive identity? What are the consequences if we were to consider identity to be mere human pretense? In one corner, there is a doctrine that holds that human identity remains constant, at least in a significant way, throughout one’s life. Among the most significant proponents of this view is John Locke, whose main criterion of identity was the continuity of one’s memory. On the other hand, there are many philosophers who challenge this view of identity, albeit optimistic. To them, the concept of identity is a mere construction, and has no grounding in objective reality. One of the significant proponents of this view that we read was David Hume with his essay "Of Personal Identity". Other proponents include Martin Heidegger and Friedrich Nietzsche. Sources: Hume, David. Of Personal Identity. Hume, David. Second Thoughts.

Hobbes, Kant, and predictions Comment 2006-02-28 09:43:57

espringer — 2007-12-11

I do agree with your statement "...Hobbes really does prevail in the present time." However I disagree with the implications of you next statement "However, in reality, the sheer number of traits a person possesses makes it impossible to use a strict rubric to predict possible actions." To me it seems that you imply that we should not try to predict people's actions, since it is impossible to do because there are too many traits to base it off of. Nevertheless, I think to in extent we can predict possible actions. We could predict that the poor man may rob the other man, and that a rich man would not rob the other man. Separately traits can be used to predict possible things people may do. But it is impossible to predict exactly what a person will do, but we can make an educated guess.

3/02

espringer — 2007-12-11

Note: abstracts should ''not'' be tagged with {{{2/28}}}; they should be tagged with your login name and <>. ''Strawson, March 2 (tagged {{{3/02}}}) //(Please make sure to include the zero!)//:'' <>

Feels like Free Will (Free Will Comes Naturally)

espringer — 2007-12-11

In short, the actions of man are never free; they are always the necessary consequence of his temperment, of the received ideas, of the notions either true or false, which he as formed to himself of happiness: of his opinions, strengthened by example, forfeited by education, consolidated by daily experience. (p.4) |Man, then, is not a free agent in any one instant of his life; he is necessarily guided in each step by those advantages, whether real or fictitious, that he attaches to the objects by which his passions are roused (p.4 d'Holbach, System of Man's Free Agency)| In d'Holbach's "Of the System of Man's Free Agency" he describes the falsehood in which people live their lives under the impression of having free will. d'Holbach asserts that our actions reflect self serving motives, however this does not illustrate free will. Acting in response to the 'necessary consequence' of our temperment may suggest that the idea of survival, or what we need to be happy controls us as individuals, not our free will. The difference, then between free will and human nature may come into question out of d'Holbach's argument, however he believes that this inherent human principal of doing what is best for yourself is in response to circumstances beyond personal control, and therefore, free will cannot exist.

Objectionality vs. Determinism

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"Now it is certainly true that in the case of the abnormal, though not in the case of the normal, our adoption of the objective attitude is the consequence of our viewing the agent as incapacitated in some or all respects for ordinary inter-personal relationships"(Strawson, pp.129).| |"The same abnormal light which shows the agent to us as one in respect of whom the personal attitudes, the personal demand, are to be suspended, shows him to us also as one in whom the impersonal attitudes, the generalized demand, are to be suspended" (Strawson, pp.134).| Strawson states that a person who is deemed mentally deranged, or in some other way abnormal as compared to the general public, is viewed objectively because of a supposed "incapacitated" state. This means an abnormal agent that caused injury can be dismissed from reactive attitudes by the victim of injury, which adheres to the thesis of determinism. One can attribute this act of injuring to determinism and can then be rid of resentment or other such attitudes that might arise in a similar situation where the agent was 'normal'. Yet, the very idea that one can view only an abnormal person's actions objectively acknowledges that all relationships are not objective---on the contrary most are laden with human emotions and reactions.

Awareness of Our Actions, Does it Really Exist?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Well people often decide to do things, really intend to do what they do, know just what they're doinh in it: the reasons they think they have for doing what they do, often really are their reasons and not their rationalizations. (121)| |These simplifications are of use to me only if they helf to emphasize how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people- and particularly of some other people- reflect attitudes toward us of good will, affection, or esteem on the one hand or comtempt, indifference, or malevolence on the other. (123)| Strawson argues that according to the optimist's point of view, we act according to our feelings and that our intentions are direct because they match the thoughts that wander around in our heads. Contrastingly, determinism denounces this idea and states that individuals have no free will over their actions and never truly know what it is that they are doing due to outside forces. In essence, we simply act on impulse since we do not possess the ability to rationalize our actions. I would agree with the optimist's point of view in arguing that we are well aware of our actions because if we were not, then we would not often modify our behaviors in order to seek the approval of others.

Although subjective, possible determinism?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|If someone treads on my hand accidentally, while trying to help me, the pain may be no less acute than if he treads on it in contemptuous disregard of my existence or with a malevolent wish to injure me. But I shall generally feel in the second case a kind and degree of resentment that I shall not feel in the first. (123)| |We should consider also in how much of our behavior the benefit or injury resides in the manifestation of attitude itself. So it is with good manners, and much of what we call kindness, on the one hand; with deliberate rudeness, studied indifference, or insult on the other. (123)| Strawson illustrates the subjectivity of human attitude in certain situations. He also emphasizes the importance of the manner in which we interpret others' actions towards us and our reactions to them. Person A may hit Person B but Person B may not feel resentment if he interprets this action as "an unintentional mistake." Take for example that Person B never really liked Person A, and although Person B may credit the act as unintentional, would he react differently than if he had been close friends with the wrongdoer himself? Stawson would point out that the attitude itself would influence this particular victim's reaction, and already having this "negative attitude" about the wrongdoer, the fact that it was unintentional would make little difference. Could it be that Strawson sometimes slightly acknowledges a determinist outlook in the sense that events that happen have been doomed to occur becuase of prior events?

Incapacitated

espringer — 2007-12-11

|He is thus incapacitated, perhaps, by the fact that his picture of reality is pure fantasy, that he does not, in a sense live in the real world at all; or by the fact that his behaviour is, in part, an unrealistic acting out of unconcious purposes; or b the fact that he is an idot..." (129).| If one cannot be sure of the true motives of anyone but one's self, and sometimes even these are unclear, it is presumptuous of Strawson to claim that those who act outside of society's perception of normal interactions are "incapacitated." Each person's interpretation of acceptable behavior is in some way dependent on past experiences and internal regulation. Just because someone appears to have a lesser ability to interact socially, it is difficult to say with confidence that another is truly "incapacitated," without the ability to see all of that person's (possibly particularly calculated) motives clearly.

The Worth of Skepticism Comment 2006-03-01 21:33:50

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like how you group the "unsubstantiated beliefs" into a group of "beliefs" themselves. Am I understanding you correctly that you are implying that "truth" is that which fits into the beliefs man creates and chooses to believe? If so, could it be possible that the scientist himself is wrong if we do not believe in his discovery of truth? This idea is related to yours, and it would be nice if you could expand on that.

Shaking the Fence Comment 2006-03-01 21:39:38

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with you that passions conflict, this seems an unavoidable phenomenon. When they conflict, however, we either remain in indecision, forever weighing our options (which, as inaction, is an option in itsself) or we go with whichever path seems the most logically sound or with whichever emotion or passion eventually overcomes the others. In effect, no matter what we do, even if we do nothing, we are making a decision.

Do Not Doubt Free Will Comment 2006-03-01 21:58:58

espringer — 2007-12-11

While I would agree that we may be capable of convincing ourselves of beliefs according to what we want them to be, is this always the case? Can we convince ourselves that we have three arms when we only have two? While this may be possible for some, it is highly improbable. And if we are capable of controlling what we believe in such a fashion, did we really wholly believe it in the first place?

set of standards Comment 2006-03-01 22:48:04

espringer — 2007-12-11

You pose some very perplexing questions in you piece. I think it is difficult to say, whether there should be a universal standard for truth, if there is such a thing as universal truth. It seems as though we could consider what is truth to be verifiable, through testing and experiencing. Some of our truths, which we accept, are actually based on faith. Faith in what others ave told us is true.

Should truth change our world?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The human commitment to participation in ordinary interpersonal relationships is, I think, too thoroughgoing and deeply rooted for us to take seriously the thought that a general theoretical conviction might so change our world that, in it, there was no longer any such things as inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them; and being involved in inter-personal relationships as we normally understand them precisely is being exposed to the range of reactive attitudes and feelings that is in question. (pg. 129)| |we are not to suppose that we are required, or permitted, as philosophers, to regard ourselves, as human beings, as detached from the attitudes which, as scientists, we study with detachment.(pg. 141)| Strawson states that human participation, whatever degree it takes, in interpersonal relationships is too deeply ingrained in human beings to allow the thesis of determinism, whatever it may be, to impede upon such an integral and everyday occurrence. Yet if determinism was somehow proven beyond a doubt to be complete truth, would it not be wise to integrate the implications of determinism into our relationships with others, however this could be done? What is more vital, truth or human relationships? Strawson might argue that while truth isn't something at which to scoff, the adaptation of this demonstrated human persistence of bonds with others would disregard a portion of the truth of what it means to be human.

Determinism has feelings, too.

espringer — 2007-12-11

|These simplifications are of use to me only if they help to emphasize how much we actually mind, how much it matters to us, whether the actions of other people- and particularly of some other people- reflect attitudes towards us of goodwill, affection, or esteem on the one hand or contempt, indifference or malevolence on the other. (p. 123)| Strawson argues in the beginning of his piece whether or not determinism may be true. He leaves this largely unresolved, but leans toward determinism not being entirely true. He then outlines two attitudes that he suggests people adopt in different situations: objective and participant attitudes. Both must be used with caution, however, since an objective attitude may detract meaning from actions, and a participant attitude my place more meaning on actions. Strawson believes that moral responsibility is not removed by determinism except for in special cases. This might not be the case, however, since if determinism were true, we would still lack the insight to see the causes behind all actions, thus we could still be upset by them.

human vs logical action

espringer — 2007-12-11

Strawson clearly delineates a disparity between objective and subjective action as something that may sometimes be integrated but most often are highly opposed to one another. Very specific requirements are needed to transition to an objective viewing of another human being, the main necessity being the lack of expected human reactions to communicate. Instead all interaction must pass through a filter used to 'translate' the interaction from how we would normally interpret it into how we will objectively interpret it. Strawson however does not really delve into the issue of rational thought and how it integrates with 'normal' human action, as normal human interaction is a very complicated and irrational method of behavior. When we encounter a problem, like a person who does not act 'normal', we switch to an objective view because we have learned it is the best method to solve problems.

justice and efficacy

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Some optimists about determinism point to the efficacy of the practices of punishment, and of moral condemnation and approval, in regulating behavior in socially desirable ways. In the fact of their efficacy, they suggest, is an adequate basis for these practices; and this fact certainly does not show determinism to be false (p.120).| Strawson analogizes optimists and pessimists with both sides of the determinism debate. He proposes a hypothetical objection using the justice system, citing our punishment system as problematic because all events are causally determined and out of one's own responsibility. While he answers this objection by arguing that the system remains effective and is therefore worth keeping around, I would disagree with this point, and argue that although it is the fundamental regulation of social behavior, it is not a complete solution to the problem. It is certainly a form of compromise, yet I would not consider it entirely efficacious. Since I do not think this objection is sufficiently rebutted, I am reluctant to subscribe to the optimistic view of determinism.

Not mutually-exclusive

espringer — 2007-12-11

|...there is a sense of 'determined' such that (1) if determinism is true, all behaviour is determined in this sense, and (2) determinism might be true, i.e., it is not inconsistent with the facts as we know them to suppose that all behaviour might be determined in this sense, and (3) our adoption of the objective attitude towards the abnormal is the result of prior embracing of the belief that the behaviour, or the relevant stretch of behaviour, or the human being in question is determined in this sense. (Freedom and Resentment, 130)| |...we cannot, as we are, seriously envisage ourselves adopting a thoroughgoing objectivity of attitude to others as a result of theoretical conviction of the truth of determinism....when we do in fact adopt such an attitude in a particular case, our doing so is not the consequence of a theoretical conviction which might be expressed as 'Determinism in this case', but is a consequence of our abandoning, for different reasons in different cases, the ordinary inter-personal attitudes. (Freedom and Resentment, 130)| Strawson claims that objectivity both stems from and creates a sense of determinism, arguing that the human need for emotional connection will eventually subsume this deterministic objectivity, making 'determinism' ultimately moot. Unlike Strawson, I don't believe that inter-personal relations and objectivity are mutually exclusive. For instance, a parent, although loving hir child, might recognize that ze is disabled, a stereotypical deterministic situation in which the child could not help but be formed by outside influences. That parent may be fully capable of objectively operating with that child's disability while maintaining that profound personal connection. Such situations exemplify that determinism is not a moot point, because Strawson has not effectively proven that human connection and objectivity (thus, determinism) are mutually exclusive.

The Will to Truth Comment 2006-03-02 08:52:20

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think the way you phrased your conclusion, "because faith in cosmic lucidity is so deeply comforting, skepticisim is more consistent with the goal of arriving at honest truth" perfectly describes that which drives so many people to believe in a higher power. Faith for the simple point of faith; it's like the spiritual version of praxis. However, I also think that while it is easy for people to hide behind their passional natures and use their desire to believe to inform conviction itself, people similarly tend to hide behind academic reasoning, using logic to confiscate all that is not easily explained through intellectual reasoning. Is there really nothing in the world that we cannot say, "We don't know how this exists, but there is simply a sense that it does and hopefully, someday, we'll better understand"? By this line of reasoning, people never would have pursued what are now considered to be areas of hard science. Also, going back to James' claim about passional nature, there is often that within us that senses something before our logical mind can fully comprehend. The sense one has when ze feels someone staring at hir, although ze cannot see them. The immediate awareness of the inter-personal energy in a room that one walks into, that instantaneous assessment of the emotional dynamics. These abilities, while perhaps not precisely ascribing to what James would deem to be our 'passional nature,' do resemble it in that they are the ability to sense and understand that which is not directly logical. Perhaps, in that way, people's collective sense about the existence of God is not able to be explained away. Perhaps we do, in fact, need to rely a bit on our passional nature in order to complement our capabilities with logic and generate fuller understanding. I'm just not sure the relationship between the two is an either-or.

Reverse reasoning?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The object of these commonplaces is to try to keep before our minds something it is easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy, especially in our cool, contemporary style, viz. what it is actually like to be involved in ordinary inter-personal relationships (p. 124)| Perhaps sometimes we do get too abstract in our dealings with things of a philosophical nature, but does not the abstract objective nature explain away "what it is actually like" as a result of our limited/subjective perception of the issue at hand? By focusing on what it is actually like, are we not confining ourselves to our individual limited perspective? Strawson might respond that no, we are instead working to understand this limited perspective so that we can put it in terms of our greater more objective perspectives (which will consider our own limited perspective in terms of a greater context, and thus providing a secondary method of judgment/analysis; i.e. philosophy).

Thought and Association

espringer — 2007-12-11

What is thought? Do we think with words, or do we think first and find the words afterwards? Early in our development, as infants, does thought precede language, or is the converse the case? Hume's basic laws of association spell out the nature of thought, but perhaps they also define thought itself. Perhaps thought is just one large web of association, built upon layers and layers of pattern recognition. Language itself is learned a word at a time, slowly building associations between sounds or written words with sensory experiences. Is it possible that logic and rationality is nothing more than a matter of semantics? When one commits an irrational or illogical act, maybe one is ignoring the accepted associations and instead bridging connections where there are none. Descartes doubts the senses, but if all of our associations are based upon and formed from sensory information, then does that make human pattern recognition -- and thus thought -- a fallacy as well? Is there such a thing as an act informed purely by sensory information? Is it possible to dispel the complex webs, the superstructures of association, without paralyzing the self? I intend to draw on Descartes, Hume, and Strawson.

Should truth change our world? Comment 2006-03-03 18:45:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

Holding off for the moment any consideration of whether the thesis of determinism can be adequately proven, you take issue with Strawson's insistence that whatever be that truth, it ought have no effect on the human interpersonal relationships. Surely, a truth so monumental must have an effect on our behavior. Perhaps Strawson holds human relationships to be a still higher truth. To strengthen the commentary, consider giving an argument for why it would "be wise to integrate the implications of determinism into our relationships with others".

3/07

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Frankfurt, March 7 (tagged {{{3/07}}}) //(Please make sure to include the zero!)//:'' <>

justice and efficacy Comment 2006-03-05 12:22:51

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think you might be on to something in bringing up the efficaciousness of the "justice system theory," however I'm not sure I see why you disagree with the optimists' premise. Perhaps you want to indicate how since the system is not so efficacious, it must be that some punishments are not simply environmental regulators of behavior? Also, I think you might want to consider how Strawson would react to your reasoning.

Although subjective, possible determinism? Comment 2006-03-05 15:44:55

espringer — 2007-12-11

You seem to have captured what the importance of reactive attitudes for Strawson, however, I am not quite sure I fully understand your objection. My understanding stumbles at the last part, when you question if Person A would react any differently towards Person B if they had been close friends. I don't really see what you’re going for. You do bring up a very good point about the possibility of "premeditated attitudes" which may influence our reactions to others without regard to their intentions. Also your last sentence seems a bit disconnected from the rest of your micro-essay, or perhaps I’m just missing your point.

Awareness of Our Actions, Does it Really Exist? Comment 2006-03-05 16:03:30

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm... I'm not sure your understand your interpretation of the optimist’s positions and I’m also not sure if such an interpretation quite captures what is in the text. The optimist basically believes that our notion of freewill should merely consist of "people doing what they wanted or intended to do". Thus if I ate some juicy tropical delights because I wanted to, I was free to eat some juicy tropical delights. Furthermore I am not sure if you’re presenting an accurate view of determinism, in fact what you state seems to resemble indeterminism rather than determinism. The determinist holds that all human actions just like all events have necessary causes, these causes don’t necessarily have to be unknown impulses. Also I think you should take another look at the context of your second quote, for it does not actually contain the optimist’s or the determinist’s position. Furthermore although it is perfectly reasonable to agree with a position in a text, for a micro-essay you should try to think up of potential objections or disagreements, in order to spark a back and forth dialogue. Hence it is good to state the position of the text clearly and accurately then move on to present a possible point of disagreement, then move on to respond to that disagreement from the viewpoint of the text.

Determinism has feelings, too. Comment 2006-03-05 16:16:03

espringer — 2007-12-11

I don't think you’re presenting a very fair interpretation of Strawson. Is he actually making any metaphysical claims? Or is he just commenting on what he views to be the basis of our ideas and beliefs regarding freewill. In fact Strawson might agree with you in regards to the human ability to know anything about the truth or falsity of determinism in the metaphysical sense. It may be good to take another careful look at the text, for the truth or falsity of determinism might be irrelevant to Strawson’s point. Also although it is good to state one’s beliefs, when it comes to philosophy it is even better to state the reasons why one believe they are true, that way you beliefs can be convincing to others.

Incapacitated Comment 2006-03-05 16:26:23

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make a very interesting point. Yes, it is a compeling point that perceptions are ultimately subjective and thus "reality", insofar as we only have access to it through our perceptions, is also subjective. However Strawson's claim regarding the condition of being incapacitated does not necessarily rest on an assumption that holds otherwise. For Strawson is not actually saying that the incapacitated have a false sense of reality, but that we view them as having a notion of reality that is significantly different from ours. Thus they are not incapacitated in the sense that they have a false view of reality, but that their view of reality is not consistent with the most common view of reality, thus we dub them as “incapacitated”. Whether we have a right to such a view is an interesting issue which you may choose to pursue further.

Not mutually-exclusive Comment 2006-03-05 16:38:10

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make a very good point. I would, however, articulate a bit carefully what you mean by determinism being moot. Furthermore perhaps human connections on an emotional level and the objective attitude are not mutually exclusive in regards to all relationships, but does not the parent have a precondition for being emotionally connected with a disabled child regardless of the attitude they choose take towards the child's action. Is not parental love, that is, the human connection between parent and child, unconditional? Hence a parent might be able to have an objective view of their child but still love their child because their relationship is based on an assumption of unconditional love of a parent towards a child. Could you befriend someone and become emotionally attached to them if you constantly viewed them as being determined?

Objectionality vs. Determinism Comment 2006-03-05 16:45:35

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm... I followed your argument till the last sentence, I'm not sure what you mean by "falsify determinism". I think Strawson argues that it affirms the anti-deterministic human attitude towards relationship, but it does not falsify determinism in a metaphysical sense. Also do you have an objection to Strawson? You seem to understand his argument very well, but it would be good to go beyond simply summarizing it. What is or rather what should be the relationship between the existence of determinism and our human attitudes?

Reverse reasoning? Comment 2006-03-05 16:53:53

espringer — 2007-12-11

You make an interesting distinction here, that is, the difference between "reality" and our perceptions of reality. I may be wrong but you seem to assume that our perceptions are necessarily excluded from access to “reality”. Thus our notion of “what it is actually like” is a misnomer because it only represents a certain perception of reality. However, I think many philosophers would object by saying that we do have access to reality and that we are not simply bound by our perceptions, which are necessarily disconnected from “what it is actually like”. Also I do not understand your last point in regards to Strawson's response. What do you mean by “put in terms of our greater more abstract [perspectives]”? If they are still perspective how does that help us? Also exactly how would such an abstraction be inconsistent with deductive reasoning?

Should truth change our world? Comment 2006-03-05 17:00:09

espringer — 2007-12-11

You have made a well constructed and clear micro-essay! It is true, it does seem that Strawson's argument ultimately rests on a certain definition of humanness and human nature, however, do we have to follow such a definition? What if our notion of what it means to be human is simply misguided and perhaps primitive? With the discovery of evidence which is contradictory to our old notion of humanness, why not develop a new definition?

human vs logical action Comment 2006-03-05 17:08:31

espringer — 2007-12-11

You seem to be on to a very deep issue here, however your writing is at times a bit hard to follow. It is true that Strawson does not explore why human beings have they nature they do, that is, why we have and switch between two modes of viewing others. You provide a very intriguing reason for the development of the objective attitude, but can you provide any evidence for its truth? You're making a very good point here, it would help me greatly if you could state it a little more directly and explicitly.

justice and efficacy Comment 2006-03-05 17:18:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

You're on to a good point, however, I’m not sure I agree with you interpretation of the optimists positions. The optimist is not using the efficacy of punishment to support the conclusion of determinism, but rather, using the efficacy of punishment in preventing harmful behavior to support the use of punishment. Given certain assumption of determinism, since all acts are casually determined, it seems problematic or unjust to condemn and punish others for acts for which they are ultimately not responsible. However, in order to respond to such an objection regarding the unjustness of condemnation and punishment under a determinist view of metaphysics, the optimist might say that although punishment may in a way unjust, it is effective in preventing harmful behavior and is thus still justifiable. Hence the optimist’s position regarding determinism does not really rest upon the efficacy of punishment.

Fact or Fallacy? Comment 2006-03-05 22:57:14

espringer — 2007-12-11

It is indeed very unsettling to think that since we create our own reality, perhaps what we see as real might be vastly different from the "reality" of the person next to us. I'm not sure, though, how this directly affects justice and the concept of right and wrong. Do you mean to then say that a criminal should not be convicted if zi proclaims zi was only doing what was right in hir eyes? It would be interesting to see where the social contract plays in to this argument, since that philosophy implies a fundamental concept of right and wrong upon which everyone agrees.

Wishful Thinking? Comment 2006-03-06 00:28:15

espringer — 2007-12-11

You might have mistaken my intent. I did not say that the concept of responsibility does not exist. Certainly this idea does exist in our minds, and is such a large foundation of our society. What I called into question was Chisolm's definition of responsibility, which he used to argue about determinism. My contention was that instead of this responsibility invalidating both determinism and indeterminism, it's incompatibility with both suggests that this definition of responsibility does not hold water.

Shaking the Fence Comment 2006-03-06 00:35:29

espringer — 2007-12-11

Indeed, as you say, inaction is a decision in itself. Perhaps then the fence sitters really are in conflict, instead of, as James claims, having already chosen to disbelieve.

Conceivability is not Reality

espringer — 2007-12-11

|My conception of the freedom of the will appears to be neutral with regard to the problem of determinism. It seems conceivable that it should be causally determined that a person is free to want what he wants to want. If this is conceivable, then it might be causally determined that a person enjoys a free will.... On the other hand, it seems conceivable that it should come about by chance that a person is free to have the will he wants.... Perhaps it is also conceivable... for states of affairs to come about in a way other than by chance or as the outcome of a sequence of natural causes... then it is also possible that a person should in that third way come to enjoy the freedom of the will. (Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person", p. 182-183)| The main advantage expounded for Frankfurt's thesis of the freedom of will is its compatibility with both a deterministic and indeterministic view of reality. Compatibility with determinism seems to hinge on the 2nd-order desires being causally determined by the agent. Yet the determinist may argue that these desires are fully determined by internal and external factors. Frankfurt may retreat up to 3rd-order desires, and the determinists may still follow. In the end, both explanations seem equally compelling. Therefore, that Frankfurt's interpretation is conceivable says nothing about its Truth. Does Frankfurt have firmer ground for his claims, or are we to accept it simply because it makes us feel better about ourselves?

Exceptions to the Rule

espringer — 2007-12-11

|What distinguishes the rational wanton from other rational agents is that he is not concerned with the desirability of his desires themselves. He ignores the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he pursue whatever course of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his inclinations is the strongest. (Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, pg 174)| |The wanton... cannot or does not care which of his conflicting first-order desires wins out. His lack of concern... is due either to his lack of the capacity for reflection or to his mindless indifference... (Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, pg 175)| Frankfurt distinguishes person from wanton based upon the nonperson's inability to have second-order volitions. However, as some people never exercise their ability to want to will something, it could be said that while most dogs are not able to have second-order volitions, there may exist those rare few that do. If this is true, Frankfurt's definition of a person doesn't necessarily exclude nonhumans. One who believes that persons must be human might then object to this argument. Frankfurt would advocate these species-specific thinkers to consider that perhaps not only humans can enjoy and lack freedom of the will, and that the title of person may not be as exclusive as some like to think.

Same Problem, Higher Degree

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"It is only because a person has volitions of the second order that he is capable both of enjoying and of lacking freedom"(Frankfurt "Free Will")| |"...that a person enjoys freedom of the will means that he is free to want what he wants to want"(Frankfurt "Free Will")| Frankfurt asserts that freedom of the will exists only with non-wanton creatures, since only a non-wanton can have a preference as to which of the first order desires becomes volition. However, what if there is also conflict on the level of second order desires? Does this not mirror the initial problem of requiring a higher order in order to avoid indifference of choice that excludes free will? Frankfurt might reply that despite the theoretical possibility of higher degrees, there is a fundamental difference between first and second order desires that makes them most crucial; having second order desires, people enter the realm of conscious awareness, specifically, of first-order forces. A person also gains an understanding that ze has the potential power to influence hir first-order desires.

An Objection to Hume Comment 2006-03-06 22:00:37

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although it seems reasonable to think that identity rests in interpretation, affirming a set of beliefs about interpretation is still not really engaging with Hume's argument. After all, what Hume is likely to reply in response to your concern is that indeed, we "impose" a notion of identity, "apply the hue" of certain notions to our perceptions... but his question remains: does anything *justify* this interpretation? To say that it's an interpretation does nothing yet to address whether it is a reasonable interpretation. As usual, then, my advice is to take that extra step of charitable interpretation and imagine how an author might respond to your objection...

Beyond Perception Comment 2006-03-06 22:04:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

I'm pretty baffled about how your example here serves as an instance in which something is concluded on the basis of logic, in the absence of perceptions. To know that "I was in bed before I went to sleep" seems to require various perceptual notions... Furthermore, even if I trust the notion that a being just like me existed before and that an identical being existed afterwards, logic can only tell me that I existed *between* then and now if I already have a premise that (1) it *is the same* being I'm discussing, in two states before and after sleeping (because...?), and (2) nothing can cease to exist and then start to exist again. While both of these may be plausible, they require something more than logic, no? At any rate, I do suspect that Hume's manner of speaking above seems too quick: I know that I have no *evidence* that I existed while sleeping, perhaps... yet that is surely distinct from knowing that I did *not* exist.

Moral Responsibility

espringer — 2007-12-11

|It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all (pg. 181).| |This assumption does entail that the person did what he did freely, or that he did it of his own free will. It is a mistake, however, to believe that someone acts freely only when he is free to do whatever he wants or that he acts of his own free will only if his will is free... the will that moved him when he acted was his will because he wanted it to be, he cannot claim that his will was forced upon him or that he was a passive bystander to its constitution (pg. 181).| Frankfurt states that a person is morally responsible regardless of whether his will is free. He says people should only be held responsible for actions they made freely. Although one might not feel like ze should be held accountable for something not in hir control, Frankfurt's view differs, for even if one feels like ze does not have the power to change hir desires, Frankfurt implies that ze has the option of making a conscious decision to change hir will. So even when it seems like one cannot control hir desires, one has the authority to change hir will even if ze does not have the physical or mental strength to succeed in doing so.

Identity at a Second Look Comment 2006-03-06 22:09:53

espringer — 2007-12-11

Indeed, there are many intriguing ideas flying around here, but it's hard to see what the actual claim is. To say that there is something "essential" at the "core" is to suggest that something *does* stay the same even while various things change. Although someone's random associations *might* happen to stay the same even while the church changes, it would be odd to say that their association is what *makes* it the same church, since then the church would suddenly change if that person ceased thinking in that way. Crucial here is that Hume is interested in saying not what makes something "identical for me", but really what makes it identical *objectively*. Åt any rate, regardless of whether you lean towards or away from suggesting that there's an essence that remains unchanged, you should make room to reflect on how you expect Hume might respond to your ideas.

More than Imagination? Comment 2006-03-06 22:14:14

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although I think you're right in suggesting that it is imagination, for Hume, that gives us the idea of identity, it does not follow that "imagination is *CLEAR* in determining self-identity"; much of Hume's point is that when we go to figure out what exactly is being believed, it is not clear after all. ! At any rate, the second point you raise, which comes very late in your piece, might be worth focusing on. (If you had brought this idea up at the beginning, you could have followed through more directly on it.) As Russell notes, the likely response from Hume would probably involve some suggestion that others' ideas affect us *insofar as* we are exposed to those ideas, and thus we have impressions and sensations related to what others think. Thus, the fact that others always call me "Elise" is a feature of my *experience*, although even this feature of experience doesn't affect every single moment of my life, since in some moments I have no consciousness of what others call me... Are these the kinds of thoughts that would be worth exploring in revising your piece?

Perceiving Identity Comment 2006-03-06 22:20:11

espringer — 2007-12-11

As we discussed in class, my sense is that Hume is not so much *endorsing* the idea that small changes over time really *do* preserve identity (while large sudden changes do not); rather, he is *describing* the rather paradoxical way in which people use ideas such as "identity". If whether people *say* it's the same thing depends not at all on how *much* it has changed, but only on how *quickly*, then perhaps they are simply deceived into counting something as "the same" when its changes are too gradual to strike us all at once. ! I'm not quite sure what the function of your comparison to Descartes is... It seems that this is a somewhat distinct issue from whether change is gradual or sudden. Perhaps you could make it clearer... It's also not clear to me, by the end, whether you have a challenge or criticism for Hume (as the earlier "disconnect" language suggests), or whether you're endorsing Hume as more "logical" than Descartes...

Perception creates Reality Comment 2006-03-06 22:25:19

espringer — 2007-12-11

It seems you are appealing to a sort of Cartesian line of thought in your third sentence ("does not the fact that we do think, feel, love, and doubt require a real reference?") By a real "reference" I assume you mean a real *subject* to *do* the thinking, feeling, etc. Yet this is exactly what Hume questions: the existence of all the distinct mental phenomena (thinking going on here-now, doubting going on here-now, remembering going on...) do not give us the idea of a thing *behind* all of these. ! I'm also not sure what's going on in the last sentence, although it sounds interesting. Is it the idea that perception is our way of *knowing* what's real, but that we have no way of being sure that there isn't something *else*, beyond what we perceive? That idea -- that there might be something real that we have no way of perceiving -- strikes at the heart of Hume's approach. Yet his reply is surely that we have *no reason to believe* in something we cannot perceive. So, even if there may be such a thing, it cannot make sense to make any specific claims about it. If this is thet sort of problem you're thinking about, see if you can make it more central in your commentary...

Perceptions strengthen identity Comment 2006-03-06 22:38:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

As we discussed in office hours, the question of what the consequences might be of Hume's skepticism about the self is an interesting question. If you can place it more centrally in your commentary, then the next question would be: How is Hume likely to respond to the attempt to let our beliefs be influenced by ideas about the consequences of one belief or another? Is it possible that we could have practical reasons to believe in a self "behind" all the changes, in such a way that an *accurate* idea (say, of the frequent great similarity of perceptions across time) could not equally serve the practical purpose?

Simplicity of Perception Comment 2006-03-06 22:42:23

espringer — 2007-12-11

I wonder to what degree you see what you've written here as an *objection* to Hume, and to what degree you recognize your work as *amplifying* Hume's claims. Hume would certainly want to affirm, with you, that there is a certain mental "laziness" involved in our willingness to take merely similar and contiguous things to be identical. It is a more difficult and interesting question whether the desire to categorize is -- unlike laziness -- something we should support as useful. It seems Hume wants to suggest that in our everyday lives it's fine to use a "loose" concept of identity, but that we should simply be careful not to take it too seriously when we go to do philosophy and answer hard questions. Could the usefulness of categories and binaries be strong enough to override a more accurate conception of variation and difference even in our most careful and philosophical thinking?

The Self and How We Perceive Comment 2006-03-06 22:48:20

espringer — 2007-12-11

The form that your commentary currently takes is what I'd call a "confessional": after discussing Hume's view, you begin to announce what you believe, which conflicts with Hume's account. While there's nothing wrong with disagreement, a philosophical engagement with Hume's view will require doing more than testifying on behalf of a different view. *Why* should one believe that each of us has a "personal identity influenced by no external sources"? What evidence do we or could we have for such a notion? How could Hume respond to this suggestion? Technical writing notes: The word {{{bourn}}} is not the one you want in your second sentence. Also, do please refrain from using the generic male in your own voice. It's fine when quoting those who spoke or wrote in an older version of English, but "men" in today's English more clearly means male people.

Consistent Free Will

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires... humans may be more or less wanton; they may act wantonly, in response to first-order desires concerning which they have no volitions of the second order, more or less frequently. (Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, p. 173)| |In maintaining that the essence of being a person lies not in reason but in will, I am far from suggesting that a creature without reason may be a person. For it is only virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming aware of his own will and forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person's will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a rational being. (Harry Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, p. 174)| Frankfurt offers an interesting concept of free will that depends on the ability of a being to make assertions as to their wants and accordingly, their desires to have those wants. I do not believe, however, that humans have free will concerning some decisions and not others. Frankfurt claims that we are wantons if we do not care about our will. I do not think that such situations exist. On the contrary, I would claim that we choose to not care, or choose to not place value on that issue, therefore exercising our free will. If a being lacks the capacity to assess and valuate their wants, then they will not have it in some instances and not in others.

ThisPersonContributed

espringer — 2007-12-11

Other beings?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I shall call 'first-order desires' or 'desires of the first order', which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires (pg. 169).| |It is only if he does want to X that he can coherently want the desire to X not merely to be one of his desires but, more decisively, to be his will (pg. 172)| Frankfurt argues that a person is defined by having what he calls second-order volitions (desires to desire something and this desire brings something about). If a being doesn't possess this characteristic they are wontons. Most animals are wontons. A dog may desire not to want to eat food off the counter to please its owner, but ze might not be able to carry this desire through. If systematically trained not to eat the owner's food, can the dog's desire become a second-order volition? Frankfurt might acknowledge that the dog has some personhood when controlling hir desires but this is limited only to when ze knows punishment is involved. Is there a difference between having second-order volitions and conditioning that causes first-order-desires to shift?

Exceptions to the Rule Comment 2006-03-06 23:36:08

espringer — 2007-12-11

I don't see where the statement that a dog somewhere may exhibit second-order volitions, weakens Frankurt's argument. I could say that there may exist a dog that could recite shakespeare, but saying it does not make it possible and no one would believe me unless I produced an actual subject. In essence, I don't understand where you're going or coming from with your comment about dogs, but perhaps a solid example would strengthen your argument.

All Persons are Rational

espringer — 2007-12-11

|In maintaining that the essence of being a person lies not in reason but in will, I am far from suggesting that a creature without reason may be a person. For it is only in virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person's will presupposes accordingly, that he is a rational being (174, Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person). Frankfurt describes 'first-order desires' and 'second-order volitions' as a means to identify and illustrate what constitutes being a "person." Both animals and wantonsÃÂ have the capability to want to do something, and act freely in doing what they want, demonstrating first-order desires, however to have 2nd order desires is to want things and thinking about one's desires or awareness. In other words, they do not critically think or examine their desire and digress from indifference. Does Frankfurt's rationale refer to this awareness and does having second-order volitions and being a rational being go hand in hand? note: I had orginally revised this commentary on time, but realized today that I forgort to put the page number of the quotation

Perception creates Reality Comment 2006-03-06 23:54:48

espringer — 2007-12-11

My point in the third sentence was that if we hold causality to be true, then the perception that there is 'thinking going on here-now, doubting going on here-now, remembering going on here-now" implies that there is a a real subject that does the "thinking, doubting, remembering". That we do not perceive that subject directly does not matter, because causality tells us there *must* be a subject. However, the class discussions have brought me to a better understanding of Hume's notion of causality, that there is nothing necessary in the connection we make between an actor and the action. This, as you pointed out obliquely in your second paragraph, invalidates the core of my argument.

Awareness of Our Actions, Does it Really Exist? Comment 2006-03-07 00:43:33

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with what you are saying, but i disagree with the statement "determinism denounces this idea and states that individuals have no control over their actions and never truly know what it is that they are doing because there is no thought process or rationalization that takes place". Determinism does not say that we do not rationalize our thoughts and action it is that we do not have free will to make decisions that are not controled by outside forces.

Objectionality vs. Determinism Comment 2006-03-07 04:01:52

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think I'd mostly agree with Behdad's comments, as I too am somewhat confused by your final conclusion. I'd like to add the suggestion that you consider changing the phrase "falsify determinism". It appears that one of the main purposes of these micro-essays being so short is to show us just how often we may express ourselves imprecisely in subtle ways. In forming an argument, it is becoming clearer to me, every single word counts and that phrase comes off to me a bit heavy-handed. It isn't very charitable to determinists to suggest that a single sentence is capable of "falsifying determinism".

Controversial Reconciliation

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all...for the assumption that a person is morally responsible for what he has done does not entail that the person was in a position to have whatever will he wanted." (p. 181, Section IV)| |"It is a mistake, however, to believe that someone acts freely only when he is free to do whatever he wants or that he acts of his own free will only if his will is free. Suppose that a person has done what he wanted to do, that he did it because he wanted to do it, and that the will by which he was moved when he did it was his will because it was the will he wanted. Then he did it freely and of his own free will." (p.181, Section IV)| Frankfurt paradoxically claims that one can freely will that which one is unwittingly compelled to will. Despite this, one is responsible for one's will irrespective of whether the will is determined. Another possibility, in contrast, involves a sort of tension, where one is both responsible for and helplessly compelled to honor one's will. To illustrate the latter perspective: if determinism is correct, a person's will isn't hir will *because* "it was the will he wanted", as Frankfurt contends, but because of external circumstances—the condition of hir wanting the will is incidental. Frankfurt might respond that "supposing he could've had a different will" ze wouldn't have chosen differently—a valid point that keeps this issue in a state of tense ambivalence.

Determinism has feelings, too. Comment 2006-03-07 14:49:40

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your statement about objective and participant attitudes with regards to someone in a more distant relationship, but is it possible that in a closer relationship an objective attitude may provide more meaning than a participant attitude in that it stems from observations and past experiences as opposed to a participant attitude which is more emotional, and less rational?

Other beings? Comment 2006-03-07 17:08:46

espringer — 2007-12-11

I really like how you raised the issue of a "trained dog." It is in fact quite possible that a trained dog could make a second order desire a second order volition. But perhaps Frankfurt would argue that humans themselves would not need such "traning" to transfer their second order desires into second order volitions, but the dogs would. This, would only emphasize Frankfurt's point that humans have a different capacity of desires as opposed to animals, creating this "concept of a person."

Seperating Person From Wanton Comment 2006-03-07 22:05:38

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like how you raise the issue of the inherent inconsistency in people's thoughts/ rationalizations. I think this is an important point that Frankfurt does not directly address. I think that he would say, however, that since a being is capable and has had instances where it used a seond-order will in the past, must mean that they can be considered a person. Surely not all those who are considered to be persons have second order wills and volitions over every action.

Limited Free Will

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Above one half of human reasonings contain inferences of a similar nature, attended with more or less degrees of certainty, proportioned to our experience of the usual conduct of mankind in such particular situations. (p.76)| |The most irregular and unexpected resolutions of men may frequently be accounted for by those, who know every particular circumstance of their character and situation. (p. 73)| Hume tries to convince his reader of the predictability of human actions. He tries to break down human actions to an exact science. Although I mostly agree, that humans act in somewhat predictable ways in given circumstances, I think predictability is more feasible on a societal, not an individual level. Although the ultimate actions of two people may be identical, their motives may differ. Hume gives himself some room by acknowledging that there are exceptions to our predictions. He then says these exceptions have causes unto themselves that we do not realize. This seems to make sense, yet I do not believe that all actions, especially trivial ones, are guided by necessity. Thus, we at least have some free will, however limited. The idea of free will is a difficult one to prve either way. One may always say that there are couses behind all of our actions that we do not realize.

Consistent Free Will Comment 2006-03-08 15:34:22

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your statement that it is not possible for humans to have free will concerning only select decision, however I think Frankfurt's reasoning works well with Chisholm's idea of being a conscious mover. When you move you are affecting things that you could be aware of but most times you are not, the grass under your feet for example. The same could be said for a wanton, it is the absense of any valuation that proves his will is inconsequential, the very act of consciously making a decision to not care is the work of the will.

Nonaversive techniques

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Until recently teaching was almost entirely aversive: the student studied almost entirely aversive: the student studied to escape the consequences of not studying but nonaversive techniques are gradually being discovered and used. The skillful parent learns to reward a child for good behavior rather than punish him for the bad. (33)| |The literature of dignity conflicts here with the literature of freedom, which favors a reduction in aversive features of daily life, as by making behavior less arduous and painful, but a concern for personal worth sometimes triumphs over freedom from aversive stumulation....In this conflict however, freedom usually wins over dignity (57)| Skinner claims that aversive techniques are slowly diminishing in society. Nowadays, parents reward their children more often for the good they do rather than punish them for the bad they do. Children do not behave well in order to escape the consequence of not behaving well. They behave well in order to receive their "reward." If a child starts behaving well everyday, and the parent runs out of rewards or decides to decrease greatness of the reward, the child may begin to feel unmotivated. "If I behave well, I get nothing so why should I behave well? If I behave badly there will be no punishment." If all of society would begin to exercise these nonaversive technques, it would be doomed to fall apart and dignity would become extinct. Perhaps this perspective is best illustrated in the "parents raising their children scenario." In distinct other cases, such as in gambling, the nonaversive technique of presenting the gambler with sproradic and randomly timed rewards may motivate the gambler even more.

The Capacity To Do What We Want

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The extent to which human aggression exemplifies innade tendencies is not clear, and many of the ways in which people attack and thus weaken or destroy the power of intentional controllers are quite obviously learned. (Skinner, 30)| |Other traditional theories could conceivably be said to define freedon as a person's condition when he is behaving under nonaversive control, but the emphasis has been upon a state of mind associated with doing what one wants. (Skinner, 32)| |A person wants something if he acts to get it when the occasion arises (Skinner, 37)| Skinner argues that the only instance in which we truly have desires, is when we are willing to go out of our way to attain what we want. We act according to our innate tendencies, which can be aversive without trying or intentional, which is the most common way for humans to behave, since we ultimately operate in a way that will be beneficial to ourselves. Therefore, we should be responsible for our actions since we possess freedom. According to Skinner, this also represents a state of mind which entails doing what we want. Thus, we are always aware of our intentions and must be held accountable.

Definition of Freedom

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"'It is better to be a conscious slave than a happy one'" (Skinner, p.39).| |"The literature of freedom has been designed to make men 'conscious' of aversive control, but in its choice of methods it has failed to rescue the happy slave" (Skinner, p.40)| Skinner identifies different aspects of what defines freedom, including the relinquishing of intentional aversive control. In terms of the happy slave, Skinner is stating his belief that one can exist under aversive control and perhaps be happy and free within the mind as long as unaware. Literature concerning freedom has not affected the slave, and has not ingrained in hir a yearning for literal freedom, or any urge to rebel against hir master. However, it would seem that the happy slave is happy not because ze has transcended the ideas within freedom literature and remained happy despite these but rather that ze is ignorant of an option besides slavery. It seems to me that ignorance truly is bliss, and if one can be a happy slave unconscious of hir status and of the literature proclaiming freedom then that is enough to be free.

Science Can Enhance Dignity

espringer — 2007-12-11

|In this conflict, however, freedom usually wins out over dignity. (p. 57)| |...the behavior we admire is the behavior we cannot yet explain. Science naturally seeks a fuller explanation of that behavior; its goal is the destruction of dignity. (p. 58)| Skinner makes several true and telling observations in his piece on the nature of freedom and dignity and their relation to each other. Most of his observations appear true, yet some are only partially so. Some unexplainable behavior may well be admired, yet it also in some cases may not be admired. To some, the thought of irrational behavior in humans may be fearsome, for instance psychopathic killers. Also, Skinner claims that advances in technology make certain actions less commendable. This, again, is only partly true. While technology makes it easier for anyone to do complex math, a superb mathematical mind will use technology as a tool to help enhance their capability. In that case, the action is very admirable.

Although subjective, possible determinism? Comment 2006-03-08 19:59:36

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that a pre-conceived attitude towards another person can influence our interpretations about their actions towards us, even to the extent that the action itself is of little signifigance, however I am also confused about Strawson suggesting determinism. Is it possible that you think that these previously formulated attitudes are ineviteble, that people will hate who they will hate and there is nothing that can be done, somewhat like a deterministic outlook that things that happen have already been decided to occur?

Subjective Credit

espringer — 2007-12-11

|We recognize a person's dignity or worth when we give him credit for what he has done. The amount we give is inversely proportional to the conspicuosness of the causes of his behavior. If we do not know why a person acts as he does, we attribute his behavior to him. (pg. 58)| Skinner states that in the absence of explanations for ones actions, we attribute ones behavior to oneself. An example being when one commits truly random kind acts. Yet, in apparent opposition to Skinner's claim, we would not attribute ones behavior to oneself if one killed with the same lack of explanation or motive. We tend to give such an individual credit only for being crazy. Skinner might respond by stating that in such cases, the behavior we do not understand is experienced to have negative consequences and requires no reinforcement and that if we were somehow to value such actions, as we typically value kindness, we would, indeed, offer praise and in this process, attribute ones behavior to oneself.

The Freedom Within Addiction Comment 2006-03-08 22:13:46

espringer — 2007-12-11

Instinctually, I agree with you that people have the option (i.e. free will) and may thus be held responsible. The possiblity remains, however, that the ability to have second order volitions is more readily available to some than to others. If some human beings are prone to obey their second order volitions, and others (wantons) are naturally or genetically inclined to merely follow impulses, then it would seem unfair to hold wantons just as morally responsible for their actions as their more calculating counterparts.

Quantifying Choice

espringer — 2007-12-11

|A slave driver induces a slave to work by whipping him when he stops; by resuming work the slave escapes from the whipping (and incidentally reinforces the slave driver's behavior in using the whip). (p. 28)| |When a bit of behavior is followed by a certain kind of consequence, it is more likely to occur again. (p. 27)| Skinner reduces the slave-master relationship to a simple law of conditioning. But a response on the part of the oppressed such as non-violent resistance illustrates that the messiness of consciousness cannot be codified into such a clear formula. The slave may choose to passively refuse work, effectively increasing hir pain. Skinner would contend that even this choice represents a means of avoiding pain, in which the slave anticipates a greater ultimate reward by forgoing immediate alleviation. However, non-violence involves a willingness through compassion to incur suffering, as well as an appeal to the master to abandon his relationship of oppression in favor of a higher normative value. Skinner's framework does not seem rich enough to account for such concepts.

Wanting Equals Acting?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|A person wants something if he acts to get it when the occasion arises, (37).| The vagueness of the term "want" can lead to confusion, and the following train of thought. A person may very much want something but not act when the occasion arises. This notion of want being converted into action regards persons as slaves to their desires. It ignores the concept of second order volitions, and of priority. Also, he may have the option of acting to get one thing he wants, or waiting to act in order to get something he wants more. Therefore, if he does not act, it is entirely possible he still wants that particular something. The term "want" seems vague enough that it could include first order desires. Skinner argues, however, that we can override those desires with second order volitions. This fact makes it unlikely that Skinner is implying we are slaves to our wants, but if he is to use this term, its meaning in this context should be further explained.

Controversial Reconciliation Comment 2006-03-08 22:42:08

espringer — 2007-12-11

I think your implication of a tension between being responsible for and victimized by the will is intriguing, but I'm confused by one detail: you write "the argument that one's will being determined or not is relevant to moral responsibility." Did you mean "irrelevant?"

Species Admiration

espringer — 2007-12-11

|From time to time, advances in physical and biological technology have seemed to threaten worth or dignity when they have reduced chances to earn credit or be admired. (56)| |There may seem to be no compensating gain when dignity or worth seems lessened by a basic scientific analysis, apart from technological applications. (58)| Skinner uses the example of medical advances as lessening the ability for a patient to 'suffer quietly' to gain the admiration of others. There is however another side to people that is closely related to Skinners idea of working for commendation; when a medical advance is widely used to better people's lives, the general population tend to admire their own race for its capability to invent such great things. This kind of species admiration benefits society as a whole because, while there may have been one inventor, the invention itself derived from a human and is appreciable by everyone and therefore necessarily ties members of species closer together. The myth of progress is the most high order form of this admiration.

operant disaster

espringer — 2007-12-11

|The aggressive behavior is not necessarily directed toward the actual source of stimulation; it may be displaced toward any convenient person or object (p.29).| |Many people have submitted to the most obvious religious, governmental, and economic controls for centuries, striking for freedom only sporadically, if at all (p.31).| Skinner suggests that while operant conditioning is effective, its repercussions are unpredictable and must be monitored to prevent negative ramifications from occurring. He cites one of the unpredictable effects as displacing aggression on unsuspecting neighbors. If this is true, and operant conditioning works as well as Skinner believes, should we not be more worried about possible global side effects? Following his rules, one attacked nation would logically attack a peaceful neighbor, citing displaced aggression as the cause. This system would be understandably catastrophic. While I believe conditioning is a powerful tool that should not be written off, the side effects, as in whenever human nature is manipulated, should be closely studied before the methods are employed on a grand scale.

Not mutually-exclusive Comment 2006-03-08 23:55:18

espringer — 2007-12-11

I completely agree with your assertion that determinism and objectivism are not mutually exclusive, and your example of a disabled child is well suited to support this claim. However, I interpreted Strawson's point to be made within more rigid confines; his idea that determinism is a moot point is based on his assertion that total and complete objectivity between humans would be an impossibility. Although humans are capable of exercising both objectivity and emotional interactions, I interpreted Strawson to mean that determinism can only exist in conditions where absolute objectivity does in flact exclude emotion; in this case determinism is a moot point, as illustrated by your example, for even when presented with the perfect situation in which to act objective, parents of a disabled child still exhibit emotional attachment.

human vs logical action Comment 2006-03-09 00:15:53

espringer — 2007-12-11

I largely agree with your commentary, but one quick thing: is it that Strawson is saying that, by being objective, it's difficult to communicate or it's different to be in relationship with someone? I believe that his point is that, while one can communicate effectively and in a much more clearly diagnostic manner when one takes the objective view, that the humanity of the interaction, the relationship itself, is lost. I feel like there's a larger claim here. Also, how do you feel about Strawson's theory that the two ways of being cannot peacably coexist, that we must be eternally switching back and forth between human and logical action, his sense that there simply is not, and maybe cannot be, a combination of the two?

3/09

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Skinner, March 9''<>

PersonForm

espringer — 2007-12-11

---- ''Commentaries already tagged as revised:'' <>''Original commentary submissions (not yet tagged as revised):'' <>''Comments you've made on other items:'' <>

The extent of free will

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"..you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you must run to the ship, leaving them and regarding none of them. But if you are old, never go far from the ship: lest, when you are called, you should be unable to come in time." (Enchiridion, 7)| |"Remember that you are an actor in a drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it." (Enchiridion, 17)| Family, is very important. No higher power ought to have the right to prioritze man's duties. This higher power cannot have such unwavering control over man, as Epicetus describes. We are somewhat in control of our fate, and the little decsions we choose to make, can greatly alter the "author's" orignial context. We are actors in a drama run both by us and the author. We should choose to show our emotions, knowing that we are not "bettering ourselves" in the long run, but pleasing ourselves in the short run. Epictetus could argue that we are in control of our emotions. Family may be in fact quite important to us, but we need to supress these passions, in order to better ourselves. Since we are not the actors of the author's drama, suppressing attatchment may make it easier to separate from your loved ones in the long run.

Augustine`s Comparison

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"But you admit that an eye is something good in the body, even though losing it does not interfere with living rightly. So don't you think that free will is a good, since no one can live rightly without it?" (23)| |"Hence, the goods that are pursued by sinners are in no way evil things, and neither is free will itself.." (25)| Augustine makes a comparison of free will to an eye. The "right" function of a freewill is to guide humans in their lives and to help them make moral decisions. In a parallel situation, the proper function of an eye is for it to see. The definition of "rightly" is somewhat vague. "Right" is taken to mean both "properly functioning and "morally just." Man, will not be able to live "properly" without free will, because then his choices in life will be controlled by a higher source, and he, himself, will have no influence. ! I do not believe that free will is good or bad. One could live both rightly and badly without it, in the sense that one could lead an evil or moral life depending on what one is destined to do. The manner in which an individual excerises free will, determines his or her nature. If nature determines personality, it would be possible that without free will, one would lack personality. However, sometimes, depending on the sitautions at hand, one cannot fully excersise free will without restrictions. Therefore, free will has its own implications, thus restricting the expression of our personalities.

Augustine`s Comparison Comment 2006-02-09 21:54:46

espringer — 2007-12-11

I am afraid I do not understand what you mean here. In the 3rd and 4th sentences of your first paragraph you state that "Man will not be able to live 'rightly' without free will", and that "he will not be able to lead a just life without free will". How is it, therefore, that you came to the conclusion in your second paragraph that "One could live both rightly and badly without [free will]"? ! I do like your assertion that it is our choices that determine who we are, instead of our nature determining our choices. What are its implications though? Perhaps you could expand on that thought a little more.

DateForm

espringer — 2007-12-11

(tagged {{{$1}}}): <>

The extent of free will Comment 2006-03-09 08:19:45

espringer — 2007-12-11

Your commentary here confronts Epictetus by defending claims that stand in contrast with the ones he makes. To engage as philosophically as possible, however, you'd want also to say something to address the premises and reasoning //behind// the priorities he defends. When you offer a contrary perspective, make sure that you present it not simply as your belief, but as something you can offer reasons to support. ! You also have significantly less text here than the assignment makes room for. So, you have more room to do things such as to anticipate a reply from Epictetus: What might he say in response to the suggestions you make? What can we learn through imagining a discussion between you and Epictetus?

anticipate a reply

espringer — 2007-12-11

Any charitable interpretation of a text requires not only that we reconstruct what an author's premises are, but also that we use clues from the text to develop a sense of how the author might reasonably reply to whatever objection we might imagine. To engage with a text in philosophy is to think of how it might //speak back// to us in ways that will challenge us and expand our understanding, whether or not we ultimately end up agreeing.

agree

espringer — 2007-12-11

Discussing "agreement" and "disagreement" is a tempting substitute for critical evaluation. Make sure that your comments, either about a philosophy text or about a seminar participant's work, do not settle for announcing agreement or disagreement. Please instead provide considerations that show what's plausible about an argument, or why we should raise doubts and objections in response to it.

Moral Responsibility Comment 2006-03-09 15:03:59

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree that it is only logical that if have no control over our will, we should not be held responsible for its right- or wrong-doings. Accusing someone of committing harm implies a conscious decision to act in that manner. However, is it not also possible that we just got the short end of the stick, and are stuck with a moral responsibility for that over which we have no control? In the end, someone has to take blame, otherwise we'd never make any progress at all.

operant disaster Comment 2006-03-09 22:45:33

espringer — 2007-12-11

I do agree that an attacked nation would not go about attacking some other nation but would probably retaliate against its attacker. In this example, the stimulation was an overt act of agression by the source of stimulation. Certainly the stimulation need not be overt, for example economic sanctions could potentially cause a nation to raid its richer neighbors, even though they are not the source of the stimulation. Perhaps Skinner would have something to say about all the mayhem we see in the Middle East nowadays.

Definition of Freedom Comment 2006-03-12 10:48:35

espringer — 2007-12-11

Although Skinner does state that freedom has often been conceptualized as merely the absence of overt negative reinforcement, I'm not sure I understand your point regarding Skinner's positions about servitude and literal freedom. What exactly do you mean by this? For Skinner, can human beings ever be really "free"? Also it might be a good idea to elaborate on the connection you draw between freedom and happiness.

Science Can Enhance Dignity Comment 2006-03-12 11:25:34

espringer — 2007-12-11

I'm not sure I agree with your interpretation of Skinner's notion of "behavioral technology". By the phrase "technology of behavior" , perhaps Skinner is referring both to our understanding of the causes of human behavior and the various techniques of controlling behavior. Thus a calculator might not qualify as part of the technology of behavior. A better example of technologies of behavior might be the various punishments and rewards used in a mathematics classroom. Furthermore although Skinner does state that a better understanding of human behavior might reduce the amount of admiration afforded to accomplished individuals, does he view this what should happen? For Skinner, is not the idea of dignity a misconception based on a misunderstanding?

The Capacity To Do What We Want Comment 2006-03-13 14:18:32

espringer — 2007-12-11

Skinner does seem to hold that human behavior is governed by certain innate tendencies, specially in regard to negative and positive reinforcement. However, I'm a little confused by what you're exactly trying to say. Also make sure you are differentiating between Skinner's position and his critique or representation of other theories, it seems to me you might be mistaking an idea Skinner is opposing for one of Skinner's actual ideas. Furthermore I'm a little unclear about the role of freedom in your argument, can you explicitly state the connection you see between Skinner's view of desires and his view of freedom?

Wanting Equals Acting? Comment 2006-03-13 14:27:21

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm... I'm not sure I agree with your interpretation of Skinner. I don't think Skinner is necessarily denying that human beings can have complex, sometimes contrary desires. Perhaps Skinner is simply defining "wanting" as a desire which motivates action. Thus for Skinner, if a second order volition overrides a first order desire, then the second order desire would simply be representative of a want. Furthermore even if he does present a simplified version of human desires, how does such a simplification affect his theory as a whole? Does his theory regarding human psychology necessarily rest on the complexities you accuse him of leaving out? If so, how?

operant disaster Comment 2006-03-13 14:38:01

espringer — 2007-12-11

Hmm you bring up and interesting point. However it seems important to make a distinction between that which Skinner describes as an aspect of human nature and that which he views as having moral authority. That is, although Skinner explains aggressive human behavior, does he view such behavior as what human beings should be doing? Furthermore are the negative side effects of operant conditioning necessary occurrences? Although systems of conditioning may have potential problems that would need working out, do such possible problems justify the abandonment of all conditioning? If yes, why? Is there any way to prevent such bad consequences from occurring?

3/28

espringer — 2007-12-11

''Sartre, March 28''<>

Nonaversive techniques Comment 2006-03-26 18:49:08

espringer — 2007-12-11

What about random acts of positive reinforcement, like in gambling? This technique keeps its subject curious and leaves the possibility of doing well open, so that ze will strive to do what ze should. I can understand how one might view the decrease in aversive techniques as a road to a chaotic society. As you said, I don't think the inadverse methods would be very effective if they were constant, but what if rewards were given for some good deeds?

Good by one is good for all?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|In creating the man that we want to be, there is not a single one of our acts which does not at the same time create an image of man as we think he ought to be... we can never choose evil.... We always choose the good, and nothing can be good for us without being good for all (p. 279).| |In choosing his ethics, he makes himself, and force of circumstances is such that he can not abstain from choosing one. We define man only in relationship to involvement (p. 293).| Sartre claims that we choose what we think is best for us and subsequently think that this is what is good for all people, which may not be true. Even so, it creates morals and expectations that we expect others to follow. These beliefs are embedded in our posterity. Each individual is responsible for hir own individuality and that of everyone else because in choosing what is good, we are also expecting others to do the same. We build ourselves on the expectations of the majority. Essence and human nature are predefined. It would be advantageous if what was good for one was actually good for all because then one's expectations of others to do good would be fulfilled.

ListCommentsOnThisOld

espringer — 2007-12-11

ListCommentsOnThis

espringer — 2007-12-11

Can Inter-Subjectivity Exist?

espringer — 2007-12-11

|Every configuration, even the Chinese, the Indian, or the Negro, can be understood by a Westerner. *Can be understood* means that by virtue of a situation that he can imagine, a European of 1945 can, in like manner, push himself to his limits and reconstitute within himself the configuration of the Chinese, the Indian, or the African. Every configuration has universality in the sense that every configuration can be understood by every man... There is always a way to understand the idiot, the child, the savage, the foreigner, provided one has the necessary information. (Sartre, Existentialism, pg 290)| Sartre defines an inter-subjectivity by which one ultimately decides what ze is while simultaneously realizing the being of others, based upon a shared value of human existence that transcends time and place, and can in some way be applied to all. However, even if this universal human condition exists, is it really possible for one to understand it? Of course, anyone can imagine being the African in 1945, yet can one be capable of truly understanding the radically different living situations of others? Sartre would reply that only to the extent one learns about others can this inter-subjectivity actually exist. This seems to suggest that one can only truly come to understand oneself through the understanding of others.

Definition of Freedom Comment 2006-03-27 15:53:56

espringer — 2007-12-11

I agree with your point that real freedom ultimately depends upon the mindset of the person, and that while to some cultures the lifestyle of another culture may not be free, yet the supposed repressed culture may feel complete freedom. However, I think that Skinner's argument championing the most realistic view is stronger, for when one is repressed, ze may think that ze is free, yet when exposed to literal freedom ze may become much happier, both literally and internally.

Reverse reasoning? Comment 2006-03-27 20:12:31

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like the quote that you use about getting wrapped up in the philosophy of things and losing track of what we are philosophising about. When in a relationship with someone, a person might philosophise about why ze loves the other person, or about why ze is feeling angry at hir while losing track of being present in the actual relationship. The person's perception of the relationship might be different than the relationship itself. I would recommend adding another sentence at the beginning of your commentary to summarize Strawson's ideas before posing questions about them. When you say more abstract perspectives, do you mean broader, less focused ones (like stepping back from the situation at hand)?

Species Admiration Comment 2006-03-27 20:54:04

espringer — 2007-12-11

I like your point about medical advances and how these advances could make people feel closer together through a pride of the human race (species admiration). However, I am not sure that I agree with your conclusion. You say that the medical advancement is appreciable by everyone, but does everyone in the world have access to the latest medical advancements? More people in the western world have access, but even here there are large discrepencies between the medical care of rich white people and working class immigrants. Could these medical advancements in fact separate the human race by dividing the people who have access to them from the people who do not?

Passion and Responsibility

espringer — 2007-12-11

|"The existentialist does not believe in the power of passion. He will never agree that a sweeping passion is a ravaging torrent which fatally leads a man to certain acts and is therefore an excuse. He thinks that man is responsible for his passion" (Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialsim, pg. 282).| Sartre asserts that people are responsible for their passions, contradicting the nature of passion. Passions are by definition passive, and occur with or without a person's consent. Certain passions seem so potent that they blind an individual to reason and supersede conscious control. Sartre might reply that although the initial appearance of a passion may be uncontrollable, the subjective experience of that initial passion is created, molded, and controlled by a series of conscious decisions. Thus, a person is responsible for hir experiences and subsequent actions. However, with regards to a condition such as kleptomaniacy, it is clear that a person has uncontrollable impulses on which ze acts, even if they contradict hir pronounced values. Clearly, there are "passions" that are not within our grasp to shape.